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10 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2023Courts should "avoid statutory interpretations that 'lead to absurd or unreasonable results.'" State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)). 2023Courts should "avoid statutory interpretations that 'lead to absurd or unreasonable results.'" State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gillgreen2 sentences2023Courts should "avoid statutory interpretations that 'lead to absurd or unreasonable results.'" State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)). 2023Courts should "avoid statutory interpretations that 'lead to absurd or unreasonable results.'" State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 369 (2005) (quoting State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444 (1966)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Regisgreen2 sentences2023Where the textual analysis and extrinsic aids both fail to resolve ambiguity, the rule of lenity "requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant." State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451 (2011). 2023Where the textual analysis and extrinsic aids both fail to resolve ambiguity, the rule of lenity "requires that the ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant." State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451 (2011). | 2 | 2 |
In Re the Guardianship of DMHgreen2 sentences2015See D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 383 , 736 A.2d 1261 (“Courts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect.”) Thus, we conclude that the textual analysis advanced by E.D.-O. is simply out of step with the legislative intent of the statute. *188 E.D.-O.’s approach deviates from several opinions of this Court and the Appellate Division. 2015See D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 383 , 736 A.2d 1261 (“Courts need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect.”) Thus, we conclude that the textual analysis advanced by E.D.-O. is simply out of step with the legislative intent of the statute. *188 E.D.-O.’s approach deviates from several opinions of this Court and the Appellate Division. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoffmangreen2 sentences2004See State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 578 , 695 A.2d 236, 243 (1997) (noting that courts may rely on extrinsic aids when legislative intent cannot be gleaned from statutory text). 2004See State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 578 , 695 A.2d 236, 243 (1997) (noting that courts may rely on extrinsic aids when legislative intent cannot be gleaned from statutory text). | 1 | 1 |
Koch v. Director, Division of Taxationgreen2 sentences2001See generally Koch v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 157 N.J. at 14 , 722 A.2d 918 (harmonizing three seemingly conflicting concepts of the Gross Income Tax to avoid taxation of the return of capital.) See also Stephen Little Trucking v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 19 N.J.Tax 461 (analyzing the entire structure of the Sales Tax Act rather than looking at a single section of the statute to specify how tax is to be collected from contractors). 2001See generally Koch v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 157 N.J. at 14 , 722 A.2d 918 (harmonizing three seemingly conflicting concepts of the Gross Income Tax to avoid taxation of the return of capital.) See also Stephen Little Trucking v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 19 N.J.Tax 461 (analyzing the entire structure of the Sales Tax Act rather than looking at a single section of the statute to specify how tax is to be collected from contractors). | 1 | 1 |
Little v. Director, New Jersey Division of Taxationgreen1 sentence2001See generally Koch v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 157 N.J. at 14 , 722 A.2d 918 (harmonizing three seemingly conflicting concepts of the Gross Income Tax to avoid taxation of the return of capital.) See also Stephen Little Trucking v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra, 19 N.J.Tax 461 (analyzing the entire structure of the Sales Tax Act rather than looking at a single section of the statute to specify how tax is to be collected from contractors). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kirkgreen2 sentences1999Based on the articulated objectives of the Legislature, the enhanced sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms, deterrence-oriented, directed at defendants who have "demonstrat[ed] an escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-167, 171 , 678 A. 2d 233 ; Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9 , 656 A. 2d 1246 ; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J.Super. at 354 , 704 A. 2d 1025 . 1999Based on the articulated objectives of the Legislature, the enhanced sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms, deterrence-oriented, directed at defendants who have "demonstrat[ed] an escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-167, 171 , 678 A. 2d 233 ; Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9 , 656 A. 2d 1246 ; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J.Super. at 354 , 704 A. 2d 1025 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal.
green
1 sentence2023"Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'" Id. at 2126 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 , 50 n.10 (1961)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen
green
2 sentences2023In so holding, the Court adopted a textual analysis that requires courts to look to the text of the Second Amendment and "the Nation's historical tradition A-2377-22 12 of firearm regulation." Id. at 2130 . 2023"Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'" Id. at 2126 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 , 50 n.10 (1961)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
G.S. v. Department of Human Services
green
2 sentences2015In G.S., supra, the Court addressed the “failure to exercise a minimum degree of care” language of N.J.S.A. 9:6 — 8.21(c)(4)(b). 157 N.J. at 177-82 , 723 A.2d 612 . 2015In G.S., supra, the Court addressed the “failure to exercise a minimum degree of care” language of N.J.S.A. 9:6 — 8.21(c)(4)(b). 157 N.J. at 177-82 , 723 A.2d 612 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. M.C. in the Matter of M.C., M.C., Jr. and A.C.
green
2 sentences2015This argument relies on a textual analysis of N.J.S.A. 9:6 — 8.21(e)(4)(b), New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. M.C., 435 N.J.Super. 405 , 89 A.3d 225 (App.Div.), certifi granted, 220 N.J. 41 , 101 A.3d 1082 (2014), to support her contention that the Division is required to prove that the child has suffered actual harm or that the child remains at risk of imminent harm at the time of the fact-finding. 2015This argument relies on a textual analysis of N.J.S.A. 9:6 — 8.21(e)(4)(b), New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. M.C., 435 N.J.Super. 405 , 89 A.3d 225 (App.Div.), certifi granted, 220 N.J. 41 , 101 A.3d 1082 (2014), to support her contention that the Division is required to prove that the child has suffered actual harm or that the child remains at risk of imminent harm at the time of the fact-finding. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Gelman
green
2 sentences2013Last, the panel held that, at best, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)’s “inclusion of section (6) renders the phrase ‘on another’ in section (3) ambiguous,” thus implicating the doctrine of lenity and “requiring resolution ‘in favor of the defendant.’ ” Ibid. (quoting State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482 , 950 A.2d 879 (2008)). 2013Last, the panel held that, at best, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)’s “inclusion of section (6) renders the phrase ‘on another’ in section (3) ambiguous,” thus implicating the doctrine of lenity and “requiring resolution ‘in favor of the defendant.’ ” Ibid. (quoting State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 482 , 950 A.2d 879 (2008)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Rangel
green
2 sentences2013In undertaking this textual analysis, the panel noted that “[n]o legislative history is available ... to shed light on the particular language at issue.” Id. at 11 , 25 A.3d 1183 . 2013In undertaking this textual analysis, the panel noted that “[n]o legislative history is available ... to shed light on the particular language at issue.” Id. at 11 , 25 A.3d 1183 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Ercolano
green
2 sentences2004We concluded that " N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2g was intended solely to confer continuing jurisdiction upon a trial court to enter an order of forfeiture if the court failed to order forfeiture at the time of conviction, rather than, as Moore [supra, ] had directed, such authority being transferred to the defendant's employer or a state agency." Ercolano, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 247 , 762 A. 2d 259 . 2004We concluded that " N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2g was intended solely to confer continuing jurisdiction upon a trial court to enter an order of forfeiture if the court failed to order forfeiture at the time of conviction, rather than, as Moore [supra, ] had directed, such authority being transferred to the defendant's employer or a state agency." Ercolano, supra, 335 N.J.Super. at 247 , 762 A. 2d 259 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Pelham
green
1 sentence2003Post at 471, 824 A. 2d at 1095 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State in Interest of M.G.
neutral
2 sentences1999Based on the articulated objectives of the Legislature, the enhanced sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms, deterrence-oriented, directed at defendants who have "demonstrat[ed] an escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-167, 171 , 678 A. 2d 233 ; Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9 , 656 A. 2d 1246 ; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J.Super. at 354 , 704 A. 2d 1025 . 1999Based on the articulated objectives of the Legislature, the enhanced sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms, deterrence-oriented, directed at defendants who have "demonstrat[ed] an escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-167, 171 , 678 A. 2d 233 ; Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9 , 656 A. 2d 1246 ; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J.Super. at 354 , 704 A. 2d 1025 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Hawks
green
2 sentences1999Thus, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) does not limit, either expressly or impliedly, the chronological sequence of convictions subject of this extended term provision; the only textual requirement is that there be "a previous conviction ... at any time." See Hawks, 114 N.J. at 365 , 554 A. 2d 1330 ; *610 see also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(b) (defining "prior conviction of a crime" generally as "[a]n adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant committed a crime ..., although sentence or the execution thereof was suspended, provided that the time to appeal has expired a 1999Thus, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) does not limit, either expressly or impliedly, the chronological sequence of convictions subject of this extended term provision; the only textual requirement is that there be "a previous conviction ... at any time." See Hawks, 114 N.J. at 365 , 554 A. 2d 1330 ; *610 see also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4(b) (defining "prior conviction of a crime" generally as "[a]n adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant committed a crime ..., although sentence or the execution thereof was suspended, provided that the time to appeal has expired a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Haliski
green
2 sentences1999Based on the articulated objectives of the Legislature, the enhanced sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms, deterrence-oriented, directed at defendants who have "demonstrat[ed] an escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-167, 171 , 678 A. 2d 233 ; Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9 , 656 A. 2d 1246 ; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J.Super. at 354 , 704 A. 2d 1025 . 1999Based on the articulated objectives of the Legislature, the enhanced sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms, deterrence-oriented, directed at defendants who have "demonstrat[ed] an escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-167, 171 , 678 A. 2d 233 ; Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9 , 656 A. 2d 1246 ; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J.Super. at 354 , 704 A. 2d 1025 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.