textual analysis in California

2023(ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 188-189 .) “Statutory interpretation requires us ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intended legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] We consider the provisions’ language in its ‘broader statutory context’ and, where possible, harmonize 8 that language with related provisions by interpreting them in a consistent fashion. [Citation.] If an ambiguity remains after this preliminary textual analysis, we may consider extrinsic sources such as legislative history . . . .” (Id. at p. 189.) “‘In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences

2020“Statutory interpretation requires us ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intended legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] We consider the provisions’ language in its ‘broader statutory context’ and, where possible, harmonize that language with related provisions by interpreting them in a consistent fashion.” (ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 189 .) “‘If this contextual reading of the statute’s language reveals no ambiguity, we need not refer to extrinsic sources.’” (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 478 ; see United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast I

2019Appellant argues that the three-year statute of limitations in section 338(a) should apply because it is challenging the City's failure to comply with LAMC section 16.05.H.1's requirement that "Prior to deciding an appeal, the Area Planning Commission shall hold a hearing or direct a hearing officer to do so." It relies on Urban Habitat , supra , 164 Cal.App.4th 1561 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 .

2019Appellant argues that the three-year statute of limitations in section 338(a) should apply because it is challenging the City's failure to comply with LAMC section 16.05.H.1's requirement that "Prior to deciding an appeal, the Area Planning Commission shall hold a hearing or direct a hearing officer to do so." It relies on Urban Habitat , supra , 164 Cal.App.4th 1561 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 .

2017Supp. 15, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 132 .) The appellate division dismissed the textual analysis of the applicable statutes advanced by Vega and Sierra as a "mission [that] amounted to a fool's errand." ( Moore , at p.

2017Supp. 16, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 132 .) The appellate division embarked on its own analysis that it tethered to subdivision ( l ) of Penal Code section 1463. ( Moore, supra, at p.

2003We believe that this textual framework, which necessarily applies to Section 311's employment of the term `physical harm,' excludes offensive bodily contact from qualifying as `physical harm,' even though the contact may offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, unless the contact produces `physical impairment of the condition of another's body, or physical pain or illness.'" ( Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center, supra, 48 F.Supp.2d at p. 891 , fn. omitted.) Here, plaintiff asserts he suffered emotional injury which gave rise to physical harm.

2003We believe that this textual framework, which necessarily applies to Section 311’s employment of the term ‘physical harm,’ excludes offensive bodily contact from qualifying as ‘physical harm,’ even though the contact may offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, unless the contact produces ‘physical impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.’ ” (Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center, supra, 48 F.Supp.2d at p. 891 , fn. omitted.) Here, plaintiff asserts he suffered emotional injury which gave rise to physical harm.

2026“Article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution gives the state Department of Alcohol Beverage Control exclusive jurisdiction to regulate alcohol. [Citation.] If the purpose and effect of the city ordinance is to regulate the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession or transportation of alcoholic beverages, the legislation is expressly preempted by the state Constitution. [Citations.] For example, an express prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages at automobile service stations conflicts with article XX, section 22.” (City of Oakland v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 740, 76

2026“Article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution gives the state Department of Alcohol Beverage Control exclusive jurisdiction to regulate alcohol. [Citation.] If the purpose and effect of the city ordinance is to regulate the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession or transportation of alcoholic beverages, the legislation is expressly preempted by the state Constitution. [Citations.] For example, an express prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages at automobile service stations conflicts with article XX, section 22.” (City of Oakland v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 740, 76

2026“Article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution gives the state Department of Alcohol Beverage Control exclusive jurisdiction to regulate alcohol. [Citation.] If the purpose and effect of the city ordinance is to regulate the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession or transportation of alcoholic beverages, the legislation is expressly preempted by the state Constitution. [Citations.] For example, an express prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages at automobile service stations conflicts with article XX, section 22.” (City of Oakland v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 740, 76

2025Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14 .) In Turrieta, the issue was whether a PAGA plaintiff was authorized “to intervene in the ongoing PAGA action of another plaintiff asserting overlapping claims, to require a court to consider objections to a proposed settlement in that overlapping action, and to move to vacate the judgment in that action[.]” (Turrieta, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 676– 677.) The court stated that “because a textual analysis is not dispositive, we examine additional considerations, including other PAGA provisions that are relevant to the parties’ arguments on whether interventio

2023(ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 188-189 .) “Statutory interpretation requires us ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intended legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] We consider the provisions’ language in its ‘broader statutory context’ and, where possible, harmonize 8 that language with related provisions by interpreting them in a consistent fashion. [Citation.] If an ambiguity remains after this preliminary textual analysis, we may consider extrinsic sources such as legislative history . . . .” (Id. at p. 189.) “‘In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider the consequences

2023Under the principle that the whole of a statute should be considered, we note that section 65008, subdivision (h) states: “The Legislature finds and declares that discriminatory practices that inhibit the development of housing for persons and families of very low, low, moderate, and middle incomes, or emergency shelters for the homeless, are a matter of statewide concern.” (§ 65008, subd. (h), italics added.) The reference to “practices that inhibit” supports the inference that the Legislature was concerned with the effect of a practice, not simply the intent underlying the practice. (§ 65008

2022For example, one court concluded the “plain language” of section 12022.53, subdivision (h) does not permit a “court to substitute one enhancement for another.” (People v. Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 643 , revd.) The court reasoned the 7 statute instead provides a “binary” choice for a sentencing court: “The court can choose to dismiss a charge or enhancement in the interest of justice, or it can choose to take no action.” (Ibid.; see Yanez, at p. 459; Garcia, at p. 791; Valles, at p. 166.) That was the state of affairs at the time of Montelongo’s sentencing.

2020Where terms are undefined, “[t]he everyday understanding . . . should count for a lot,” and we look to “regular usage to see what Congress probably meant.” (Lopez v. Gonzales (2006) 549 U.S. 47, 53 ; Sacks v. City of Oakland (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1082 .) 1. “all interest” Moving to the first step of the textual analysis here, I note that the parties do not dispute the meaning of “all” in the phrase “all interest.” Because the phrase is not a term of art, its meaning may be discerned as a matter of everyday English.

2020(Vucinich, supra, 51 Cal.App.2d at p. 437 .) A parallel policy rationale reinforces this textual analysis.

2020Where terms are undefined, “[t]he everyday understanding . . . should count for a lot,” and we look to “regular usage to see what Congress probably meant.” (Lopez v. Gonzales (2006) 549 U.S. 47, 53 ; Sacks v. City of Oakland (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1082 .) 1. “all interest” Moving to the first step of the textual analysis here, I note that the parties do not dispute the meaning of “all” in the phrase “all interest.” Because the phrase is not a term of art, its meaning may be discerned as a matter of everyday English.

2020“Statutory interpretation requires us ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intended legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] We consider the provisions’ language in its ‘broader statutory context’ and, where possible, harmonize that language with related provisions by interpreting them in a consistent fashion.” (ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 189 .) “‘If this contextual reading of the statute’s language reveals no ambiguity, we need not refer to extrinsic sources.’” (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 478 ; see United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast I

2017The statute focuses on the fact of the conviction and nothing suggests that the prior final conviction may be subject to collateral attack for potential constitutional errors before it may be counted.” ( Custis, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 490-491, fn. omitted.) Allen , in holding that Custis did not require overruling the California rule permitting collateral attack on a prior conviction on Boykin/Tahl grounds, was not concerned with the high court’s textual analysis of the federal statute but rather with its constitutional and policy analysis. 10 Appellant quotes the court’s statement in Allen th

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2017The statute focuses on the fact of the conviction and nothing suggests that the prior final conviction may be subject to collateral attack for potential constitutional errors before it may be counted.” ( Custis, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 490-491, fn. omitted.) Allen , in holding that Custis did not require overruling the California rule permitting collateral attack on a prior conviction on Boykin/Tahl grounds, was not concerned with the high court’s textual analysis of the federal statute but rather with its constitutional and policy analysis. 10 Appellant quotes the court’s statement in Allen th

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2017But what Garcia said was that “a prior conviction that has been determined to be constitutionally invalid may not be used to enhance the punishment for a subsequent offense.” (Garcia, at p. 959, italics added.) As Alien and Garcia illustrate, whether the constitutionality of a prior conviction may be challenged by motion to strike in a current sentencing proceeding depends on the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. 11 Allen stated, “Our decision in Sumstine . . . was not based on constitutional imperatives, but on the policy judgment, first announced in Coffey, supra. 67 Cal.2d 204

2013(Camerado, at p. 840.) The Camerado court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the motion because the vexatious litigant statute “implicitly applies only to litigants acting in propria persona in the civil action in which the vexatious litigant motion is brought.” (Ibid.) After a thorough review, the Camerado court concluded this was “inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, policy, case law and commentary.” (Ibid.) Consistent with the textual analysis employed by the Shalant court, the Camerado court first looked to “ ‘ “the usual, ordinary import of the l

2013As the Shalant court pointed out, if the limits of the statute are too confining, “ ‘it is the function of the Legislature, not the courts, to expand them.’ ” (Shalant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1176 .) We have no authority to interpret the vexatious litigant statutes based on the policy considerations urged by plaintiff in the face of their unambiguous language.

2001The Legislature's selection of verb tense in these two statements is properly accorded substantial significance. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P.2d 641 ; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 .) There is no compelling reason to disregard that language in the statute or to ignore the common interpretation of the words used by the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 .) In response to this textual analysis o

2001The Legislature's selection of verb tense in these two statements is properly accorded substantial significance. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P.2d 641 ; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 .) There is no compelling reason to disregard that language in the statute or to ignore the common interpretation of the words used by the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 .) In response to this textual analysis o

2001The Legislature's selection of verb tense in these two statements is properly accorded substantial significance. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P.2d 641 ; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 .) There is no compelling reason to disregard that language in the statute or to ignore the common interpretation of the words used by the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 .) In response to this textual analysis o

2001The Legislature's selection of verb tense in these two statements is properly accorded substantial significance. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P.2d 641 ; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 .) There is no compelling reason to disregard that language in the statute or to ignore the common interpretation of the words used by the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 .) In response to this textual analysis o

2001The Legislature's selection of verb tense in these two statements is properly accorded substantial significance. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P.2d 641 ; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 .) There is no compelling reason to disregard that language in the statute or to ignore the common interpretation of the words used by the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 .) In response to this textual analysis o

2001The Legislature's selection of verb tense in these two statements is properly accorded substantial significance. ( Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 952 P.2d 641 ; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 .) There is no compelling reason to disregard that language in the statute or to ignore the common interpretation of the words used by the Legislature. ( Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 694 P.2d 1153 .) In response to this textual analysis o