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10 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Butler v. Catinellagreen2 sentences2017Additionally, “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplusage and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary.” (Towne v Kingsley, 121 AD3d 1381, 1383 [3d Dept 2014]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150-151 [2d Dept 2008].) Thus, this court’s conclusions with respect to the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction cannot form the basis for dismissal of affirmative defenses. 2014As for the defense of failure to state a claim, this Court’s rule is well established that “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplus-age and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary” (Pump v Anchor Motor Frgt., 138 AD2d 849, 851 [1988]; see Dubois v Vanderwalker, 245 AD2d 758, 760 [1997]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150 [2008]). | 4 | 4 |
Pump v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.green2 sentences2014As for the defense of failure to state a claim, this Court’s rule is well established that “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplus-age and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary” (Pump v Anchor Motor Frgt., 138 AD2d 849, 851 [1988]; see Dubois v Vanderwalker, 245 AD2d 758, 760 [1997]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150 [2008]). 2014As for the defense of failure to state a claim, this Court’s rule is well established that “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplus-age and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary” (Pump v Anchor Motor Frgt., 138 AD2d 849, 851 [1988]; see Dubois v Vanderwalker, 245 AD2d 758, 760 [1997]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150 [2008]). | 3 | 3 |
Dubois v. Vanderwalkergreen2 sentences2014As for the defense of failure to state a claim, this Court’s rule is well established that “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplus-age and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary” (Pump v Anchor Motor Frgt., 138 AD2d 849, 851 [1988]; see Dubois v Vanderwalker, 245 AD2d 758, 760 [1997]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150 [2008]). 2014As for the defense of failure to state a claim, this Court’s rule is well established that “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplus-age and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary” (Pump v Anchor Motor Frgt., 138 AD2d 849, 851 [1988]; see Dubois v Vanderwalker, 245 AD2d 758, 760 [1997]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150 [2008]). | 3 | 3 |
Towne v. Kingsleygreen1 sentence2017Additionally, “the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplusage and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary.” (Towne v Kingsley, 121 AD3d 1381, 1383 [3d Dept 2014]; see also Butler v Catinella, 58 AD3d 145, 150-151 [2d Dept 2008].) Thus, this court’s conclusions with respect to the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction cannot form the basis for dismissal of affirmative defenses. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeSanctis v. Laudeman
green
2 sentences2015Further, the Second Department rejected the Youssef plaintiffs' claim that they had been prejudiced by the answer's citation of the wrong statute because "the pleaded defense sufficiently provided them with notice of the matters intended to be proved" ( id. at 662 ) — despite the absence of any factual allegations from the paragraph of the answer that asserted the defense. [FN4] The Third Department followed Immediate in DeSanctis v Laudeman ( 169 AD2d 1026 [3d Dept 1991]), where the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations defense as follows: "That the Cause of Action set forth in plainti 2015Further, the Second Department rejected the Youssef plaintiffs’ claim that they had been prejudiced by the answer’s citation of the wrong statute because “the pleaded defense sufficiently provided them with notice of the matters intended to be proved” (id. at 662) — despite the absence of any factual allegations from the paragraph of the answer that asserted the defense. 4 The Third Department followed Immediate in DeSanctis v Laudeman ( 169 AD2d 1026 [3d Dept 1991]), where the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations defense as follows: “That the Cause of Action set forth in plaintiff’s c | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Youssef v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority
green
1 sentence2015Further, the Second Department rejected the Youssef plaintiffs' claim that they had been prejudiced by the answer's citation of the wrong statute because "the pleaded defense sufficiently provided them with notice of the matters intended to be proved" ( id. at 662 ) — despite the absence of any factual allegations from the paragraph of the answer that asserted the defense. [FN4] The Third Department followed Immediate in DeSanctis v Laudeman ( 169 AD2d 1026 [3d Dept 1991]), where the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations defense as follows: "That the Cause of Action set forth in plainti | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wheeler v. Stevensville Hotel & Country Club
neutral
1 sentence1988Inasmuch as our determination in Wheeler v Stevensville Hotel & Country Club ( 103 AD2d 945 ) has been the source of some confusion (see, e.g., Molinari v Molinari, 134 Mise 2d 998), despite its specific citation to Riland v Todman & Co. (supra), we shall now state unequivocally that the rule in this Department, as in the First Department, is that the pleaded defense of failure to state a cause of action is harmless surplusage and a motion to strike it should be denied as unnecessary (accord, Siegel, 1987 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:38 [1988 Supp | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Finkle v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1940While ordinarily the interpretation of an ambiguous innuendo is a question of fact for the jury (Finkle v. Westchester Newspapers, 235 App. Div. 817 ), in this situation there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the statement and it seems clear that the statement went beyond the pleaded defense. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Ward v. Saint Vincent's Hospital
neutral
1 sentence1924Vincent’s Hospital ( 39 App. Div. 624 ) as authority for the proposition that a public charitable hospital is liable to a patient therein for injuries sustained by the patient for a breach of a contract to furnish a competent nurse and attendance. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Matter of Denton v. . Sanford
neutral
1 sentence1922(Blair v. Cargill, 111 App. Div. 853, 858 ; Matter of Denton v. Sanford, 103 N. Y. 607 ; Central Trust Co. v. Falck, 177 App. Div. 501 ; affd., sub nom. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Blair v. Cargill
neutral
1 sentence1922(Blair v. Cargill, 111 App. Div. 853, 858 ; Matter of Denton v. Sanford, 103 N. Y. 607 ; Central Trust Co. v. Falck, 177 App. Div. 501 ; affd., sub nom. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Central Trust Co. v. Falck
neutral
1 sentence1922(Blair v. Cargill, 111 App. Div. 853, 858 ; Matter of Denton v. Sanford, 103 N. Y. 607 ; Central Trust Co. v. Falck, 177 App. Div. 501 ; affd., sub nom. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Evans v. Columbia Fire Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1909Co., 40 Misc. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.