pleaded claim in Texas

2015See Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd, 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.I967); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas High-Speed Rail Authority, 867 S.W.2d 154 , 157 21Page 423 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).

1997See Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.1967); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas High-Speed Rail Auth., 867 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.App. — Austin 1993, writ denied).

2015See Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd, 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.I967); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas High-Speed Rail Authority, 867 S.W.2d 154 , 157 21Page 423 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).

1997See Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.1967); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas High-Speed Rail Auth., 867 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.App. — Austin 1993, writ denied).

2023See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (plaintiff has initial burden to plead facts affirmatively showing trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction).

2020Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

2016Ass’n, 171 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1943) (“As to the sufficiency of Hanley’s petition, we recognize that his demand must be upon the new promise, that he must declare upon it as his cause of action, in order to avoid respondent’s plea of limitation.”); Cain, 194 S.W. at 1098 (“When in an action for debt a new promise is relied upon to avoid a plea of limitation, such promise, whether made before or after the bar is complete, constitutes the cause of action and must be declared upon for a recovery.”); Siegel, 530 S.W.2d at 896 (“[T]o recover on the new promise to pay embraced in the acknowledgmen

1975Hanley v. Oil Capital Broadcasting Ass’n, 141 Tex. 243 , 171 S.W.2d 864, 866 (1943).

2015See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 355 (Tex.1995) (“A defendant need not ... show that the plaintiff cannot succeed on any theory conceivable in order to obtain summary judgment; he is only ‘required to meet the plaintiffs case as pleaded.’ ”); Ely v. Gen.

2015See 32 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 355 (Tex. 1995) (“A defendant need not . . . show that the plaintiff cannot succeed on any theory conceivable in order to obtain summary judgment; he is only ‘required to meet the plaintiff’s case as pleaded.’”); Ely v. Gen.

2010Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. at 2173 . 3 But a pleaded claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for Section 1338 jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.

2010Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08 , 108 S.Ct. at 2173 . 3 But a pleaded claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for Section 1338 jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.

2018App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[T]o recover on the new promise to pay embraced in the acknowledgment of the previous debt, the new promise to pay must be specifically pleaded as the cause of action in order to avoid the pleaded bar of limitation to the original debt."), and Canon v. Stanley , 100 S.W.2d 377 , 378 (Tex. Civ.

2016Ass’n, 171 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1943) (“As to the sufficiency of Hanley’s petition, we recognize that his demand must be upon the new promise, that he must declare upon it as his cause of action, in order to avoid respondent’s plea of limitation.”); Cain, 194 S.W. at 1098 (“When in an action for debt a new promise is relied upon to avoid a plea of limitation, such promise, whether made before or after the bar is complete, constitutes the cause of action and must be declared upon for a recovery.”); Siegel, 530 S.W.2d at 896 (“[T]o recover on the new promise to pay embraced in the acknowledgmen

2024“The test of fair notice is whether an opposing attorney of reasonable competence, with the pleadings before him, can determine the nature of the controversy and the testimony probably relevant.” City of Houston v. Howard, 786 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied); see In re J.O., No. 04-19-00381-CV, 2019 WL 6719029 , at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, Dec. 11, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding fair notice was not provided in a custody matter where court went beyond the pleaded claim to terminate parental rights by also finalizing adoption of the children by t

2023Servicing, Inc., No. 04-16-00788-CV, 2017 WL 4014626 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sep. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); cf. Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 89–92 (“distin[guishing] between pleas by the non-movant which challenge the existence of limitations, such as [the tolling statute], and those which do not challenge the limitations defense, but are affirmative defenses in the nature of confession and avoidance” and noting that, although the plaintiff bears the burden on both at trial, for the former, a defendant seeking summary judgment on limitations grounds bears the burden to negate the pl

2023Servicing, Inc., No. 04-16-00788-CV, 2017 WL 4014626 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sep. 13, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); cf. Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 89–92 (“distin[guishing] between pleas by the non-movant which challenge the existence of limitations, such as [the tolling statute], and those which do not challenge the limitations defense, but are affirmative defenses in the nature of confession and avoidance” and noting that, although the plaintiff bears the burden on both at trial, for the former, a defendant seeking summary judgment on limitations grounds bears the burden to negate the pl

2021Id.; see also Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725 , 736–41 (Tex. 2019) (considering federal preemption affirmative defense in the context of a Rule 91a motion); Estate of Mathis, 543 S.W.3d 927 , 931–32 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, no pet.) (holding that “[w]ithout a claim asking the trial court to revoke the [release in the] settlement agreement,” the petition “did not have a basis in law.”).

2018Id.; Vast Constr., LLC v. CTC Contractors, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 709, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

2016Ass’n, 171 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1943) (“As to the sufficiency of Hanley’s petition, we recognize that his demand must be upon the new promise, that he must declare upon it as his cause of action, in order to avoid respondent’s plea of limitation.”); Cain, 194 S.W. at 1098 (“When in an action for debt a new promise is relied upon to avoid a plea of limitation, such promise, whether made before or after the bar is complete, constitutes the cause of action and must be declared upon for a recovery.”); Siegel, 530 S.W.2d at 896 (“[T]o recover on the new promise to pay embraced in the acknowledgmen

2016Ass’n, 171 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1943) (“As to the sufficiency of Hanley’s petition, we recognize that his demand must be upon the new promise, that he must declare upon it as his cause of action, in order to avoid respondent’s plea of limitation.”); Cain, 194 S.W. at 1098 (“When in an action for debt a new promise is relied upon to avoid a plea of limitation, such promise, whether made before or after the bar is complete, constitutes the cause of action and must be declared upon for a recovery.”); Siegel, 530 S.W.2d at 896 (“[T]o recover on the new promise to pay embraced in the acknowledgmen

2015See Wright v. State, 855 S.W.2d 110 , 111–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (holding that evading arrest and evading detention are two separate offenses for purposes of legal sufficiency of the evidence).

2013Compare Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 911– 12 (defendant law firm must attack merits of and conclusively negate arguable fraud claim pleaded by plaintiff as exception to immunity); Mendoza v. Fleming, conversion, abuse of process, fraud and conspiracy to defraud by plaintiff against opposing counsel in underlying litigation); Alexander v. Malek, No. 01-06-01156- CV, 2008 WL 597652 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming summary judgment on claims based on attorney’s representations to opposing party regarding trial date). 12 41 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Corp

2013Compare Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 911-12 (defendant law firm must attack merits of and conclusively negate arguable fraud claim pleaded by plaintiff as exception to immunity); Mendoza v. Fleming, 41 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (same), with Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, Inc. v. Hazen, No. 03-05-00699-CV, 2008 WL 2938823 , at *8-10 (Tex.App.-Austin July 29, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (non-movant had burden to raise issue of fact on exception to immunity of attorney to defeat summary judgment based on immunity) (citing Eckman v. Centennial Sav.

2013Compare Toles, 113 S.W.3d at 911– 12 (defendant law firm must attack merits of and conclusively negate arguable fraud claim pleaded by plaintiff as exception to immunity); Mendoza v. Fleming, conversion, abuse of process, fraud and conspiracy to defraud by plaintiff against opposing counsel in underlying litigation); Alexander v. Malek, No. 01-06-01156- CV, 2008 WL 597652 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming summary judgment on claims based on attorney’s representations to opposing party regarding trial date). 12 41 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Tex. App.—Corp

2005See McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 684-85 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied).

1996Stone , 417 S.W.2d at 385-86 ; Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner , 369 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Tex. 1963).

1987Wise v. Anderson, 163 Tex, 608, 359 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1962).