comparable rule in Pennsylvania

1996In Consumers Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372 , 382, 368 A.2d 675 , 680-81 (1977), we addressed the speech and debate clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution and noted that it is essentially identical to a comparable clause in the United States Constitution, the scope of which has been interpreted in federal cases: [T]he Supreme Court of the United States recently held that the federal Speech and Debate Clause must be interpreted broadly in order to protect legislators from judicial interference with their legitimate legislative activities, and that even where the activity questioned is not l

1996In Consumers Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372 , 382, 368 A.2d 675 , 680-81 (1977), we addressed the speech and debate clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution and noted that it is essentially identical to a comparable clause in the United States Constitution, the scope of which has been interpreted in federal cases: [T]he Supreme Court of the United States recently held that the federal Speech and Debate Clause must be interpreted broadly in order to protect legislators from judicial interference with their legitimate legislative activities, and that even where the activity questioned is not l

2016This Court will not disturb the sentencing court’s discretion where the sentencing court has been informed by a pre- sentence report and has demonstrated “any degree of awareness of the sentencing considerations.” Devers, 546 A.2d at 18 . -9- J-S90021-16 & J-S90022-16 In his brief in No. 3297 EDA 2015, Appellant claims that the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to order a pre-sentence investigation or conduct a comparable inquiry, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 702.

2004We accept the wisdom of this approach and hold that where, as here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced from the violation of this rule a request to suppress the fruits of the search is not justified.” Id. at 403-404, 490 A.2d at 424-25 . (internal citations and emphasis omitted) See also, Commonwealth v. DeGeorge, 319 Pa. Super. 244 , 466 A.2d 140 (1983), rev ’d on other grounds, 506 Pa. 445 , 485 A.2d 1089 (1984) (violation of former Rule 2009(a), now Rule 209(a), requiring return of an inventory of the items seized, does not require exclusion of evidence).

2004We accept the wisdom of this approach and hold that where, as here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced from the violation of this rule a request to suppress the fruits of the search is not justified.” Id. at 403-404, 490 A.2d at 424-25 . (internal citations and emphasis omitted) See also, Commonwealth v. DeGeorge, 319 Pa. Super. 244 , 466 A.2d 140 (1983), rev ’d on other grounds, 506 Pa. 445 , 485 A.2d 1089 (1984) (violation of former Rule 2009(a), now Rule 209(a), requiring return of an inventory of the items seized, does not require exclusion of evidence).

2004We accept the wisdom of this approach and hold that where, as here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced from the violation of this rule a request to suppress the fruits of the search is not justified.” Id. at 403-404, 490 A.2d at 424-25 . (internal citations and emphasis omitted) See also, Commonwealth v. DeGeorge, 319 Pa. Super. 244 , 466 A.2d 140 (1983), rev ’d on other grounds, 506 Pa. 445 , 485 A.2d 1089 (1984) (violation of former Rule 2009(a), now Rule 209(a), requiring return of an inventory of the items seized, does not require exclusion of evidence).

2004We accept the wisdom of this approach and hold that where, as here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced from the violation of this rule a request to suppress the fruits of the search is not justified.” Id. at 403-404, 490 A.2d at 424-25 . (internal citations and emphasis omitted) See also, Commonwealth v. DeGeorge, 319 Pa. Super. 244 , 466 A.2d 140 (1983), rev ’d on other grounds, 506 Pa. 445 , 485 A.2d 1089 (1984) (violation of former Rule 2009(a), now Rule 209(a), requiring return of an inventory of the items seized, does not require exclusion of evidence).

2004We accept the wisdom of this approach and hold that where, as here, appellant has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced from the violation of this rule a request to suppress the fruits of the search is not justified.” Id. at 403-404, 490 A.2d at 424-25 . (internal citations and emphasis omitted) See also, Commonwealth v. DeGeorge, 319 Pa. Super. 244 , 466 A.2d 140 (1983), rev ’d on other grounds, 506 Pa. 445 , 485 A.2d 1089 (1984) (violation of former Rule 2009(a), now Rule 209(a), requiring return of an inventory of the items seized, does not require exclusion of evidence).

1997There is a comparable exception to the three-factor method for calculating CNIT in Section 401(3)2.(b) which similarly permits trucking, airline, and railroad companies to apportion their CNIT using one fraction that represents the ratio of revenue miles in Pennsylvania to the total revenue miles of the company, except when both people and property are transported. 4 Revenue miles are the “average receipts derived from the transportation of persons or property one mile.” Id.

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1988See e.g., U.S. v. Hall, 505 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1974); In Re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 , 76 S.Ct. 781 , 100 L.Ed. 1454 .

1977See Stryjewski v. Panfil, 269 Pa. 568 , 112 A. 764 (1921); Schlicter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. 119 , 27 A. 45 (1893); Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. 42 (1879). [3] There can be no question, *165 however, that the legislature in enacting MTAA had the power to abrogate the common-law rule with regard to it; appellants, rather, argue that the legislature failed to do so, and that a majority of all the members thus means a majority of all members of a quorum present and voting.

1977See Stryjewski v. Panfil, 269 Pa. 568 , 112 A. 764 (1921); Schlicter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. 119 , 27 A. 45 (1893); Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. 42 (1879). 3 There can be no ques tion, however, that the legislature in enacting MTAA had the power to abrogate the common-law rule with regard to it; appellants, rather, argue that the legislature failed to do so, and that a majority of all the members thus means a majority of all members of a quorum present and voting.

1977See Stryjewski v. Panfil, 269 Pa. 568 , 112 A. 764 (1921); Schlicter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. 119 , 27 A. 45 (1893); Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. 42 (1879). [3] There can be no question, *165 however, that the legislature in enacting MTAA had the power to abrogate the common-law rule with regard to it; appellants, rather, argue that the legislature failed to do so, and that a majority of all the members thus means a majority of all members of a quorum present and voting.

1977See Stryjewski v. Panfil, 269 Pa. 568 , 112 A. 764 (1921); Schlicter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. 119 , 27 A. 45 (1893); Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. 42 (1879). [3] There can be no question, *165 however, that the legislature in enacting MTAA had the power to abrogate the common-law rule with regard to it; appellants, rather, argue that the legislature failed to do so, and that a majority of all the members thus means a majority of all members of a quorum present and voting.

1963In the case of Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. West (Okla. 1959), 351 P 2d 398 , the court went so far as to hold that a substitute car was covered by insurance under a comparable clause providing for temporary substitution when it would be imprudent to use the insured car because of its condition (holes in tires) In Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis. 2d 586 , 97 N. W. 2d 408 (1959) the court, construing a temporary substitute clause comparable to the one in the present case, held that a farm truck was a substitute automobile for a pleasure trip when the insured’s automobile would not start.

1963In the case of Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. West (Okla. 1959), 351 P 2d 398 , the court went so far as to hold that a substitute car was covered by insurance under a comparable clause providing for temporary substitution when it would be imprudent to use the insured car because of its condition (holes in tires) In Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis. 2d 586 , 97 N. W. 2d 408 (1959) the court, construing a temporary substitute clause comparable to the one in the present case, held that a farm truck was a substitute automobile for a pleasure trip when the insured’s automobile would not start.

1963In the case of Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. West (Okla. 1959), 351 P 2d 398 , the court went so far as to hold that a substitute car was covered by insurance under a comparable clause providing for temporary substitution when it would be imprudent to use the insured car because of its condition (holes in tires) In Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis. 2d 586 , 97 N. W. 2d 408 (1959) the court, construing a temporary substitute clause comparable to the one in the present case, held that a farm truck was a substitute automobile for a pleasure trip when the insured’s automobile would not start.

1939The comparable rule as to the opening of judgments at law is discussed in Sallada et al. v. Mock et al., 277 Pa. 285 . 2 Cope’s Est., 328 Pa. 296 .

1939The comparable rule as to the opening of judgments at law is discussed in Sallada et al. v. Mock et al., 277 Pa. 285 . 2 Cope’s Est., 328 Pa. 296 .

1939See also Stetson’s Est., 305 Pa. 62, 71 ; Daub’s Est., 313 Pa. 35, 42 ; Elkins’s Est., 325 Pa. 373, 376 ; Neafie’s Est., 325 Pa. 561, 564 ; Knox's Est.

1939See also Stetson’s Est., 305 Pa. 62, 71 ; Daub’s Est., 313 Pa. 35, 42 ; Elkins’s Est., 325 Pa. 373, 376 ; Neafie’s Est., 325 Pa. 561, 564 ; Knox's Est.

1939See also Stetson’s Est., 305 Pa. 62, 71 ; Daub’s Est., 313 Pa. 35, 42 ; Elkins’s Est., 325 Pa. 373, 376 ; Neafie’s Est., 325 Pa. 561, 564 ; Knox's Est.