comparable instruction in California

2016(People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1138-1144 .) The court held that “CALJIC No. 2.92 [CALCRIM No. 315’s predecessor] or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative evidence.” (Wright, p. 1144.) “[A] proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 114

2014(People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1230 ; Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1141 .) “[A]n explanation of the effects of those factors is best left to argument by counsel, cross-examination of the eyewitnesses, and expert testimony where appropriate.” ( Wright, supra, at p. 1143 , fn. omitted; accord, People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 .) The California Supreme Court has held that “CALJIC No. 2.92 or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative evidence. [Citation.]” (Wright,

2026Courts have stated that an instruction on the principles contained in CALCRIM No. 224 “ ‘must be given sua sponte when the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 885 [analyzing the comparable instruction CALJIC No. 2.01].) But our Supreme Court has also indicated CALCRIM No. 224 “should not be given where the evidence relied on is either direct or, if circumstantial, is not equally consistent with a reasonable conclusion of innocence.” (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [analyzing the comparable instruc

2025Counsel argued that the jury’s question therefore demanded something “stronger” and “calls for a direct answer” and that the “direct answer would be no, he’s never going to be released.” The prosecutor disagreed, citing our decision in People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43 (Snow), which held that “when the jury expresses a concern regarding the effect of a life without parole sentence, the court should instruct the jury ‘to assume that whatever penalty it selects will be carried out’ or give ‘a comparable instruction.’ [Citation].” (Id. at p. 123, italics in original.) The trial court declined C

2025The governing law at the time of trial, as we held in Snow, was that when a penalty phase jury expresses concern regarding the effect of a verdict of life without the possibility of parole, the trial court should instruct the jury “ ‘to assume that whatever penalty it selects will be carried out’ ” or give “ ‘a comparable instruction.’ ” (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 123 , italics in original.) Subsequently, however, in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99 (Letner), we disapproved of such an instruction, due to its misleading nature.

2025The governing law at the time of trial, as we held in Snow, was that when a penalty phase jury expresses concern regarding the effect of a verdict of life without the possibility of parole, the trial court should instruct the jury “ ‘to assume that whatever penalty it selects will be carried out’ ” or give “ ‘a comparable instruction.’ ” (Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 123 , italics in original.) Subsequently, however, in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99 (Letner), we disapproved of such an instruction, due to its misleading nature.

2025Analysis We have repeatedly held that CALJIC No. 8.84, by explicitly referencing a sentence of “life without the possibility of parole,” “adequately informs the jury ‘of the defendant’s ineligibility for parole.’ ” (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 270 .) Choyce primarily contends that, due to the uncertainty about the effect of a life verdict reflected in the jury’s question, the responsive instruction was insufficient because the jury in this case was “never informed that if they rejected a death sentence appellant would never be released on parole.” However, as we have held, because

2018Striking of CALJIC No. 2.92 Factors was Erroneous A defendant is entitled to a specific "pinpoint" jury instruction if it relates to particular facts or a theory of the defense and is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513 , 542, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 376 P.3d 1178 .) More specifically, "CALJIC No. 2.92 or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative *1010 evidence." ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 , 1144, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 755 P.2d 1049 .) Th

2018Striking of CALJIC No. 2.92 Factors was Erroneous A defendant is entitled to a specific "pinpoint" jury instruction if it relates to particular facts or a theory of the defense and is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513 , 542, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 746 , 376 P.3d 1178 .) More specifically, "CALJIC No. 2.92 or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative *1010 evidence." ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 , 1144, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 755 P.2d 1049 .) Th

2016(People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1138-1144 .) The court held that “CALJIC No. 2.92 [CALCRIM No. 315’s predecessor] or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative evidence.” (Wright, p. 1144.) “[A] proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 114

2014(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72-73 & fn. 4 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ].) A comparable test is appropriate on appeal from the denial of a change of venue. *509 Defendant also contends the publicity was so pervasive, and the John and Ken Show so poisonous, that prejudice must be presumed and need not be established.

2014(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72-73 & fn. 4 [ 116 L.Ed.2d 385 , 112 S.Ct. 475 ].) A comparable test is appropriate on appeal from the denial of a change of venue. *509 Defendant also contends the publicity was so pervasive, and the John and Ken Show so poisonous, that prejudice must be presumed and need not be established.

2010As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “speculation into what transpired in the jury room” should not play a part in double jeopardy analysis. ( Yeager, supra, 557 U.S. at p._[ 129 S.Ct. at p. 2368 ].) Although an election by a prosecutor will avoid the necessity of giving a jury a unanimity instruction where conviction on a single count could be based on two or more discrete criminal events shown by the evidence, the issue before us is not whether defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict was protected.

2009Since our decision in Stanson , numerous out-of-state decisions have cited that opinion and utilized a comparable analysis in evaluating the propriety of public expenditures for a variety of election-related material and activities (see, e.g., Anderson v. Boston (1978) 376 Mass. 178 [ 380 N.E.2d 628 ], app. dism. for want of substantial federal question sub nom.

2009Since our decision in Stanson , numerous out-of-state decisions have cited that opinion and utilized a comparable analysis in evaluating the propriety of public expenditures for a variety of election-related material and activities (see, e.g., Anderson v. Boston (1978) 376 Mass. 178 [ 380 N.E.2d 628 ], app. dism. for want of substantial federal question sub nom.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.

2009Boston v. Anderson (1979) 439 U.S. 1060 [ 59 L.Ed.2d 26 , 99 S.Ct. 822 ]; Smith v. Dorsey (Miss. 1992) 599 So.2d 529, 540-544 ; Burt v. Blumenauer (1985) 299 Ore. 55 [ 699 P.2d 168, 171-181 ]; Dollar v. Town of Cary, supra, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-734 ), and the City has failed to cite any authority that has concluded the Stanson standard is unconstitutionally vague.