long-held rule in Pennsylvania

10 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
In Re Adoption of R.J.S.green pasuperct · 2006 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 2 sentences 2021We agree that the cases “merely confirm the long-held rule that explicitly rejects a balancing or best interest approach to determining whether the statutory prerequisites of termination of parental rights have been met pursuant to [Section] 2511(a).” (Id.); see also In re R.J.S., supra at 508 (observing needs and welfare analysis of Section 2511(b) is irrelevant to initial Rule 2511(a) analysis of parent’s conduct); In re Coast, supra at 766 (same). - 14 - J-A29038-21 her, unlike with Mother. 2021We agree that the cases “merely confirm the long-held rule that explicitly rejects a balancing or best interest approach to determining whether the statutory prerequisites of termination of parental rights have been met pursuant to [Section] 2511(a).” (Id.); see also In re R.J.S., supra at 508 (observing needs and welfare analysis of Section 2511(b) is irrelevant to initial Rule 2511(a) analysis of parent’s conduct); In re Coast, supra at 766 (same). - 14 - J-A29038-21 her, unlike with Mother.	2	2
In the Interest of Coastgreen pa · 1989 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 2 sentences 2021We agree that the cases “merely confirm the long-held rule that explicitly rejects a balancing or best interest approach to determining whether the statutory prerequisites of termination of parental rights have been met pursuant to [Section] 2511(a).” (Id.); see also In re R.J.S., supra at 508 (observing needs and welfare analysis of Section 2511(b) is irrelevant to initial Rule 2511(a) analysis of parent’s conduct); In re Coast, supra at 766 (same). - 14 - J-A29038-21 her, unlike with Mother. 2021We agree that the cases “merely confirm the long-held rule that explicitly rejects a balancing or best interest approach to determining whether the statutory prerequisites of termination of parental rights have been met pursuant to [Section] 2511(a).” (Id.); see also In re R.J.S., supra at 508 (observing needs and welfare analysis of Section 2511(b) is irrelevant to initial Rule 2511(a) analysis of parent’s conduct); In re Coast, supra at 766 (same). - 14 - J-A29038-21 her, unlike with Mother.	2	2
Commonwealth v. Aikens, M., Aplt.green pa · 2017 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020 2 sentences 2020See Commonwealth v. Aiken, 168 A.3d 137, 143 (Pa. 2017) (reiterating the long-held presumption that jurors follow trial court instructions). 2019See Commonwealth v. Aiken, 168 A.3d 137, 143 (Pa. 2017) (reiterating the long-held presumption that jurors follow trial court instructions).	2	2
Lizzi v. Commonwealthgreen pa · 1976 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005Lizzi v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 466 Pa. 450, 452 , 353 A.2d 440, 441 (1976). .To allow Appellants to use mandamus to circumvent the time requirements for a land use appeal would violate the long-held rule established in Lizzi . 2005Lizzi v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 466 Pa. 450, 452 , 353 A.2d 440, 441 (1976). .To allow Appellants to use mandamus to circumvent the time requirements for a land use appeal would violate the long-held rule established in Lizzi .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

Case	Cited	Years
Commonwealth v. Hicks, M., Aplt. green pa · 2019 2 sentences 2020Second, the Commonwealth argues that, contrary to the trial court’s analysis, this long-held rule has - 10 - J-A13005-20 neither been altered by intervening legislation, namely, the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. § 10231.101 et seq., nor by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019) (holding that the presence of a concealed firearm, alone, does not provide police with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot). 2020Second, the Commonwealth argues that, contrary to the trial court’s analysis, this long-held rule has - 10 - J-A13005-20 neither been altered by intervening legislation, namely, the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. § 10231.101 et seq., nor by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019) (holding that the presence of a concealed firearm, alone, does not provide police with reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot).	2	2020–2020
Crawford v. Washington green scotus · 2004 2 sentences 2008Significant to our discussion, however, is the United States Supreme Court’s acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing on the basis that it “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 , 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). ¶24 Recently, in Giles v. California, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), while recognizing the limited applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the United States Supreme 2008Significant to our discussion, however, is the United States Supreme Court’s acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing on the basis that it “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 , 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). ¶24 Recently, in Giles v. California, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), while recognizing the limited applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the United States Supreme	1	2008–2008
Reynolds v. United States green scotus · 1879 2 sentences 2008Significant to our discussion, however, is the United States Supreme Court’s acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing on the basis that it “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 , 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). ¶24 Recently, in Giles v. California, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), while recognizing the limited applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the United States Supreme 2008Significant to our discussion, however, is the United States Supreme Court’s acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing on the basis that it “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 , 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). ¶24 Recently, in Giles v. California, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), while recognizing the limited applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the United States Supreme	1	2008–2008
Davis v. Washington green scotus · 2006 2 sentences 2008Indeed, F.R.E. 804(b)(6) represents a codification of the common-law forfeiture rule, which “was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them — in other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’ ” Id. at 2691 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833-34 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)). 2008Indeed, F.R.E. 804(b)(6) represents a codification of the common-law forfeiture rule, which “was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them — in other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’ ” Id. at 2691 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833-34 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)).	1	2008–2008
Giles v. California green scotus · 2008 2 sentences 2008Significant to our discussion, however, is the United States Supreme Court’s acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing on the basis that it “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 , 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). ¶24 Recently, in Giles v. California, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), while recognizing the limited applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the United States Supreme 2008Significant to our discussion, however, is the United States Supreme Court’s acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing on the basis that it “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.” Id. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 , 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). ¶24 Recently, in Giles v. California, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2678 , 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), while recognizing the limited applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the United States Supreme	1	2008–2008
Whiteside v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green pacommwct · 1994 2 sentences 2000Whiteside, 650 A.2d at 1205 . 2000Whiteside, 650 A.2d at 1205 .	1	2000–2000
Commonwealth v. Moore green pa · 1975 2 sentences 1984It is a benchmark, however, for our inquiry because it confirms the long-held rule that upon an indictment for murder, a jury may “... return a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter, notwithstanding that it is irrational to return any verdict other than either acquittal or guilty of some degree of murder, if the evidence would have been sufficient to support a conviction of some degree of murder.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317 , 326 n. 7, 344 A.2d 850 , 855 n. 7 (1975) (Justice Roberts concurring). 1984It is a benchmark, however, for our inquiry because it confirms the long-held rule that upon an indictment for murder, a jury may “... return a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter, notwithstanding that it is irrational to return any verdict other than either acquittal or guilty of some degree of murder, if the evidence would have been sufficient to support a conviction of some degree of murder.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317 , 326 n. 7, 344 A.2d 850 , 855 n. 7 (1975) (Justice Roberts concurring).	1	1984–1984

Where else courts name it

MI 17 (1981–2022) TX 12 (2000–2015) IL 11 (1993–2025) CA 11 (1981–2020) PA 10 (1984–2021) MD 10 (2000–2025) OH 7 (2002–2023) WA 7 (1968–2004) NC 6 (1988–2023) TN 6 (2010–2025) NY 5 (1988–2025) VA 4 (1994–1998) WI 4 (1988–2016) MS 4 (2008–2017) GA 4 (2006–2020) MO 4 (1983–2020) MN 4 (1985–2014) AL 3 (1987–2011) MT 3 (1988–2026) KS 3 (1974–2013) AR 3 (2003–2020) DC 3 (2011–2012) KY 3 (2021–2026) RI 3 (2006–2011) IN 2 (1993–2009) NJ 2 (1987–2025) UT 2 (2012–2022) FL 2 (2015–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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