long-held principle (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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long-held principle in Tennessee

6 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2010–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc.green
ca2 · 2024 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Finally, the employers ask this Court to consider longstanding “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.” However, courts considering the passage of the Act have repeatedly recognized that it “pulls back on the long-held presumption towards arbitration where sexual harassment is concerned.” Steinberg, 2022 WL 3371323 , at *2; see, e.g., Olivieri, 112 F.4th at 84 (“The EFAA is codified directly into the FAA and limits the scope of this broad mandate to enforce arbitration agreements.”); Newton v. LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., 746 F.Supp.3d 135 , 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“the EFAA direc

11
Cole v. Dychgreen
tenn · 1976 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court reiterated the long-held principle that mandatory injunctions are extraordinary in nature and “has cautioned that this relief should be granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 395 (citing Cole v. Dych, 535 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tenn. 1976); King v. Elrod, 196 Tenn. 378 , 268 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tenn. 1954)).

11
Holloway v. Bradleygreen
tenn · 1950 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a) (stating that custody determinations “shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-401 (“In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.”); Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 696 (Tenn. 2014) (“The overarching ‘standard by which courts determine and allocate the parties’ parental responsibilities’ after divorce is the ‘best interests of the child.’”) (quoting Tenn. Code An

2022See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a) (stating that custody determinations “shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-401 (“In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.”); Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 696 (Tenn. 2014) (“The overarching ‘standard by which courts determine and allocate the parties’ parental responsibilities’ after divorce is the ‘best interests of the child.’”) (quoting Tenn. Code An

11
Luke v. Lukegreen
tenn · 1983 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a) (stating that custody determinations “shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-401 (“In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.”); Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 696 (Tenn. 2014) (“The overarching ‘standard by which courts determine and allocate the parties’ parental responsibilities’ after divorce is the ‘best interests of the child.’”) (quoting Tenn. Code An

11
King v. Elrodgreen
tenn · 1954 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court reiterated the long-held principle that mandatory injunctions are extraordinary in nature and “has cautioned that this relief should be granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 395 (citing Cole v. Dych, 535 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tenn. 1976); King v. Elrod, 196 Tenn. 378 , 268 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tenn. 1954)).

11
Terri Ann Kelly v. Willard Reed Kellygreen
tenn · 2014 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 (a) (stating that custody determinations “shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-401 (“In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.”); Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 696 (Tenn. 2014) (“The overarching ‘standard by which courts determine and allocate the parties’ parental responsibilities’ after divorce is the ‘best interests of the child.’”) (quoting Tenn. Code An

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Michael Dwayne EDWARDS v. STATE of Tennessee, Wayne Brandon, Warden green
tenn · 2008
2 sentences

2011Today’s majority opinion properly reiterates the long-held principle, first enumerated in Burkhart, that a sentence is illegal and void, and thus may form a basis for habeas relief, if it is imposed “in direct contravention of a governing sentencing statute” or if it is a sentence “not available under the sentencing statutes governing the case.” See Edwards, 269 S.W.3d at 921 .

2010Today’s majority opinion properly reiterates the long-held principle, first enumerated in Burkhart, that a sentence is illegal and void, and thus may form a basis for habeas relief, if it is imposed “in direct contravention of a governing sentencing statute” or if it is a sentence “not available under the sentencing statutes governing the case.” See Edwards, 269 S.W.3d at 921 .

22010–2011
King v. Elrod neutral
tenn · 1953
1 sentence

2022Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court reiterated the long-held principle that mandatory injunctions are extraordinary in nature and “has cautioned that this relief should be granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 395 (citing Cole v. Dych, 535 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tenn. 1976); King v. Elrod, 196 Tenn. 378 , 268 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tenn. 1954)).

12022–2022
Hunt v. Shaw green
tennctapp · 1996
1 sentence

2011Id. at 307-08 .

12011–2011

Where else courts name it

MI 17 (1981–2022) TX 12 (2000–2015) IL 11 (1993–2025) CA 11 (1981–2020) PA 10 (1984–2021) MD 10 (2000–2025) OH 7 (2002–2023) WA 7 (1968–2004) NC 6 (1988–2023) TN 6 (2010–2025) NY 5 (1988–2025) VA 4 (1994–1998) WI 4 (1988–2016) MS 4 (2008–2017) GA 4 (2006–2020) MO 4 (1983–2020) MN 4 (1985–2014) AL 3 (1987–2011) MT 3 (1988–2026) KS 3 (1974–2013) AR 3 (2003–2020) DC 3 (2011–2012) KY 3 (2021–2026) RI 3 (2006–2011) IN 2 (1993–2009) NJ 2 (1987–2025) UT 2 (2012–2022) FL 2 (2015–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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