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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Theodor v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ 1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ | 2 | 2 |
County of Los Angeles v. Frisbiegreen2 sentences1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ 1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. State of Californiagreen1 sentence2020However, Alameda County did acknowledge the long-held rule that even where an employee’s vested pension rights are at stake, the “‘employee does not have a right to any fixed or definite benefits,’” and “‘the amount, terms, and conditions of the benefits may be altered.’” (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1100, quoting Kern, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 855 ; see also Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 816 (Miller), quoting Kern, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 854– 855 [“Although vested prior to the time when the obligation to pay matures, pension rights are not immutable. . . . [T]h | 1 | 1 |
Kern v. City of Long Beachgreen2 sentences2020However, Alameda County did acknowledge the long-held rule that even where an employee’s vested pension rights are at stake, the “‘employee does not have a right to any fixed or definite benefits,’” and “‘the amount, terms, and conditions of the benefits may be altered.’” (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1100, quoting Kern, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 855 ; see also Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 816 (Miller), quoting Kern, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 854– 855 [“Although vested prior to the time when the obligation to pay matures, pension rights are not immutable. . . . [T]h 2020However, Alameda County did acknowledge the long-held rule that even where an employee’s vested pension rights are at stake, the “‘employee does not have a right to any fixed or definite benefits,’” and “‘the amount, terms, and conditions of the benefits may be altered.’” (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1100, quoting Kern, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 855 ; see also Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 816 (Miller), quoting Kern, supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 854– 855 [“Although vested prior to the time when the obligation to pay matures, pension rights are not immutable. . . . [T]h | 1 | 1 |
Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co.green2 sentences2007(Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 847 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 780 ].) Although there is a recognized exception to this rule for pure questions of law on uncontroverted records that require no factual determinations (ibid.), it is manifest that this issue does not qualify. 2007(Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 847 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 780 ].) Although there is a recognized exception to this rule for pure questions of law on uncontroverted records that require no factual determinations (ibid.), it is manifest that this issue does not qualify. | 1 | 1 |
Bardis v. Oatesgreen2 sentences2007(Bardis v. Oates (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1, 13 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 ].) This long-held rule is based upon fairness, more specifically the recognition that it would be unfair to both the opposing litigant and the trial court to allow a party to adopt a new theory not explored below. 2007(Bardis v. Oates (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1, 13 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 ].) This long-held rule is based upon fairness, more specifically the recognition that it would be unfair to both the opposing litigant and the trial court to allow a party to adopt a new theory not explored below. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C 1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C 1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Winthropgreen2 sentences1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C 1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Estorgagreen2 sentences1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C 1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monge v. California
green
2 sentences2000Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections.” (Id. at p. 734 [ 118 S.Ct. at p. 2253 ].) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721 , that this case was the first in which the court had departed from the long-held rule that a retrial or resentencing is not permitted when the evidence at the first proceeding is insufficient as compared to there being legal error which infects the first proceeding. 2000Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections.” (Id. at p. 734 [ 118 S.Ct. at p. 2253 ].) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721 , that this case was the first in which the court had departed from the long-held rule that a retrial or resentencing is not permitted when the evidence at the first proceeding is insufficient as compared to there being legal error which infects the first proceeding. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2000Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections." ( Id. at p. 734, 118 S.Ct. 2246 .) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 , that this case was the first in which the court had departed from the long-held rule that a retrial or resentencing is not permitted when the evidence at the first proceeding is insufficient as compared to there being legal error which infects the first proceeding. ( Id. at pp. 735-737, 118 S.Ct. 2246 , dis. opn. of St 2000Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections." ( Id. at p. 734, 118 S.Ct. 2246 .) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 , that this case was the first in which the court had departed from the long-held rule that a retrial or resentencing is not permitted when the evidence at the first proceeding is insufficient as compared to there being legal error which infects the first proceeding. ( Id. at pp. 735-737, 118 S.Ct. 2246 , dis. opn. of St | 2 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ 1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ | 2 | 1984–1985 |
People v. Cardenas
green
2 sentences1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ 1985Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 652 ], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [ 122 P.2d 526 ]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [ | 2 | 1984–1985 |
Riley v. Fitzgerald
green
1 sentence2013(Riley, supra, at pp. 875-877 .) Addressing that latter question, the court first cited case law from both California and Texas standing for the proposition that “the effect of corporate dissolution or expiration depends upon the law of [the corporation’s] domicile.” (Riley, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 876 .) 8 The court found that “[n]othing in the California Corporations Code indicates that this long-held principle has been overruled or superseded by statute.” (Riley, at p. 876.) In reaching its conclusion the court relied substantially on section 2115, located in chapter 21 (foreign corpora | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
red
1 sentence2013"The pleading of fraud . . . is . . . the last remaining habitat of the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings." (Committee On Children's Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 216–217.) Under these circumstances, we will not dispense with the long-held principle of law in California requiring heightened pleading for fraud. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013And, as these pleading requirements have been at least impliedly applied to the tort of negligent misrepresentation (see Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 ), we conclude the deficient pleading defeats plaintiffs' cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2000Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections." ( Id. at p. 734, 118 S.Ct. 2246 .) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 , that this case was the first in which the court had departed from the long-held rule that a retrial or resentencing is not permitted when the evidence at the first proceeding is insufficient as compared to there being legal error which infects the first proceeding. ( Id. at pp. 735-737, 118 S.Ct. 2246 , dis. opn. of St 2000Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that would diminish these important procedural protections." ( Id. at p. 734, 118 S.Ct. 2246 .) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721 , 118 S.Ct. 2246 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615 , that this case was the first in which the court had departed from the long-held rule that a retrial or resentencing is not permitted when the evidence at the first proceeding is insufficient as compared to there being legal error which infects the first proceeding. ( Id. at pp. 735-737, 118 S.Ct. 2246 , dis. opn. of St | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Monge
green
2 sentences2000Beyond Monge I and II, and Hernandez In remanding the case in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , the court concluded only that retrial was not barred by double jeopardy, specifically leaving open for determination the question of whether other constitutional or statutory grounds prevented retrial. ( Id. at p. 845, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 .) The court in Monge I noted its conclusion raised "numerous secondary issues": "For example, the Court of Appeal's determination that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant's prior conviction was of a s 2000Beyond Monge I and II, and Hernandez In remanding the case in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , the court concluded only that retrial was not barred by double jeopardy, specifically leaving open for determination the question of whether other constitutional or statutory grounds prevented retrial. ( Id. at p. 845, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 .) The court in Monge I noted its conclusion raised "numerous secondary issues": "For example, the Court of Appeal's determination that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant's prior conviction was of a s | 1 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Shirley
green
2 sentences1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C 1988(People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 88 [ 50 P. 390 ]; People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 85-87 [ 273 P. 575 ]; People v. Hernandez (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 715, 719 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 4 In People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 ], this court ruled inadmissible the testimony of any nondefendant witness who has been hypnotized for the purpose of restoring his or her memory of the events in issue, and that the prejudicial effect of erroneous admission of such testimony is to be judged under the “reasonable probability” test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 C | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co. v. Garrett
green
1 sentence1986App. 1978) 570 S.W.2d 70, 72 , citing Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co. v. Garrett (Tex.Com.App. 1923) 252 S.W. 738 .) Nothing in the California Corporations Code indicates that this long-held principle has been overruled or superseded by statute. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Country Cupboard, Inc. v. Texstar Corp.
green
1 sentence1986App. 1978) 570 S.W.2d 70, 72 , citing Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co. v. Garrett (Tex.Com.App. 1923) 252 S.W. 738 .) Nothing in the California Corporations Code indicates that this long-held principle has been overruled or superseded by statute. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.