aggrieved party must assign error in Texas

2022Scott v. Galusha, 890 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).

2005“When the trial court’s judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made.” Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28, 54 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (citing Scott v. Galusha, 890 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)).

2010Scott v. Galusha, 890 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, no writ).

2007Ass'n , 716 S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (affirming summary judgment “because summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly,” on the ground set out in the motion, and the appellant did not challenge that ground); see also Bridges v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. , No. 02-06-00081-CV, 2006 WL 3751404 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 21, 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[w]hen a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, and its judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense ass

2000See Bailey v. Rogers , 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. App.--Austin 1982, no writ); Hudson v. Buddie ' s Super Markets , Inc ., 488 S.W.2d 143, 147-48 (Tex. Civ.

2000See Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, no writ); Hudson v. Buddie’s Super Markets, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 143, 147-48 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1972, no writ).

2006Specialty Retailers v. DeMoranville , 933 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. 1996); Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc. , 138 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) ("Generally, when a trial court's judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground with merit to which no complaint is made."); see also Tex. R.

2006Specialty Retailers v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. 1996); Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (“Generally, when a trial court’s judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground 14 with merit to which no complaint is made.”); see also Tex. R.

2006Specialty Retailers v. DeMoranville , 933 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. 1996); Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc. , 138 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) ("Generally, when a trial court's judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground with merit to which no complaint is made."); see also Tex. R.

2006Specialty Retailers v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. 1996); Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (“Generally, when a trial court’s judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground 14 with merit to which no complaint is made.”); see also Tex. R.

2010Co., Inc., 169 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2005, no pet.).

2010Co., Inc., 169 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.).

2005Davis v. Conveyor-Matic, Inc. , 139 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2005Davis v. Conveyor-Matic, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2013Logistics, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (“When, 11 as in this case, the trial court’s judgment rests or may rest upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made.”).

2013Logistics, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (“When, as in this case, the trial court’s judgment rests or may rest upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made.”).

2011Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 181 , 182–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (affirming summary judgment ―because summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly,‖ on the ground set out in the motion, and the appellant did not challenge that ground); see also Smith, 195 S.W.3d at 311 (noting that because the plaintiff’s cause of action was excluded under one exception, the court did not need to address whether another alleged exception would apply).

2011Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 181 , 182–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (affirming summary judgment “because summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly,” on the ground set out in the motion, and the appellant did not challenge that ground); see also Smith , 195 S.W.3d at 311 (noting that because the plaintiff’s cause of action was excluded under one exception, the court did not need to address whether another alleged exception would apply).

2004Williamson v. State Farm Lloyds, 76 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2004Williamson v. State Farm Lloyds , 76 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2004Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (summary judgment); Umar v. Scott, 991 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (summary judgment); Hixson v. Pride of Texas Dist.

1999See Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995); Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, no writ); Hudson v. Buddie’s Super Markets, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 143, 147-48 (Tex.Civ.App. —Fort Worth 1972, no writ).

2011Ass’n, 716 S.W.2d 181 , 182–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (affirming summary judgment ―because summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly,‖ on the ground set out in the motion, and the appellant did not challenge that ground); see also Smith, 195 S.W.3d at 311 (noting that because the plaintiff’s cause of action was excluded under one exception, the court did not need to address whether another alleged exception would apply).

2007Ass'n , 716 S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (affirming summary judgment “because summary judgment may have been granted, properly or improperly,” on the ground set out in the motion, and the appellant did not challenge that ground); see also Bridges v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. , No. 02-06-00081-CV, 2006 WL 3751404 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 21, 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[w]hen a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, and its judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense ass

2006Wright , 991 S.W.2d at 349 ; see Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1970); cf. Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct Mortg., Inc ., 138 S.W.3d 497, 502-03 (Tex. App.སྭHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that if appellant brings a general point, they must provide argument for each summary judgment bases in the argument of the brief).

2002Wright v. Fowler, 991 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982, no writ).

2020Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ) (appellant must address each summary judgment ground asserted and why it is deficient to support judgment).

2015At the outset, it must be noted that Appellant’s failure to challenge each of the grounds upon which the trial court may have granted 38 Davis v. West, 433 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). 39 Id. 40 Mid-Century Ins. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). 41 Nabors Corp. Services, Inc. v. Northfield Ins.

2015First, the Bastrop County deed records, as well as a title certificate from Independence Title Company, prove that 73 Leffler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 290 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); see also Nabors Corp. Services, 132 S.W.3d at 95 (“[W]hen a trial court's summary judgment rests upon more than one independent ground, [ ] the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground not complained of.”); Secure Comm, Inc. v. Anderson, 31 S.W.3d 428, 430-31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (same proposition); Conely, 2010 WL 1632

2015First, the Bastrop County deed records, as well as a title certificate from Independence Title Company, prove that 73 Leffler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 290 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); see also Nabors Corp. Services, 132 S.W.3d at 95 (“[W]hen a trial court's summary judgment rests upon more than one independent ground, [ ] the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground not complained of.”); Secure Comm, Inc. v. Anderson, 31 S.W.3d 428, 430-31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (same proposition); Conely, 2010 WL 1632

2015First, the Bastrop County deed records, as well as a title certificate from Independence Title Company, prove that 73 Leffler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 290 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); see also Nabors Corp. Services, 132 S.W.3d at 95 (“[W]hen a trial court's summary judgment rests upon more than one independent ground, [ ] the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground not complained of.”); Secure Comm, Inc. v. Anderson, 31 S.W.3d 428, 430-31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (same proposition); Conely, 2010 WL 1632

2015First, the Bastrop County deed records, as well as a title certificate from Independence Title Company, prove that 73 Leffler v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 290 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); see also Nabors Corp. Services, 132 S.W.3d at 95 (“[W]hen a trial court's summary judgment rests upon more than one independent ground, [ ] the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground or the judgment will be affirmed on any ground not complained of.”); Secure Comm, Inc. v. Anderson, 31 S.W.3d 428, 430-31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (same proposition); Conely, 2010 WL 1632

2015At the outset, it must be noted that Appellant’s failure to challenge each of the grounds upon which the trial court may have granted 38 Davis v. West, 433 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). 39 Id. 40 Mid-Century Ins. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). 41 Nabors Corp. Services, Inc. v. Northfield Ins.

2015At the outset, it must be noted that Appellant’s failure to challenge each of the grounds upon which the trial court may have granted 38 Davis v. West, 433 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). 39 Id. 40 Mid-Century Ins. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2007). 41 Nabors Corp. Services, Inc. v. Northfield Ins.

2011See Markel, 293 S.W.3d at 385 . 15 When the trial court‘s judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made.

2007Co. , 683 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (holding that “[w]here a judgment may rest upon more than one ground, the party aggrieved must assign error to each such ground, or he has waived his right to complain of the ruling to which no error was assigned”). 12: See generally Wheeler v. Green , 157 S.W.3d 439, 442-44 (Tex. 2005) (reversing summary judgment based on deemed admissions that pro se plaintiff had failed to timely answer). 13: Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); see Tex. R.

2007Co. , 683 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (holding that “[w]here a judgment may rest upon more than one ground, the party aggrieved must assign error to each such ground, or he has waived his right to complain of the ruling to which no error was assigned”). 12: See generally Wheeler v. Green , 157 S.W.3d 439, 442-44 (Tex. 2005) (reversing summary judgment based on deemed admissions that pro se plaintiff had failed to timely answer). 13: Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); see Tex. R.

2007Co. , 683 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (holding that “[w]here a judgment may rest upon more than one ground, the party aggrieved must assign error to each such ground, or he has waived his right to complain of the ruling to which no error was assigned”). 12: See generally Wheeler v. Green , 157 S.W.3d 439, 442-44 (Tex. 2005) (reversing summary judgment based on deemed admissions that pro se plaintiff had failed to timely answer). 13: Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); see Tex. R.

2006Wright , 991 S.W.2d at 349 ; see Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1970); cf. Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct Mortg., Inc ., 138 S.W.3d 497, 502-03 (Tex. App.སྭHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that if appellant brings a general point, they must provide argument for each summary judgment bases in the argument of the brief).

2006Wright , 991 S.W.2d at 349 ; see Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier , 461 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. 1970); cf. Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct Mortg., Inc ., 138 S.W.3d 497, 502-03 (Tex. App.སྭHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that if appellant brings a general point, they must provide argument for each summary judgment bases in the argument of the brief).

2005“When the trial court’s judgment rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is made.” Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28, 54 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (citing Scott v. Galusha, 890 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)).

2004Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (summary judgment); Umar v. Scott, 991 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (summary judgment); Hixson v. Pride of Texas Dist.

1993Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Orr, 730 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987, no writ).