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10 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gibson v. Turnergreen2 sentences2015Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289 , 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1956); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“A covenant of general warranty means that the real property conveyed is free from encumbrances.”). 2015Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289 , 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1956); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“A covenant of general warranty means that the real property conveyed is free from encumbrances.”). | 2 | 2 |
City of Beaumont v. Mooregreen2 sentences2015See id. (“The covenant against encumbrances is embraced within the general warranty clause, and it is the legal duty of the grantor to pay off and discharge all liens and encumbrances incurred prior to the conveyance which are not assumed by the warrantee.”). 1960City of Beaumont v. Moore, 1947, 146 Tex. 46 , 202 S.W.2d 448 ; Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 1940, 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 ; Bumpass v. Bond, 1938, 131 Tex. 266 , 114 S.W.2d 1172 . | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2015Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289 , 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1956); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“A covenant of general warranty means that the real property conveyed is free from encumbrances.”). 2013Gibson v. Turner, 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (Tex. 1956); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419 , 424–25 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 2 |
Triplett v. Shieldgreen1 sentence2015Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289 , 294 S.W.2d 781, 787 (1956); Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424-25 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Triplett v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“A covenant of general warranty means that the real property conveyed is free from encumbrances.”). | 1 | 1 |
Kokernot v. Caldwellgreen1 sentence1986Cf. Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1950, writ ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rowe v. Heath
green
1 sentence2022In Rowe, the initial general warranty clause would have had no purpose “if we read the additional covenant to limit the scope of the general warranty’s protections.” Id. at 905 (citing Rowe, 23 Tex. at 619 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Humber v. Morton
green
1 sentence2015But the court also explained that “the covenant against incumbrances is embraced within the general warranty clause . . . .” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Walcott v. Kershner
neutral
1 sentence1965Arts. 1297, 1298, V.T.C.S., Walcott v. Kershner, Tex.Com.App., 291 S.W. 195 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Bumpass v. Bond
green
2 sentences1960City of Beaumont v. Moore, 1947, 146 Tex. 46 , 202 S.W.2d 448 ; Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 1940, 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 ; Bumpass v. Bond, 1938, 131 Tex. 266 , 114 S.W.2d 1172 . 1960City of Beaumont v. Moore, 1947, 146 Tex. 46 , 202 S.W.2d 448 ; Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 1940, 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 ; Bumpass v. Bond, 1938, 131 Tex. 266 , 114 S.W.2d 1172 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1960City of Beaumont v. Moore, 1947, 146 Tex. 46 , 202 S.W.2d 448 ; Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 1940, 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 ; Bumpass v. Bond, 1938, 131 Tex. 266 , 114 S.W.2d 1172 . 1960City of Beaumont v. Moore, 1947, 146 Tex. 46 , 202 S.W.2d 448 ; Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 1940, 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 ; Bumpass v. Bond, 1938, 131 Tex. 266 , 114 S.W.2d 1172 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
E. B. Germany v. J. B. Turner
green
2 sentences1950In Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491 , 123 S.W.2d 874, 877 , at page 877, our Supreme Court, stated: “While it is of course the duty of the Court to consider all parts of a deed, and if possible determine the intention of the grantors from a consideration of all its parts, giving effect to all parts if that can be done, yet it is not infrequent that a situation arises where it becomes necessary to resolve a conflict between certain portions of the deed. 1950In Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491 , 123 S.W.2d 874, 877 , at page 877, our Supreme Court, stated: “While it is of course the duty of the Court to consider all parts of a deed, and if possible determine the intention of the grantors from a consideration of all its parts, giving effect to all parts if that can be done, yet it is not infrequent that a situation arises where it becomes necessary to resolve a conflict between certain portions of the deed. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Delta County v. Blackburn
green
2 sentences1947Delta County v. Blackburn, 100 Texas 51 , 93 S. W. 419 ; Taylor v. Lane, 18 Texas Civ. 1947Delta County v. Blackburn, 100 Texas 51 , 93 S. W. 419 ; Taylor v. Lane, 18 Texas Civ. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Moses v. Chapman
green
1 sentence1939Moses v. Chapman, 280 S. W. 911 ; Baum v. McAfee, 59 Texas Civ. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.