Kelly reliability factors in Texas

2026Under the Kelly reliability test: “(1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid, (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid, and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question.” Id. (citing Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573 ).

2026Under the Kelly reliability test: “(1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid, (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid, and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question.” Id. (citing Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573 ).

2015See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2, 10 , 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doubt has increased in the medical community ‘over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone.’ ”) (quoting State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15 , 308 Wis.2d 374 , 746 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.2008, pet. denied)). 20 For all of these reasons, applying the Kelly reliability factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discre tion by admitting the testimony of the State’s experts; even if the principles supporting the testimony are not universally acce

2015Finally, the medical articles cited by appellant, while representative of Dr. Rothfeder’s testimony and the ongoing dispute concerning the diagnosis of abusive head trauma, do not compel us to hold that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the State’s expert testimony in this case. 25 For all of these reasons, applying the Kelly reliability factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of the State’s experts; even if the principles supporting the testimony are not universally accepted in various medical fields, we cannot hold th

2014La ter, in Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), the Court held that the multi-factor Kelly reliability test applies to Intoxilyzer test results.

2013Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2023Cf. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that “[t]he reliability inquiry is . . . a flexible one” that “even if the traditional Kelly reliability factors do not perfectly apply to particular testimony, the proponent is not excused from proving its reliability”); Wolfe v. State, 459 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015) (similar, citing Vela), aff’d, 509 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

2019“And even if the traditional Kelly reliability factors do not perfectly apply to particular testimony, the proponent is not excused from proving its reliability.” Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134 .

2015Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134 . 8 “The ‘hard’ sciences, areas in which precise measurement, calculation, and prediction are generally possible, include mathematics, physical science, earth science, and life science.” Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540 , 542 n.5 (Tex. Crim.

2013Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). *863 Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that was acquired in violation of the third prong of the Kelly reliability test — that is, that the technique employed to draw the blood was not properly applied.

2023Cf. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that “[t]he reliability inquiry is . . . a flexible one” that “even if the traditional Kelly reliability factors do not perfectly apply to particular testimony, the proponent is not excused from proving its reliability”); Wolfe v. State, 459 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015) (similar, citing Vela), aff’d, 509 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

2015App. 2000) (analyzing whether DNA evidence was reliable when allegations of contamination were raised); Hines v. State, 38 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (applying the Kelly reliability analysis to claims of contaminated DNA).

2015See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2, 10 , 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doubt has increased in the medical community ‘over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone.’ ”) (quoting State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15 , 308 Wis.2d 374 , 746 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.2008, pet. denied)). 20 For all of these reasons, applying the Kelly reliability factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discre tion by admitting the testimony of the State’s experts; even if the principles supporting the testimony are not universally acce

2015See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2, 10 , 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doubt has increased in the medical community ‘over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone.’ ”) (quoting State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15 , 308 Wis.2d 374 , 746 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.2008, pet. denied)). 20 For all of these reasons, applying the Kelly reliability factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discre tion by admitting the testimony of the State’s experts; even if the principles supporting the testimony are not universally acce

2015See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2, 10 , 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doubt has increased in the medical community ‘over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone.’ ”) (quoting State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15 , 308 Wis.2d 374 , 746 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.2008, pet. denied)). 20 For all of these reasons, applying the Kelly reliability factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discre tion by admitting the testimony of the State’s experts; even if the principles supporting the testimony are not universally acce

2015See, e.g., Cavazos v. Smith, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2, 10 , 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Doubt has increased in the medical community ‘over whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone.’ ”) (quoting State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 15 , 308 Wis.2d 374 , 746 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Wis.Ct.App.2008, pet. denied)). 20 For all of these reasons, applying the Kelly reliability factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discre tion by admitting the testimony of the State’s experts; even if the principles supporting the testimony are not universally acce