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10 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Janecka v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Appellant concedes that no objection was lodged against the allegedly improper argument, but argues that "when a jury argument is manifestly improper, an objection is not necessary to preserve the issue for appeal." Appellant points to Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 474 (Tex. Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825 , 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), in which the Court stated, "[w]ithout timely and specific objections, the question of allegedly improper closing arguments is not preserved for review unless manifestly improper. " (Emphasis added by appellant). 2004Appellant concedes that no objection was lodged against the allegedly improper argument, but argues that “when a jury argument is manifestly improper, an objection is not necessary to preserve the issue for appeal.” Appellant points to Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 474 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cer t. denied, 522 U.S. 825 , 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), in which the Court stated, “[w]ithout timely and specific objections, the question of allegedly improper closing arguments is not preserved for review unless manifestly improper.” (Emphasis added by appellant). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2012The four generally approved areas for jury argument are: (1> summation of the evidence. (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence. (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel, and (4) plea for law enforcement, Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Grim, App. 2010): Berrvv. | 1 | 1 |
Archer v. Stategreen1 sentence1983Griffin v. State, 487 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Archer v. State, 474 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Stategreen1 sentence1983Griffin v. State, 487 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Archer v. State, 474 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Purtell v. State
green
1 sentence2011App. 2002) (concluding that defendant waived his argument that the prosecutor committed reversible error when he referred to defendant in closing argument as a “despicable piece of human trash” because defendant failed to object and request a mistrial); Purtell, 761 S.W.2d at 366 ; see also Valentine v. State, No. 01-06-00522-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 8730 , at **12-13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“By failing to make a timely objection to the State’s closing argument, Valentine waived any alleged error.”). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Janecka v. Texas
green
2 sentences2004Appellant concedes that no objection was lodged against the allegedly improper argument, but argues that "when a jury argument is manifestly improper, an objection is not necessary to preserve the issue for appeal." Appellant points to Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 474 (Tex. Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825 , 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), in which the Court stated, "[w]ithout timely and specific objections, the question of allegedly improper closing arguments is not preserved for review unless manifestly improper. " (Emphasis added by appellant). 2004Appellant concedes that no objection was lodged against the allegedly improper argument, but argues that “when a jury argument is manifestly improper, an objection is not necessary to preserve the issue for appeal.” Appellant points to Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 474 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cer t. denied, 522 U.S. 825 , 118 S.Ct. 86 , 139 L.Ed.2d 43 (1997), in which the Court stated, “[w]ithout timely and specific objections, the question of allegedly improper closing arguments is not preserved for review unless manifestly improper.” (Emphasis added by appellant). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Clark v. State
green
1 sentence1995Id. at 724-25 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ramey v. State
green
1 sentence1995He cites Ramey v. State , 575 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bell v. State
green
1 sentence1983This is unlike the situation in the case cited by appellant, Bell v. State, 433 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a prosecutor committed reversible error by persistently disregarding a trial court’s ruling that the defendant’s reputation had not been placed in issue, and therefore could not properly be impeached. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Marshburn v. State
green
1 sentence1982In appellant’s sixth ground of error, it is argued that the prosecutor committed reversible error in several instances by arguing outside those permissible areas of jury argument outlined in Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.), wherein the following rules were enunciated: “To receive the stamp of approval of this court, jury arguments need to be within the areas of: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement, [citations omitted from text.] The arguments that go beyond these | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Alejandro v. State
green
1 sentence1982In appellant’s sixth ground of error, it is argued that the prosecutor committed reversible error in several instances by arguing outside those permissible areas of jury argument outlined in Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.), wherein the following rules were enunciated: “To receive the stamp of approval of this court, jury arguments need to be within the areas of: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement, [citations omitted from text.] The arguments that go beyond these | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Clanton v. State
green
1 sentence1982In appellant’s sixth ground of error, it is argued that the prosecutor committed reversible error in several instances by arguing outside those permissible areas of jury argument outlined in Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.), wherein the following rules were enunciated: “To receive the stamp of approval of this court, jury arguments need to be within the areas of: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement, [citations omitted from text.] The arguments that go beyond these | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Henry
neutral
1 sentence1979During his cross-examination of appellant’s wife the prosecutor asked her where she resided; she replied, “the Lubbock County Jail.” It is proper to question a witness as to his place of residence and occupation, in order to identify the witness and place before the jury facts which enable them to assess the witness’ credibility. 62 Tex.Jur.2d, Witnesses, Sec. 142, p. 12; Elam v. State, 518 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Galveston, H. & S. A. Railway Co. v. Henry, 252 S.W. 210 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1923). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Elam v. State
green
1 sentence1979During his cross-examination of appellant’s wife the prosecutor asked her where she resided; she replied, “the Lubbock County Jail.” It is proper to question a witness as to his place of residence and occupation, in order to identify the witness and place before the jury facts which enable them to assess the witness’ credibility. 62 Tex.Jur.2d, Witnesses, Sec. 142, p. 12; Elam v. State, 518 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Galveston, H. & S. A. Railway Co. v. Henry, 252 S.W. 210 (Tex.Civ.App. — Galveston 1923). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Sparks v. State
neutral
2 sentences1962In Sparks v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 111 , 261 S.W.2d 571 , we held that the prosecutor committed reversible error by stating that the appellant possessed marijuana for the purpose of selling it to school children where there was no evidence in the record to support such a statement. 1962In Sparks v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 111 , 261 S.W.2d 571 , we held that the prosecutor committed reversible error by stating that the appellant possessed marijuana for the purpose of selling it to school children where there was no evidence in the record to support such a statement. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Kirk v. State
green
2 sentences1962In Kirk v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 124 , 261 S.W.2d 721 , we held the prosecutor's statement to the jury that he had helped appellant *384 out of other trouble reversible error where there was no evidence in the record to support the same. 1962In Kirk v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 124 , 261 S.W.2d 721 , we held the prosecutor's statement to the jury that he had helped appellant *384 out of other trouble reversible error where there was no evidence in the record to support the same. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.