accused manages his own defense in California

1989Our highest court has cogently observed: “When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581 ].) Moreover, virtually all of the tasks petitioner urges in support of his request for Keenan counsel—interviewing witnesses, including experts, aiding in obtaining his own expert witnesses, preparation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial, assistance in challenging the special circumstance allegation—may

1989Our highest court has cogently observed: “When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.” (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581 ].) Moreover, virtually all of the tasks petitioner urges in support of his request for Keenan counsel—interviewing witnesses, including experts, aiding in obtaining his own expert witnesses, preparation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial, assistance in challenging the special circumstance allegation—may

2020For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits. [Citations.] Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 23 p. 835.) Pertinent to the instant case, a pro se defendant does not, however, have a

2020For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits. [Citations.] Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 23 p. 835.) Pertinent to the instant case, a pro se defendant does not, however, have a

2020(People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1105 (Hall) [concluding a “knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is required before the criminal defendant is permitted to represent himself or herself”].) The constitutional requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is designed for the protection of the criminal defendant: “When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.

2020(People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1105 (Hall) [concluding a “knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is required before the criminal defendant is permitted to represent himself or herself”].) The constitutional requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is designed for the protection of the criminal defendant: “When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.

1977For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelli *990 gently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, at p. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , atp. 581].) But even prior to the Faretta decision California law had declared that “[b]efore a defendant may be permitted to waive his right to counsel, the trial court must determine that he is competent to represent himself (People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 908 (13) [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 208 , 471 P.2d 1008 ]) and has an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act (People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d

1977For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelli *990 gently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, at p. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , atp. 581].) But even prior to the Faretta decision California law had declared that “[b]efore a defendant may be permitted to waive his right to counsel, the trial court must determine that he is competent to represent himself (People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 908 (13) [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 208 , 471 P.2d 1008 ]) and has an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act (People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d

1977For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelli *990 gently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, at p. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , atp. 581].) But even prior to the Faretta decision California law had declared that “[b]efore a defendant may be permitted to waive his right to counsel, the trial court must determine that he is competent to represent himself (People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 908 (13) [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 208 , 471 P.2d 1008 ]) and has an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act (People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d

1977For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelli *990 gently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, at p. 835 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , atp. 581].) But even prior to the Faretta decision California law had declared that “[b]efore a defendant may be permitted to waive his right to counsel, the trial court must determine that he is competent to represent himself (People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 908 (13) [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 208 , 471 P.2d 1008 ]) and has an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act (People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d