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9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Transamerica Title Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1052 (Transamerica Title).) The scope of the waiver “is narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title, at p. 1052; see, e.g., Manela, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-1148 [waiver of privilege as to communications with two doctors did not waive the privilege as to communications with a third doctor on the same subject].) The application of these waiver principles is straightforward here. 2004Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1052 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 825 ].) The party opposing the privilege bears the burden of showing that there has been an implied waiver. | 3 | 4 |
TJX Companies, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2001The appearance of neutrality suffers when the replacement makes no appearance at all. ( TJX, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 755, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 . ["Hearing oral argument is one of the best way we know for substitute judges to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the parties and the public that judicial responsibility has been exercised rather than abdicated"].) The vagueness of the order in question ("the attorney client privilege was waived") hardly inspires confidence that the court carefully reviewed the waiver claims and limited "the information required to be disclosed ... [to] fit strict 2001The appearance of neutrality suffers when the replacement makes no appearance at all. ( TJX, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 755, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 . ["Hearing oral argument is one of the best way we know for substitute judges to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the parties and the public that judicial responsibility has been exercised rather than abdicated"].) The vagueness of the order in question ("the attorney client privilege was waived") hardly inspires confidence that the court carefully reviewed the waiver claims and limited "the information required to be disclosed ... [to] fit strict | 2 | 2 |
Manela v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2022Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1052 (Transamerica Title).) The scope of the waiver “is narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title, at p. 1052; see, e.g., Manela, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-1148 [waiver of privilege as to communications with two doctors did not waive the privilege as to communications with a third doctor on the same subject].) The application of these waiver principles is straightforward here. | 1 | 1 |
Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen1 sentence2004(Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604 ; Wellpoint, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) “Where privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ].) The scope of an implied waiver must be “narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co.green2 sentences2004(Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604 ; Wellpoint, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) “Where privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ].) The scope of an implied waiver must be “narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title Ins. 2004(Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604 ; Wellpoint, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) “Where privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ].) The scope of an implied waiver must be “narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sisson v. Ruby
green
2 sentences2025(Sisson, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 363 .) Instead, the court confines its inquiry to whether this type of incident could disrupt maritime commerce. 2025(Sisson, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 363 .) Instead, the court confines its inquiry to whether this type of incident could disrupt maritime commerce. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Vickers
green
1 sentence2015Defendant points to section 1203.2, which he asserts “‘incorporate[s] the procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [(Morrissey)],[4] and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 [(Vickers)], and their progeny’ . . . (see 2012 Cal. Legis.Serv. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
1 sentence2015Defendant points to section 1203.2, which he asserts “‘incorporate[s] the procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [(Morrissey)],[4] and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 [(Vickers)], and their progeny’ . . . (see 2012 Cal. Legis.Serv. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mitchell v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2004(Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604 ; Wellpoint, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) “Where privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ].) The scope of an implied waiver must be “narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title Ins. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Aceves v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1998The trial court still has a duty to explore the conflict, and counsel has a corresponding duty to respond, and to describe the general nature, as fully as possible but within the confines of privilege." ( Id., at pp. 592-593, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 280 .) It may be argued that the truncated exchange between counsel and the court did not permit such exploration here. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wilson v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1987(Wilson v. Superior Court (1916) 63 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 130 ].) The scope of either a statutory or implied waiver is narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver. 1987(Wilson v. Superior Court (1916) 63 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 130 ].) The scope of either a statutory or implied waiver is narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.