essentially defendant in California

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

1965He cites such cases as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 [ 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 ]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 884 , 392 P.2d 964 ]; People v. Robinson, 42 Cal.2d 741 [ 269 P.2d 6 ]; and People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569 [ 140 P.2d 24 , 148 A.L.R. 176 ].

2013(See Jakks Pacific, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 596, 603 .) A notice of disqualification can be based upon any subdivision of section 1281.9, results in automatic disqualification upon service, and is subject to a 15-day deadline. (§ 1281.91, subds. (a), (b).) A demand for disqualification can be made outside of the 15-day window upon the grounds specified in section 170.1 for disqualification of a judge. (§ 1281.91, subd. (d).) “If any ground specified in Section 170.1 exists, a neutral arbitrator shall disqualify himself or herself upon the demand of any party made before t

2003Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, subdivision (b)(2) defines “frivolous” to mean “(A) totally and completely without merit or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” Whether action taken by a party or party’s attorney is frivolous under that statute “ ‘is governed by an objective standard: Any reasonable attorney would agree it is totally and completely without merit.’ ” (Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc. (2002) 95 *350 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1262 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) 5 This is essentially the standard used by the Flaherty court.

1986(People v. Scott (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 937 , *1207 940-942 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 220-221 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ].) We apply the familiar substantial evidence test as to the entire record on appeal to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the special circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

1986(People v. Scott (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 937 , *1207 940-942 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 322 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 220-221 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ].) We apply the familiar substantial evidence test as to the entire record on appeal to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the special circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

1978Essentially defendant makes three contentions on this appeal: (1) that the exclusion, prior to the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, of prospective jurors who expressed conscientious scruples against capital punishment to the extent that they could not vote for the death penalty irrespective of the evidence, amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights to due process of law, equal protection of the laws and a right to an impartial trial by jury; (2) that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of defendant’s assault on a police officer upon defendant’s ini

1978Essentially defendant makes three contentions on this appeal: (1) that the exclusion, prior to the guilt phase of defendant’s trial, of prospective jurors who expressed conscientious scruples against capital punishment to the extent that they could not vote for the death penalty irrespective of the evidence, amounted to a denial of his constitutional rights to due process of law, equal protection of the laws and a right to an impartial trial by jury; (2) that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of defendant’s assault on a police officer upon defendant’s ini

1973It is not true that one could not be convicted of theft based upon a representation that a fraudulent check was good. 'In People v. Rose, 42 Cal.App. 540 [ 183 P. 874 ], such a conviction was upheld based upon an explicit declaration the check was good.

1973It is not true that one could not be convicted of theft based upon a representation that a fraudulent check was good. 'In People v. Rose, 42 Cal.App. 540 [ 183 P. 874 ], such a conviction was upheld based upon an explicit declaration the check was good.