essentially claim in Wisconsin

2021We defer to the court’s credibility determinations.3 See Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶28 , 312 Wis. 2d 435 , 752 N.W.2d 359 . ¶20 Weckler next argues the circuit court erred because it “dissected the testimony” regarding each claimed use of the disputed area and “refused to evaluate [those uses] collectively.” He asserts the court essentially applied a rule that in order to establish twenty continuous years of adverse possession, the “nature and type” of use must be the same for the entire twenty-year period.

2021We defer to the court’s credibility determinations.3 See Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶28 , 312 Wis. 2d 435 , 752 N.W.2d 359 . ¶20 Weckler next argues the circuit court erred because it “dissected the testimony” regarding each claimed use of the disputed area and “refused to evaluate [those uses] collectively.” He asserts the court essentially applied a rule that in order to establish twenty continuous years of adverse possession, the “nature and type” of use must be the same for the entire twenty-year period.

2018Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC , 2013 WI 62 , ¶ 23, 348 Wis. 2d 631 , 833 N.W.2d 586 . ¶ 20 The circuit court properly observed that the Bank's evidence was severely lacking in showing that the dictates of WIS.

2018Tufail v. Midwest Hosp., LLC , 2013 WI 62 , ¶ 23, 348 Wis. 2d 631 , 833 N.W.2d 586 . ¶ 20 The circuit court properly observed that the Bank's evidence was severely lacking in showing that the dictates of WIS.

2012In Harvot , we ultimately rejected the plaintiffs claim to a jury trial right because "the most analogous common law cause of action" that the plaintiff offered to the court was essentially a claim for the breach of an employment contract. 320 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 85 .

2005Where Westport appears to err is in its failure to appreciate that this is essentially a claim of failure to adhere to professional standards, sounding in negligence, but arising in the context of a contract. 15 Malpractice actions "may sound in either tort or contract." McMahon v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 351, 353 , 371 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1985).

2005Where Westport appears to err is in its failure to appreciate that this is essentially a claim of failure to adhere to professional standards, sounding in negligence, but arising in the context of a contract. 15 Malpractice actions "may sound in either tort or contract." McMahon v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 351, 353 , 371 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1985).

1979This essentially is the standard which a trial judge uses when he sentences a defendant in an ordinary criminal proceeding.” Cook, supra, 66 Wis.2d at 29 .

1978These rules were recently reiterated by the court in Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 174, 183 , 242 N.W.2d 919 (1976): "`While intent is a state of mind, it is not to be determined apart from the actions of the person involved.

1978These rules were recently reiterated by the court in Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 174, 183 , 242 N.W.2d 919 (1976): "`While intent is a state of mind, it is not to be determined apart from the actions of the person involved.

1977This is essentially the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, and I would affirm its judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) (Agurs dissent, Slip Opinion at 8-9, 49 L.