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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Districtgreen2 sentences2012Lastly, tolling benefits the court system by reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing requirement, in many instances rendering later court proceedings either easier and cheaper to resolve or wholly unnecessary.” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99-100 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 194 P.3d 1026 ] (McDonald).) If otherwise appropriate, equitable tolling is available when there is timely notice and lack of prejudice to the defendant and reasonable and good faith conduct by the plaintiff. 2012Lastly, tolling benefits the court system by reducing the costs associated with a duplicative filing requirement, in many instances rendering later court proceedings either easier and cheaper to resolve or wholly unnecessary.” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99-100 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 194 P.3d 1026 ] (McDonald).) If otherwise appropriate, equitable tolling is available when there is timely notice and lack of prejudice to the defendant and reasonable and good faith conduct by the plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
Elkins v. Derbygreen1 sentence2008(See Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 923 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ].) Its application in such circumstances serves “the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration of justice.” (Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958, 965 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” (Ibid.; see also Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 419-420; Collier v. City of Pasadena, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 926 .) By al | 1 | 1 |
Schifando v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2008(E.g., Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1091 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569 ]; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 820-821 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ].) The tolling doctrine does so without compromising defendants’ significant “interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve evidence” because that notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that gives rise to tolling. 2008(E.g., Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1091 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569 ]; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 820-821 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ].) The tolling doctrine does so without compromising defendants’ significant “interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve evidence” because that notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that gives rise to tolling. | 1 | 1 |
Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.green2 sentences2008(E.g., Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1091 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569 ]; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 820-821 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ].) The tolling doctrine does so without compromising defendants’ significant “interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve evidence” because that notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that gives rise to tolling. 2008(E.g., Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1091 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 , 79 P.3d 569 ]; Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 820-821 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 ].) The tolling doctrine does so without compromising defendants’ significant “interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may gather and preserve evidence” because that notice interest is satisfied by the filing of the first proceeding that gives rise to tolling. | 1 | 1 |
Olson v. County of Sacramentogreen2 sentences2008(See Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 923 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ].) Its application in such circumstances serves “the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration of justice.” (Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958, 965 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” (Ibid.; see also Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 419-420; Collier v. City of Pasadena, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 926 .) By al 2008(See Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 923 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ].) Its application in such circumstances serves “the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration of justice.” (Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958, 965 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” (Ibid.; see also Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 419-420; Collier v. City of Pasadena, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 926 .) By al | 1 | 1 |
Collier v. City of Pasadenagreen2 sentences2008(See Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 923 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ].) Its application in such circumstances serves “the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration of justice.” (Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958, 965 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” (Ibid.; see also Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 419-420; Collier v. City of Pasadena, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 926 .) By al 2008(See Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 923 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 681 ].) Its application in such circumstances serves “the need for harmony and the avoidance of chaos in the administration of justice.” (Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958, 965 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 664 ].) Tolling eases the pressure on parties “concurrently to seek redress in two separate forums with the attendant danger of conflicting decisions on the same issue.” (Ibid.; see also Elkins v. Derby, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 419-420; Collier v. City of Pasadena, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 926 .) By al | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brownred1 sentence1991(See, e.g., People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1277 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ].) Because of the potentially misleading nature of the instruction, we held that in reviewing cases tried before Brown we would review the record to determine “whether . . . the sentencer may have been mislead to defendant’s prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion . . . .” (Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17 .) Defendant here contends that the prosecutor’s repeated emphasis on the apparently mandatory language of the instruction—“shall impose a sentence of death”—misled the ju | 1 | 1 |
People v. Allengreen2 sentences1991(See, e.g., People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1277 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ].) Because of the potentially misleading nature of the instruction, we held that in reviewing cases tried before Brown we would review the record to determine “whether . . . the sentencer may have been mislead to defendant’s prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion . . . .” (Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17 .) Defendant here contends that the prosecutor’s repeated emphasis on the apparently mandatory language of the instruction—“shall impose a sentence of death”—misled the ju 1991(See, e.g., People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1277 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ].) Because of the potentially misleading nature of the instruction, we held that in reviewing cases tried before Brown we would review the record to determine “whether . . . the sentencer may have been mislead to defendant’s prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion . . . .” (Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17 .) Defendant here contends that the prosecutor’s repeated emphasis on the apparently mandatory language of the instruction—“shall impose a sentence of death”—misled the ju | 1 | 1 |
Pettitt v. Levygreen2 sentences1990It must always be borne in mind that it is not intended to protect malicious and untruthful persons, but that it is intended to protect persons acting bona fide, who under a different rule would be liable, not perhaps to verdicts and judgments against them, but to the vexation of defending actions.’ ”]; Pettitt v. Levy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 492 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 650 ] [“It is not gratifying to reach a result which insulates those guilty of alleged heinous conduct from answering therefor. 1990It must always be borne in mind that it is not intended to protect malicious and untruthful persons, but that it is intended to protect persons acting bona fide, who under a different rule would be liable, not perhaps to verdicts and judgments against them, but to the vexation of defending actions.’ ”]; Pettitt v. Levy (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 484, 492 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 650 ] [“It is not gratifying to reach a result which insulates those guilty of alleged heinous conduct from answering therefor. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Chiu
red
2 sentences2015“When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 .) “An instructional error presenting the jury with a legally invalid theory of guilt does not require reversal . . . if other parts of the verdict demonstrate that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory.” (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 727 .) Here, the trial court properly instruc 2015“When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 .) “An instructional error presenting the jury with a legally invalid theory of guilt does not require reversal . . . if other parts of the verdict demonstrate that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory.” (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 727 .) Here, the trial court properly instruc | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Pulido
green
2 sentences2015“When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 .) “An instructional error presenting the jury with a legally invalid theory of guilt does not require reversal . . . if other parts of the verdict demonstrate that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory.” (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 727 .) Here, the trial court properly instruc 2015“When a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on a valid ground.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 .) “An instructional error presenting the jury with a legally invalid theory of guilt does not require reversal . . . if other parts of the verdict demonstrate that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory.” (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 727 .) Here, the trial court properly instruc | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Perez
green
1 sentence2024Perez decided substantial evidence—with deference—is the proper standard. ( Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1059 & 1066.) Thomas states a fear that to rule against him will mean all police evasion convictions will result in ineligibility under the Act. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Iniguez
green
1 sentence2016(Iniguez, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 856 .) The subjective component “asks whether a victim genuinely entertained a fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury sufficient to induce her to submit” to sexual activity against her will. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
red
2 sentences1993Finally, the finder of fact should test the genuineness of the plaintiff's fear under the factors discussed in Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , including expert testimony, a juror's own experience, and the particular circumstances of the case. 1993Finally, the finder of fact should test the genuineness of the plaintiff’s fear under the factors discussed in Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , including expert testimony, a juror’s own experience, and the particular circumstances of the case. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.