frustration doctrine in California

2025Co. v. Perscallo (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 799, 802 .) At least two of the elements of a frustration defense— interference with the parties’ recognized purpose in contracting and the near total destruction of counterperformance—are not established in this case.16 With respect to the parties’ purpose in entering the agreement, Lee stated in his declaration that Yellow Cross purchased the laser “for the purpose of expanding our skin care clinic.” But there is no evidence Stearns was aware of Lee’s purpose, let alone that it shared that purpose when it loaned money to Yellow Cross.

2025(Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman).) This “burden ‘grows with the complexity of the record’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 739 ), and unless this burden is met, we may treat the substantial evidence issues as waived and presume the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.

2023The doctrine of commercial frustration exists where “‘Performance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event.’” (Dorn v. Goetz (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 407 , 410 quoting Williston on Contracts, vol. 6, Rev.Ed., p. 5419).) While this appeal was pending, our colleagues in the Fourth District concluded in a similar case involving Fitness that “because the application of the doctrine of frustration under

2023(Poway Crossings, at p. 896; 20th Century Lites, at p. 945.) Fitness International cites Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1001 for the proposition California law does recognize temporary frustration of purpose, but Maudlin addressed the doctrine of temporary impossibility or impracticability, not temporary frustration of purpose.

2023Our conclusion is supported by the rule that where commercial frustration does apply, the “legal effect . . . is the immediate termination of the contract.” (Johnson v. Atkins (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 430, 435 ; see also 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d Supp. 938 , 945 (20th Century Lites) [“frustration brings the contract to end forthwith”].) As amicus curiae points out, because the application of the doctrine of frustration under California law compels the termination of the contract, the law does not recognize the “temporary” frustration defense Fitness attempts to asser

1969(See e.g., McLarren v. Spalding (1852) 2 Cal. 510, 514 .) It applies also to subdivision 2 of section 1932 of the Civil Code. 14 Whether the perishment required by section 1932 was the failure of the cesspool or the consequent termination of the trailer park operations pursuant *678 to governmental order, Sewell cannot prevail, for he assumed the risk of both occurrences.

1969(Ainsworth v. Ritt (1869) 38 Cal. 89, 90 .) Although the doctrine of frustration might, in the absence of section 1932, apply to situations covered by that section, the section neither limits the frustration doctrine nor codifies its principles.

1969(Ainsworth v. Ritt (1869) 38 Cal. 89, 90 .) Although the doctrine of frustration might, in the absence of section 1932, apply to situations covered by that section, the section neither limits the frustration doctrine nor codifies its principles.