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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Friendred2 sentences1969(See People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 767-768 [ 306 P.2d 463 ]; Model Pen. 1969(See People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 767-768 [ 306 P.2d 463 ]; Model Pen. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Dominguezgreen2 sentences2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a 2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Leavelgreen2 sentences2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a 2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Powergreen2 sentences2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a 2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Vinesred2 sentences2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a 2017(See People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1151-1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [summarizing the standard applied in determining the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping; explaining that "the jury must 'consider [ ] the "scope and nature" of the movement,' as well as 'the context of the environment in which the movement occurred' " (italics omitted) & articulating "various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Conleyred2 sentences1973(People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 324-326, fn. 4 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ].) This contention involves the complex subject of the kinds of instruction required where diminished capacity to form a specific mental intent is the issue in a homicide case. 1973(People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 324-326, fn. 4 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ].) This contention involves the complex subject of the kinds of instruction required where diminished capacity to form a specific mental intent is the issue in a homicide case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2021(Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 598 .) The Johnson majority pointed out that in three of the court’s previous four decisions on the residual clause, “we found it necessary to resort to a different ad hoc test to guide our inquiry.” (Ibid.) Further, lower federal courts found the residual clause “ ‘nearly impossible to apply consistently,’ ” and their decisions indicated “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.” (Id. at p. 601.) It is relevant that California appellate court decisions on aggravated k 2021The jury here also asked for a definition of “minor or moderate bodily harm.” 13 majority observed, “even clear laws produce close cases.” ( 576 U.S. at p. 601 .) The problem with the residual clause was that cases demonstrated a “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.” (Ibid.) The Ledesma court explained, “In contrast, California cases on the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping . . . show broad agreement on both the nature of the inquiry required and the relevant factors to evaluate when | 3 | 2017–2021 |
People v. Ledesma
green
1 sentence2021The jury here also asked for a definition of “minor or moderate bodily harm.” 13 majority observed, “even clear laws produce close cases.” ( 576 U.S. at p. 601 .) The problem with the residual clause was that cases demonstrated a “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.” (Ibid.) The Ledesma court explained, “In contrast, California cases on the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping . . . show broad agreement on both the nature of the inquiry required and the relevant factors to evaluate when | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sessions v. Dimaya
green
1 sentence2021The jury here also asked for a definition of “minor or moderate bodily harm.” 13 majority observed, “even clear laws produce close cases.” ( 576 U.S. at p. 601 .) The problem with the residual clause was that cases demonstrated a “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.” (Ibid.) The Ledesma court explained, “In contrast, California cases on the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping . . . show broad agreement on both the nature of the inquiry required and the relevant factors to evaluate when | 1 | 2021–2021 |
County of Orange v. FST Sand & Gravel, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998This is a companion case to County of Orange v. FST Sand & Gravel, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 353 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 633 ] (FST Sand & Gravel), which we also decide today. (1) Both cases involve the question of whether a claim by a public entity is a “covered claim” for purposes of section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(4) (formerly subdivision (c)(3)) of the Insurance Code, 1 which limits the kinds of claim which the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) is potentially liable to indemnify. 1998This is a companion case to County of Orange v. FST Sand & Gravel, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 353 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 633 ] (FST Sand & Gravel), which we also decide today. (1) Both cases involve the question of whether a claim by a public entity is a “covered claim” for purposes of section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(4) (formerly subdivision (c)(3)) of the Insurance Code, 1 which limits the kinds of claim which the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA) is potentially liable to indemnify. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Finn v. G. D. Searle & Co.
green
2 sentences1991Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (9th Cir.1968) 399 F.2d 121, 129-130 , described the need to warn in order to provide "true choice": "When, in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given. [Fn. omitted.]" (See also Finn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 699-700, on the kinds of warnings and their implications.) Thus, the fact that a manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer in deciding no 1991Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (9th Cir. 1968) 399 F.2d 121, 129-130 , described the need to warn in order to provide “true choice”: “When, in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given. [Fn. omitted.]” (See also Finn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 699-700, on the kinds of warnings and their implications.) Thus, the fact that a manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer in deciding n | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (9th Cir.1968) 399 F.2d 121, 129-130 , described the need to warn in order to provide "true choice": "When, in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given. [Fn. omitted.]" (See also Finn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 699-700, on the kinds of warnings and their implications.) Thus, the fact that a manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer in deciding no 1991Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (9th Cir. 1968) 399 F.2d 121, 129-130 , described the need to warn in order to provide “true choice”: “When, in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g., of death or major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment, medical or personal, the warning must be given. [Fn. omitted.]” (See also Finn, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 699-700, on the kinds of warnings and their implications.) Thus, the fact that a manufacturer acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer in deciding n | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Polk
green
1 sentence1969Recitation of such factors by the trial court is therefore not essential.” Nor was the court required to give the instructions requested by defendant, even had his request been in writing and timely. 4 We noted in People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d 443 , 451, that “The trial court may . . . properly aid the jury by stating the kinds of factors that may be considered, thereby setting the tone for the jury’s deliberation. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.