mutual waiver (California) · Go Syfert
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mutual waiver in California

9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Elden v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.green
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998The statutes specify the content of the declarations and that they be on forms prescribed by the Judicial Council. ( Elden v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1497 , 1505-1506 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 ].) *Page 690 "The parties may stipulate to a mutual waiver of [final declarations] by execution of a waiver in a marital settlement agreement or by stipulated judgment or a stipulation entered into in open court." (§ 2105 , subd. (c).) The record here does not demonstrate that the parties entered into such a waiver or stipulation.

1998The statutes specify the content of the declarations and that they be on forms prescribed by the Judicial Council. ( Elden v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1497 , 1505-1506 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 322 ].) *Page 690 "The parties may stipulate to a mutual waiver of [final declarations] by execution of a waiver in a marital settlement agreement or by stipulated judgment or a stipulation entered into in open court." (§ 2105 , subd. (c).) The record here does not demonstrate that the parties entered into such a waiver or stipulation.

12
Najah v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.green
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 125, 143 [ 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 ] (Najah).) Background On August 3, 2012, approximately two months prior to trial and six weeks after filing its motion for summary judgment, Ameron made an offer to compromise under section 998, offering a mutual waiver of costs and fees in exchange for a dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiffs’ claims against Ameron.

2015Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 125, 143 [ 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 ] (Najah).) Background On August 3, 2012, approximately two months prior to trial and six weeks after filing its motion for summary judgment, Ameron made an offer to compromise under section 998, offering a mutual waiver of costs and fees in exchange for a dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiffs’ claims against Ameron.

11
In Re Marriage of Fellgreen
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Code, § 2105, subd. (d).) Unless the mandatory conditions specified in section 2105 are met, no purported waiver is *782 effective to excuse exchange of the prescribed final declarations. 5 (In re Marriage of Fell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1065 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ] [“Where the Legislature permits a particular, limited waiver of a right upon satisfaction of a set of conditions, it intends that no other related waivers be permitted.”].) Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts have recognized that when parties to a marital dissolution agree to settle their property or support issues by nonjudic

2014Code, § 2105, subd. (d).) Unless the mandatory conditions specified in section 2105 are met, no purported waiver is *782 effective to excuse exchange of the prescribed final declarations. 5 (In re Marriage of Fell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1065 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ] [“Where the Legislature permits a particular, limited waiver of a right upon satisfaction of a set of conditions, it intends that no other related waivers be permitted.”].) Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts have recognized that when parties to a marital dissolution agree to settle their property or support issues by nonjudic

11
Randles v. Lowrygreen
calctapp · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007(Randles v. Lowry (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 68, 74 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 321 ] (Randles).) That concern is absent here, not only because Gloria Peterson did not constitute multiple plaintiffs, but also because the proposed settlement sum was zero—John Crane having proposed a mutual waiver of costs—and one-third of zero is still zero.

2007(Randles v. Lowry (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 68, 74 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 321 ] (Randles).) That concern is absent here, not only because Gloria Peterson did not constitute multiple plaintiffs, but also because the proposed settlement sum was zero—John Crane having proposed a mutual waiver of costs—and one-third of zero is still zero.

11
California Trust Co. v. Cohngreen
calctapp · 1935 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989Appalachian argues article 14 should be reformed to reflect this “true agreement” of the parties. 8 *19 As a general rule, a written contract, having been deliberately executed, is presumed to correctly express the parties’ intentions, (California Trust Co. v. Cohn (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 33, 40 [ 48 P.2d 744 ].) “The presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome by satisfactory evidence which shows that the written instrument is not in conformity with the true agreement of the parties.” (Ibid.) Civil Code section 3399 allows reformation of a contract when, through mistake, it fails to express

1989Appalachian argues article 14 should be reformed to reflect this “true agreement” of the parties. 8 *19 As a general rule, a written contract, having been deliberately executed, is presumed to correctly express the parties’ intentions, (California Trust Co. v. Cohn (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 33, 40 [ 48 P.2d 744 ].) “The presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome by satisfactory evidence which shows that the written instrument is not in conformity with the true agreement of the parties.” (Ibid.) Civil Code section 3399 allows reformation of a contract when, through mistake, it fails to express

11
American Home Insurance v. Travelers Indemnity Co.green
calctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
1 sentence

1989Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 951, 961 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 826 ].) When reformation is sought, “the Court may inquire what the instrument was intended to mean, and what were intended to be its legal consequences, and is not confined to the inquiry what the language of the instrument was intended to be.” (Civ.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Mecchi v. Picchi green
calctapp · 1966
2 sentences

2019(Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Mecchi, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 475 .) In determining whether the trial court can modify or reconsider a mutual waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial agreement because its impact once executed appears unfair to a party, we find it useful to compare the waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial agreement to similar provisions in marital settlement agreements made once a dissolution action is filed that seek to limit modification of support or terminate it entirely.

2019(Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Mecchi , supra , 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 475 , 54 Cal.Rptr. 1 .) In determining whether the trial court can modify or reconsider a mutual waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial agreement because its impact once executed appears unfair to a party, we find it useful to compare the waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial agreement to similar provisions in marital settlement agreements made once a dissolution action is filed that seek to limit modification of support or terminate it entirely.

22019–2019
People v. Ross green
calctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2024The jury was not given the legal definition or requirements for mutual combat but was erroneously told that it “involved no particular legal requirement, but should be understood and applied in an ordinary, lay sense.” ( Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1042, fn. 9, 1047.) The two errors resulted in “an unwarranted and dangerously incomplete instruction on a prosecution theory in rebuttal of the defense.” (Id. at p. 1054.) The instructional errors left the jury to think the instruction applied to any exchange of blows and the court failed to clarify the meaning of mutual combat even after r

12024–2024
People Ex Rel. Lockyer v. Fremont General Corp. green
calctapp · 2001
2 sentences

2007Any dilemma the People faced cannot be attributed to uncertainty in the offer itself, or affect the validity of defendant's offer to buy its peace in traditional fashion." ( Fremont, supra, at p. 1270 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 127 .) Consistent with Fremont , we conclude that Gloria Peterson was a "single plaintiff," capable of deciding for herself whether a dismissal of all of her claims in exchange for a mutual waiver of costs was an acceptable resolution. ( Fremont, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 127 .) Any uncertainty was not the type that would invalidate John Crane's section

2007Any dilemma the People faced cannot be attributed to uncertainty in the offer itself, or affect the validity of defendant’s offer to buy its peace in traditional fashion.” (Fremont, supra, at p. 1270 .) Consistent with Fremont , we conclude that Gloria Peterson was a “single plaintiff,” capable of deciding for herself whether a dismissal of all of her claims in exchange for a mutual waiver of costs was an acceptable resolution. ( Fremont, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260 .) Any uncertainty was not the type that would invalidate John Crane’s section 998 offer.

12007–2007

Where else courts name it

LA 35 (1936–2021) NY 20 (1856–2016) CA 9 (1989–2024) MO 5 (1893–2008) TN 4 (1866–2026) IL 4 (1934–2026) TX 4 (1941–2014) OH 4 (1989–2017) PA 3 (1900–2020) MD 3 (1956–2010) MA 3 (1996–2007) NJ 3 (2008–2019) OR 2 (1987–1989) OK 2 (1974–1978) KY 2 (1869–2005) VA 2 (1831–1883) IN 2 (2005–2018) CO 2 (1975–2016) MI 2 (1999–2023) WV 2 (2009–2015) NE 2 (1894–2013) NM 2 (1984–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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