nlra rule in California

2021The Court considered whether the FAA was in conflict with other federal laws, including section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which guarantees workers the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” (Olson v. Lyft, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 862 , 868 (Olson), discussing Epic, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1624 .) “The Court found no such conflict, and refused to ‘re

2021(See id. at pp. 691–692.) The Iskanian rule concerning PAGA waivers has not been similarly superseded, so Ledesma provides no basis for us to disregard our Supreme Court’s controlling authority. 8 the National Labor Relations Act that guarantees workers the right to engage in “concerted activities.” (Epic Systems, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1622 .) The U.S. Supreme Court rejected any NLRA exception to the FAA and reiterated that the FAA instructs federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.

2021(See, e.g., Contreras v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 461 , 470-471; Olson, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 872-873; Provost v. YourMechanic (2020), 55 Cal.App.5th 982 , 997-998; Collie v. The Icee Co. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 477 , 480; Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 620 (Correia).) “On federal questions, intermediate appellate courts in California must follow the decisions of the California Supreme Court, unless the United States Supreme Court has decided the same question differently.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 619 , citing

2021(See id. at pp. 691–692.) The Iskanian rule concerning PAGA waivers has not been similarly superseded, so Ledesma provides no basis for us to disregard our Supreme Court’s controlling authority. 8 the National Labor Relations Act that guarantees workers the right to engage in “concerted activities.” (Epic Systems, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 1622 .) The U.S. Supreme Court rejected any NLRA exception to the FAA and reiterated that the FAA instructs federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.

2021(See, e.g., Contreras v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 461 , 470-471; Olson, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 872-873; Provost v. YourMechanic (2020), 55 Cal.App.5th 982 , 997-998; Collie v. The Icee Co. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 477 , 480; Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 620 (Correia).) “On federal questions, intermediate appellate courts in California must follow the decisions of the California Supreme Court, unless the United States Supreme Court has decided the same question differently.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 619 , citing

2021(See, e.g., Contreras v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 461 , 470-471; Olson, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 872-873; Provost v. YourMechanic (2020), 55 Cal.App.5th 982 , 997-998; Collie v. The Icee Co. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 477 , 480; Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 602, 620 (Correia).) “On federal questions, intermediate appellate courts in California must follow the decisions of the California Supreme Court, unless the United States Supreme Court has decided the same question differently.” (Correia, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 619 , citing

2020(Maj. opn. ante, at pp. 18-19.) But Linn’s point was merely that the inability of an NLRA claim to address a particular type of harm “vitiate[d]” the need for preemption. ( Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 63-64.) This point has no application here, as the harm plaintiffs seek to remedy with the threat of PAGA penalties is the existence of excessively restrictive confidentiality policies, and the regional director’s complaint has already led Google to withdraw the offending policies. 7 rejected the idea that defamatory statements were covered by the NLRA. ( Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 60-61.) Thi

2020(Maj. opn. ante, at pp. 18-19.) But Linn’s point was merely that the inability of an NLRA claim to address a particular type of harm “vitiate[d]” the need for preemption. ( Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 63-64.) This point has no application here, as the harm plaintiffs seek to remedy with the threat of PAGA penalties is the existence of excessively restrictive confidentiality policies, and the regional director’s complaint has already led Google to withdraw the offending policies. 7 rejected the idea that defamatory statements were covered by the NLRA. ( Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 60-61.) Thi

2020(Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 682 .) Jones therefore construed the identical controversy test from Sears as turning on whether a “crucial element” of the state and NLRA claims is identical.

2020(Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 682 .) Jones therefore construed the identical controversy test from Sears as turning on whether a “crucial element” of the state and NLRA claims is identical.

2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 380-382 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502- 1503; see also, Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 556-557 .)103 102 The original rationale for the NLRA rule was to avoid abuses that might occur if direct judicial review of the board’s certification rulings were permitted, such as frivolous litigation delays being used to stall a prompt election or otherwise drag out recognition of the worker-supported choice of representation, t

2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 380-382 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502- 1503; see also, Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 556-557 .)103 102 The original rationale for the NLRA rule was to avoid abuses that might occur if direct judicial review of the board’s certification rulings were permitted, such as frivolous litigation delays being used to stall a prompt election or otherwise drag out recognition of the worker-supported choice of representation, t

2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 380-382 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502- 1503; see also, Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 556-557 .)103 102 The original rationale for the NLRA rule was to avoid abuses that might occur if direct judicial review of the board’s certification rulings were permitted, such as frivolous litigation delays being used to stall a prompt election or otherwise drag out recognition of the worker-supported choice of representation, t

2018(See, e.g., Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 380-382 ; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 1489 , 1502- 1503; see also, Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 551, 556-557 .)103 102 The original rationale for the NLRA rule was to avoid abuses that might occur if direct judicial review of the board’s certification rulings were permitted, such as frivolous litigation delays being used to stall a prompt election or otherwise drag out recognition of the worker-supported choice of representation, t

2017Code, § 1140) have upheld imposing liability on an employer for an act by an agent that constituted an unfair labor practice, even when such act was not expressly authorized by the employer, as long as such act was within the scope of the agent’s duties. 49 (See Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 625 P.2d 263 ]; Superior Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 100 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) However, decisions under the ALRA provide little guidance because “under the ALRA, application of the NLRA standard i

2017Code, § 1140) have upheld imposing liability on an employer for an act by an agent that constituted an unfair labor practice, even when such act was not expressly authorized by the employer, as long as such act was within the scope of the agent’s duties. 49 (See Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 625 P.2d 263 ]; Superior Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 100 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) However, decisions under the ALRA provide little guidance because “under the ALRA, application of the NLRA standard i

2017Code, § 1140) have upheld imposing liability on an employer for an act by an agent that constituted an unfair labor practice, even when such act was not expressly authorized by the employer, as long as such act was within the scope of the agent’s duties. 49 (See Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 625 P.2d 263 ]; Superior Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 100 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) However, decisions under the ALRA provide little guidance because “under the ALRA, application of the NLRA standard i

2017Code, § 1140) have upheld imposing liability on an employer for an act by an agent that constituted an unfair labor practice, even when such act was not expressly authorized by the employer, as long as such act was within the scope of the agent’s duties. 49 (See Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 625 P.2d 263 ]; Superior Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 100 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) However, decisions under the ALRA provide little guidance because “under the ALRA, application of the NLRA standard i

2017Code, § 1140) have upheld imposing liability on an employer for an act by an agent that constituted an unfair labor practice, even when such act was not expressly authorized by the employer, as long as such act was within the scope of the agent’s duties. 49 (See Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 625 P.2d 263 ]; Superior Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 100 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) However, decisions under the ALRA provide little guidance because “under the ALRA, application of the NLRA standard i

2017Code, § 1140) have upheld imposing liability on an employer for an act by an agent that constituted an unfair labor practice, even when such act was not expressly authorized by the employer, as long as such act was within the scope of the agent’s duties. 49 (See Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 720 , 625 P.2d 263 ]; Superior Farming Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 100 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 608 ].) However, decisions under the ALRA provide little guidance because “under the ALRA, application of the NLRA standard i

2015(F&P Growers, supra, at pp. 672–677.) In its discussion of that issue, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that prior ALRA judicial (and Board) precedent had adopted the NLRA rule that “a year after certification, there is a rebuttable presumption that a union continues to be supported by a majority of employees” (F&P Growers, supra, at p. 672 ), but concluded that the loss-of- majority support defense to bargaining with a particular union was clearly inapplicable to the ALRA because of important differences between the ALRA and the NLRA.

2015(F&P Growers, supra, at pp. 672–677.) In its discussion of that issue, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that prior ALRA judicial (and Board) precedent had adopted the NLRA rule that “a year after certification, there is a rebuttable presumption that a union continues to be supported by a majority of employees” (F&P Growers, supra, at p. 672 ), but concluded that the loss-of- majority support defense to bargaining with a particular union was clearly inapplicable to the ALRA because of important differences between the ALRA and the NLRA.

1985The court in Cadiz quoted from Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392 , and also relied on the statement “[T]he board could fairly have inferred that the Legislature intended it to select and follow only those federal precedents which are relevant to the particular problems of the California agricultural scene.” Therefore, relying on language in Tulare and also Cadiz , and the standard set therein, the court will find the NLRA defense related to the employer’s good faith belief as to loss of majority support to be applicable here, only if this NLRA precedent r

1985The court in Cadiz quoted from Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 392 , and also relied on the statement “[T]he board could fairly have inferred that the Legislature intended it to select and follow only those federal precedents which are relevant to the particular problems of the California agricultural scene.” Therefore, relying on language in Tulare and also Cadiz , and the standard set therein, the court will find the NLRA defense related to the employer’s good faith belief as to loss of majority support to be applicable here, only if this NLRA precedent r