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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ingels v. Rileygreen2 sentences2020(See Ingels v. Riley (1936) 5 Cal.2d 154, 159 [property tax does not impose any condition or place any restriction on the use of property taxed; privilege tax imposed on the right to exercise a privilege]; City of Huntington Beach v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 333, 341 [privilege tax does not become a property tax simply because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection with the privilege which is taxed]; § 3.56.030, subd. 1978A privilege tax “does not become a property tax simply because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection with the privilege which is taxed.” (Ingels v. Riley, supra, 5 Cal.2d 154, 160 .) Plaintiffs rely upon the statement in Ingels v. Riley, supra, 5 Cal.2d 154, 159 , that a “privilege tax ... is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.” It is urged that since the city ordinance did not make actual payment of the tax a “condition precedent” for effectuat | 3 | 4 |
City of Huntington Beach v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2020(See Ingels v. Riley (1936) 5 Cal.2d 154, 159 [property tax does not impose any condition or place any restriction on the use of property taxed; privilege tax imposed on the right to exercise a privilege]; City of Huntington Beach v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 333, 341 [privilege tax does not become a property tax simply because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection with the privilege which is taxed]; § 3.56.030, subd. 1993(See City of Oakland v. Digre (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 99, 106 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 99 ].) “[A]n excise tax is ‘a tax on the exercise of one of the incidences of property ownership,’ such as the ability to transfer or devise property or the ability to use, store, or consume it.” (Ibid.) It is “ ‘. . . imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.’ ” (City of Huntington Beach v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 333, 341 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 236 ].) The excise tax here has all of the characteristics of a | 2 | 2 |
City of Oakland v. Digregreen2 sentences2000Stated another way, the excise tax is a tax on the privilege of exercising the taxed incident of ownership. [Citation.]" ( City of Oakland v. Digre, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 99 .) Because it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, the payment of an excise tax invariably is a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved. ( Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) Consequently, a property tax is one the imposition of which is triggered merely by property ownership, while an excise tax is 2000Stated another way, the excise tax is a tax on the privilege of exercising the taxed incident of ownership. [Citation.]" ( City of Oakland v. Digre, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 99 .) Because it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, the payment of an excise tax invariably is a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved. ( Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) Consequently, a property tax is one the imposition of which is triggered merely by property ownership, while an excise tax is | 1 | 2 |
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1997Section 2(b) defines the “essential governmental services,” contended to be the rationale of its tax, as those which “must be provided by any municipal government as a matter of necessity and not individual choice.” This simply concedes that payment of the parcel tax is not a condition precedent to the landowner’s exercise of any privilege of use of the City’s services. “ ‘A privilege tax . . . is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.’ ” (Douglas, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 550 .) 6 Simila 1963It is imposed on certain of the privileges of ownership, but not on all of them." (Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. v. Johnson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 545, 551 [ 90 P.2d 572 ]; italics added.) The use tax frames an excise tax upon the privilege of utilizing property within this state in a certain manner. [9] "A privilege tax ... is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved." (Ingels v. Riley (1936) 5 Cal.2d 154, 159 [ 53 P.2d 939 , 103 A.L.R. 1 ].) The sales and use taxes encompass apposite privileges. | 1 | 2 |
City of Glendale v. Trondsengreen2 sentences1997Section 2(b) defines the “essential governmental services,” contended to be the rationale of its tax, as those which “must be provided by any municipal government as a matter of necessity and not individual choice.” This simply concedes that payment of the parcel tax is not a condition precedent to the landowner’s exercise of any privilege of use of the City’s services. “ ‘A privilege tax . . . is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.’ ” (Douglas, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 550 .) 6 Simila 1997Section 2(b) defines the “essential governmental services,” contended to be the rationale of its tax, as those which “must be provided by any municipal government as a matter of necessity and not individual choice.” This simply concedes that payment of the parcel tax is not a condition precedent to the landowner’s exercise of any privilege of use of the City’s services. “ ‘A privilege tax . . . is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its payment is invariably made a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved.’ ” (Douglas, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 550 .) 6 Simila | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2002(Cf. School Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1129-1130 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ; and see Nissan Motor Corporation v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 155 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 [judicial efficiency is not to be fostered at the expense of a litigant's rights under section 170.6].) Like it or not, the disqualification motion must be granted. 2002(Cf. School Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1129-1130 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ; and see Nissan Motor Corporation v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 155 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 [judicial efficiency is not to be fostered at the expense of a litigant's rights under section 170.6].) Like it or not, the disqualification motion must be granted. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
SCHOOL DIST. OF OKALOOSA CTY. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
2 sentences2002(Cf. School Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1129-1130 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ; and see Nissan Motor Corporation v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 155 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 [judicial efficiency is not to be fostered at the expense of a litigant's rights under section 170.6].) Like it or not, the disqualification motion must be granted. 2002(Cf. School Dist. of Okaloosa County v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1129-1130 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ; and see Nissan Motor Corporation v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 155 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 [judicial efficiency is not to be fostered at the expense of a litigant's rights under section 170.6].) Like it or not, the disqualification motion must be granted. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo
green
2 sentences2000Stated another way, the excise tax is a tax on the privilege of exercising the taxed incident of ownership. [Citation.]" ( City of Oakland v. Digre, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 99 .) Because it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, the payment of an excise tax invariably is a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved. ( Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) Consequently, a property tax is one the imposition of which is triggered merely by property ownership, while an excise tax is 2000Stated another way, the excise tax is a tax on the privilege of exercising the taxed incident of ownership. [Citation.]" ( City of Oakland v. Digre, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 99 .) Because it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, the payment of an excise tax invariably is a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved. ( Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) Consequently, a property tax is one the imposition of which is triggered merely by property ownership, while an excise tax is | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Thomas v. City of East Palo Alto
green
1 sentence2000Stated another way, the excise tax is a tax on the privilege of exercising the taxed incident of ownership. [Citation.]" ( City of Oakland v. Digre, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 106 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 99 .) Because it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege, the payment of an excise tax invariably is a condition precedent to the exercise of the privilege involved. ( Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 48 .) Consequently, a property tax is one the imposition of which is triggered merely by property ownership, while an excise tax is | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Perry v. Paschal
green
2 sentences1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th 1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Barnes v. Rea
green
2 sentences1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th 1927The difference, however, between appellant’s position and the conclusion arrived at by this court is: That the appellant assumes, contrary to its declaration in the petition regarding the doctrine of relation, that the Zumwalts became identified or connected with the title to the property by virtue of the agreement of option, whereas our position is, as indicated in the former opinion, that the option agreement did not have any such effect; that said option merely involved a unilateral agreement which does not become a contract inter partes in the. sense of an absolute contract to convey on th | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.