Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rivero v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2005(Rivero v. Thomas (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 225, 239 [ 194 P.2d 533 ] [noting that “ ‘[a]s a general rule, courts of equity will not award exemplary damages, although this rule is not without exception,’ [citation]” and affirming, as modified, punitive damages awarded by trial court in an equitable action].) 19 Laurens acknowledges that shareholder derivative actions are equitable in nature, but contends that he “had a right to jury trial on punitive damages even though that claim was incidental to equitable claims.” Thus, Laurens appears to be arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial on Sylvia 2005(Rivero v. Thomas (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 225, 239 [ 194 P.2d 533 ] [noting that “ ‘[a]s a general rule, courts of equity will not award exemplary damages, although this rule is not without exception,’ [citation]” and affirming, as modified, punitive damages awarded by trial court in an equitable action].) 19 Laurens acknowledges that shareholder derivative actions are equitable in nature, but contends that he “had a right to jury trial on punitive damages even though that claim was incidental to equitable claims.” Thus, Laurens appears to be arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial on Sylvia | 1 | 1 |
Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc.green2 sentences1980For the reasons hereafter stated, we disagree. “‘Undoubtedly, the general rule in this state is that when it appears there is a violation of a regulating statute, the prescribed penalty is the equivalent of an express prohibition and a contract made contrary to its terms is void even though the statute does not pronounce the fact. [Citations.] The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, or a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be 1980For the reasons hereafter stated, we disagree. “‘Undoubtedly, the general rule in this state is that when it appears there is a violation of a regulating statute, the prescribed penalty is the equivalent of an express prohibition and a contract made contrary to its terms is void even though the statute does not pronounce the fact. [Citations.] The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, or a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be | 1 | 1 |
Felix v. Zlotoffgreen2 sentences1980For the reasons hereafter stated, we disagree. “‘Undoubtedly, the general rule in this state is that when it appears there is a violation of a regulating statute, the prescribed penalty is the equivalent of an express prohibition and a contract made contrary to its terms is void even though the statute does not pronounce the fact. [Citations.] The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, or a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be 1980For the reasons hereafter stated, we disagree. “‘Undoubtedly, the general rule in this state is that when it appears there is a violation of a regulating statute, the prescribed penalty is the equivalent of an express prohibition and a contract made contrary to its terms is void even though the statute does not pronounce the fact. [Citations.] The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, or a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stearnsgreen2 sentences1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). 1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Berka v. Woodwardgreen2 sentences1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). 1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. McClurggreen2 sentences1948Their allowance rests entirely in the discretion of the jury, and they may be awarded only where there is some evidence of fraud, malice, express or implied, or oppression.” Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 282 [ 9 P.2d 505, 506 , 81 A.L.R. 908 ]. 1948Their allowance rests entirely in the discretion of the jury, and they may be awarded only where there is some evidence of fraud, malice, express or implied, or oppression.” Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 282 [ 9 P.2d 505, 506 , 81 A.L.R. 908 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Malting Co. v. Keitel
green
2 sentences2007Neither could courts of common law until the Common-Law Procedure Act of 1854, because they had no power to grant injunctions.'" ( American Malting Co. v. Keitel (2d Cir.1913) 209 F. 351, 354 .) [9] Consistently, American Jurisprudence Second observes that "while it is true that equity will not normally restrain a libel, the rule is not without exception ... and an injunction properly issued to prohibit a defendant from reiterating statements which had been found in current and prior proceedings to be false and libelous...." (42 Am.Jur.2d (2000) Injunctions, § 98, p. 693.) [10] Justice Kennard 2007Neither could courts of common law until the Common-Law Procedure Act of 1854, because they had no power to grant injunctions.’ ” (American Malting Co. v. Keitel (2d Cir. 1913) 209 F. 351, 354 .) Consistently, American Jurisprudence Second observes that “while it is true that equity will not normally restrain a libel, the rule is not without exception . . . and an injunction properly issued to prohibit a defendant from reiterating statements which had been found in current and prior proceedings to be false and libelous . . . .” (42 Am.Jur.2d, supra, Injunctions, § 98, p. 693.) Justice Kennard’ | 1 | 2007–2007 |
C & K ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS v. Amber Steel Co.
green
1 sentence2005(Rivero v. Thomas (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 225, 239 [ 194 P.2d 533 ] [noting that “ ‘[a]s a general rule, courts of equity will not award exemplary damages, although this rule is not without exception,’ [citation]” and affirming, as modified, punitive damages awarded by trial court in an equitable action].) 19 Laurens acknowledges that shareholder derivative actions are equitable in nature, but contends that he “had a right to jury trial on punitive damages even though that claim was incidental to equitable claims.” Thus, Laurens appears to be arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial on Sylvia | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Hall
green
1 sentence1984(Id., 28 Cal.3d at p. 152 .) But the court was careful to note that the rule is not without exception: “If the facts to which the defendant has offered to stipulate retain some probative value, then evidence of such facts may be introduced. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Harris v. Runnels
green
2 sentences1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). 1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Holm v. Bramwell
green
2 sentences1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). 1973(Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 127 [ 57 P. 777 ]; Holm v. Bramwell, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 .) The rule is not without exception, however, and before the rule can be applied in any case of a statute prohibiting or enjoining things to be done, with a prohibition or a penalty, dr a penalty only for doing a thing which it forbids, the statute must be examined as a whole, *592 to find out whether the makers meant a contract in contravention of it should be void (Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79 [ 13 L.Ed. 901 ]; Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [ 267 P.2d 59 ]). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Meyer v. State Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences1958As recently pointed out in Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal. 2d 376 at pages 386 and 387 [ 267 P.2d 257 ], the rule is not without exception. ‘' Such an amendment may be allowed where it is clearly shown that the earlier pleading is the result of mistake or inadvertence (citing eases).... ‘It is a well-established rule which is founded on good reason and justice that a court should exercise great liberality in permitting amendments of pleadings at any and all stages of the trial to present adequately all issues which are properly involved in the litigation. ’ ” Code of Civil Proced 1958As recently pointed out in Meyer v. State Board of Equalization, 42 Cal. 2d 376 at pages 386 and 387 [ 267 P.2d 257 ], the rule is not without exception. ‘' Such an amendment may be allowed where it is clearly shown that the earlier pleading is the result of mistake or inadvertence (citing eases).... ‘It is a well-established rule which is founded on good reason and justice that a court should exercise great liberality in permitting amendments of pleadings at any and all stages of the trial to present adequately all issues which are properly involved in the litigation. ’ ” Code of Civil Proced | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Reitano v. Yankwich
green
2 sentences1952(See Reitano v. Yankwich, 38 Cal.2d 1 [ 237 P.2d 6 ].) Thus it has been held where the appeal by the accepting party is such that the review is limited to the question of whether appellant is entitled to additional relief, the appellant is not held to have waived his right of appeal. 1952(See Reitano v. Yankwich, 38 Cal.2d 1 [ 237 P.2d 6 ].) Thus it has been held where the appeal by the accepting party is such that the review is limited to the question of whether appellant is entitled to additional relief, the appellant is not held to have waived his right of appeal. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
County of San Bernardino v. County of Riverside
green
2 sentences1952While it is true that a party is held to have waived his right of appeal by acceptance of the benefits of a judgment (San Bernardino County v. Riverside County, 135 Cal. 618 [ 67 P. 1047 ]), the rule is not without exception. 1952While it is true that a party is held to have waived his right of appeal by acceptance of the benefits of a judgment (San Bernardino County v. Riverside County, 135 Cal. 618 [ 67 P. 1047 ]), the rule is not without exception. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Richards v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank
green
2 sentences1919And where such decree is sought upon the ground of fraud, and, because of peculiar complications or circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable or impossible to apply such a rule, the court in the exercise of its broad powers of a court of equity, and not having any special solicitude for the party enmeshed in the web he has spun for others, may decree rescission, notwithstanding such party may not be placed exactly in statu quo. (9 Corpus Juris, 1210; Richards v. Farmers’ etc. Bank, 7 Cal. App. 387 , [ 94 Pac. 393 ].) In the case of Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 389 , [ 80 1919And where such decree is sought upon the ground of fraud, and, because of peculiar complications or circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable or impossible to apply such a rule, the court in the exercise of its broad powers of a court of equity, and not having any special solicitude for the party enmeshed in the web he has spun for others, may decree rescission, notwithstanding such party may not be placed exactly in statu quo. (9 Corpus Juris, 1210; Richards v. Farmers’ etc. Bank, 7 Cal. App. 387 , [ 94 Pac. 393 ].) In the case of Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 389 , [ 80 | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Green v. Duvergey
green
2 sentences1919And where such decree is sought upon the ground of fraud, and, because of peculiar complications or circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable or impossible to apply such a rule, the court in the exercise of its broad powers of a court of equity, and not having any special solicitude for the party enmeshed in the web he has spun for others, may decree rescission, notwithstanding such party may not be placed exactly in statu quo. (9 Corpus Juris, 1210; Richards v. Farmers’ etc. Bank, 7 Cal. App. 387 , [ 94 Pac. 393 ].) In the case of Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 389 , [ 80 1919And where such decree is sought upon the ground of fraud, and, because of peculiar complications or circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable or impossible to apply such a rule, the court in the exercise of its broad powers of a court of equity, and not having any special solicitude for the party enmeshed in the web he has spun for others, may decree rescission, notwithstanding such party may not be placed exactly in statu quo. (9 Corpus Juris, 1210; Richards v. Farmers’ etc. Bank, 7 Cal. App. 387 , [ 94 Pac. 393 ].) In the case of Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 389 , [ 80 | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.