Sanders analysis in California

2005(People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th atp. 333 , citing People v. Reyes [(1998)] 19 Cal.4th [743,] 753 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 ].) Therefore we cannot ascertain from Tyrell J. any special consideration of the juvenile justice system that would justify departure from the Sanders analysis.” (People v. Hester, supra, at p. 404.) As a corollary, we observe that in the Tyrell J. opinion itself the Supreme Court’s primary analysis was that a juvenile probationer’s right to be protected from a search by an officer not knowing the juvenile was on search- *365 conditioned probation was base

2005(People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th atp. 333 , citing People v. Reyes [(1998)] 19 Cal.4th [743,] 753 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 ].) Therefore we cannot ascertain from Tyrell J. any special consideration of the juvenile justice system that would justify departure from the Sanders analysis.” (People v. Hester, supra, at p. 404.) As a corollary, we observe that in the Tyrell J. opinion itself the Supreme Court’s primary analysis was that a juvenile probationer’s right to be protected from a search by an officer not knowing the juvenile was on search- *365 conditioned probation was base

2021(Hall, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 504 .) Turning to Sanders’s claim based on the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment, Sanders asserts that this claim does not fall under the parameters of section 1237.2 because “the nature of the constitutional violation is in failing to provide a hearing, not ‘in the imposition or calculation of fines.’ ” We are not persuaded by this asserted distinction.

2018Thus, identity theft in the electronic age is an essentially unique crime, not simply a form of grand theft." ( Id. at p. 808, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 34 .) Our analysis of the statute and the cases interpreting it lead us to conclude Sanders violation of the "identity theft" statute was not a theft as it relates to the cardholder.

2016(See, e.g., In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 ; and see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688.) “Similar concepts have been used to measure the performance of appellate counsel. [Citations.]” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 833 .) Sanders’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal fails because he has not shown his claims have merit.

2016Appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

2016(See, e.g., In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 ; and see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688.) “Similar concepts have been used to measure the performance of appellate counsel. [Citations.]” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 833 .) Sanders’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal fails because he has not shown his claims have merit.

2016(See, e.g., In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 832-833 ; and see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688.) “Similar concepts have been used to measure the performance of appellate counsel. [Citations.]” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 833 .) Sanders’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal fails because he has not shown his claims have merit.

2013(U.S. v. Dien (2d Cir. 1979) 609 F.2d 1038, 1045 .) In considering this split of authority, it is important to note that although courts have applied the Sanders dictum with varying results, the United States Supreme Court has never itself applied the Sanders dictum to uphold a warrantless search of a closed container on the theory that its outward appearance or any other characteristic announced its contents.

2013(U.S. v. Dien (2d Cir. 1979) 609 F.2d 1038, 1045 .) In considering this split of authority, it is important to note that although courts have applied the Sanders dictum with varying results, the United States Supreme Court has never itself applied the Sanders dictum to uphold a warrantless search of a closed container on the theory that its outward appearance or any other characteristic announced its contents.

2013In U.S. v. Haley, supra, 669 F.2d 201 , the Fourth Circuit said that in addition to a container’s outward appearance or distinctive configuration, “[a]nother characteristic which brings the contents into plain view is the odor given off by those contents.” (Id. at p. 203.) The court upheld the search of opaque plastic garbage bags on the ground that their “distinctive configuration together with the intense marijuana odor brought” their contents into plain view.

2013In U.S. v. Haley, supra, 669 F.2d 201 , the Fourth Circuit said that in addition to a container’s outward appearance or distinctive configuration, “[a]nother characteristic which brings the contents into plain view is the odor given off by those contents.” (Id. at p. 203.) The court upheld the search of opaque plastic garbage bags on the ground that their “distinctive configuration together with the intense marijuana odor brought” their contents into plain view.

2006(Dis. opn., post, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 445 , 146 P.3d at p. 977 .) But as we have explained ( ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 437 , 146 P.3d at p. 971 ), Samson involved officers who were aware of the search condition and thus adds nothing of import to our Sanders analysis.

2006(Dis. opn., post, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 445 , 146 P.3d at p. 977 .) But as we have explained ( ante, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 437 , 146 P.3d at p. 971 ), Samson involved officers who were aware of the search condition and thus adds nothing of import to our Sanders analysis.

2005(In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 85 .) The Tyrell J. court stated, “As a general rule, ‘[adult] probationers “have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering certain intrusions by governmental authorities ‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be invalid under traditional constitutional concepts, at least to the extent that such intrusions are necessitated by legitimate governmental demands.” ’ [Citations.] We believe this observation applies fully to juvenile probationers as well.” (Ibid., brackets in original.) Only as a secondary matter, the Tyrell J. court added, “Moreover, im

2005(In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 85 .) The Tyrell J. court stated, “As a general rule, ‘[adult] probationers “have a reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering certain intrusions by governmental authorities ‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be invalid under traditional constitutional concepts, at least to the extent that such intrusions are necessitated by legitimate governmental demands.” ’ [Citations.] We believe this observation applies fully to juvenile probationers as well.” (Ibid., brackets in original.) Only as a secondary matter, the Tyrell J. court added, “Moreover, im

2004Since the Fourth Amendment applies equally to searches of a residence ( People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ), detentions of automobiles ( United States v. Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 ), and detentions of individuals in a public place ( Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ), the Sanders analysis should be used whenever a search or seizure implicates the Fourth Amendment.

2004Since the Fourth Amendment applies equally to searches of a residence ( People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333 , 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ), detentions of automobiles ( United States v. Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 ), and detentions of individuals in a public place ( Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ), the Sanders analysis should be used whenever a search or seizure implicates the Fourth Amendment.

2004The appellate court concluded that after the Sanders decision, the only basis for distinguishing Sanders from Tyrell J. was "`the special needs' of the system applied to juvenile offenders." ( People v. Bowers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268 , 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 15 .) "In every other respect, the Supreme Court's discussion of Tyrell J. throughout Sanders was clearly disapproving." ( Id. at p. 1269, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 15 .) The appellate court held that because the defendant was not on juvenile probation, Sanders compelled the conclusion that the search violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment righ

2004The appellate court concluded that after the Sanders decision, the only basis for distinguishing Sanders from Tyrell J. was "`the special needs' of the system applied to juvenile offenders." ( People v. Bowers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268 , 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 15 .) "In every other respect, the Supreme Court's discussion of Tyrell J. throughout Sanders was clearly disapproving." ( Id. at p. 1269, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 15 .) The appellate court held that because the defendant was not on juvenile probation, Sanders compelled the conclusion that the search violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment righ

1973In People v. Hotz, supra, 85 Cal.App. 450 , despite stating the Sanders rule, the court affirmed the conviction, by finding that the arrangement between the defendant and his victim to share both profits and losses from the sale of automobiles was not in fact a partnership, commenting that the essential distinguishing feature of a co-partnership “is the association for the ‘purpose of carrying on the business together’ [citation], and the agreement to divide profits is not sufficient.” ( 85 Cal.App. at p. 453 .) People v. Foss, supra, 7 Cal.2d 669 , the other authority relied upon in Hotz , ci

1973In People v. Hotz, supra, 85 Cal.App. 450 , despite stating the Sanders rule, the court affirmed the conviction, by finding that the arrangement between the defendant and his victim to share both profits and losses from the sale of automobiles was not in fact a partnership, commenting that the essential distinguishing feature of a co-partnership “is the association for the ‘purpose of carrying on the business together’ [citation], and the agreement to divide profits is not sufficient.” ( 85 Cal.App. at p. 453 .) People v. Foss, supra, 7 Cal.2d 669 , the other authority relied upon in Hotz , ci

1973The statement contained in People v. Hotz, supra, 85 Cal.App. 450 , is not required by the wording of the California statute and indeed the conspicuous omission of the requirement that the property entrusted to the one who fraudulently appropriates it be “of another” in our California statute would seem to require that the state follow the Kusnick rule rather than the Sanders rule.

1973The statement contained in People v. Hotz, supra, 85 Cal.App. 450 , is not required by the wording of the California statute and indeed the conspicuous omission of the requirement that the property entrusted to the one who fraudulently appropriates it be “of another” in our California statute would seem to require that the state follow the Kusnick rule rather than the Sanders rule.

1969"A. I went there because I was forced into it, I would rather go with a police officer than I would in a pine box, ’ ’ 5 Defendant contends that the Sanders instruction is inconsistent'with the more recent decision in People v. Anderson (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 271 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 231 ].

1969"A. I went there because I was forced into it, I would rather go with a police officer than I would in a pine box, ’ ’ 5 Defendant contends that the Sanders instruction is inconsistent'with the more recent decision in People v. Anderson (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 271 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 231 ].