Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1920–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Seijasgreen1 sentence2013We assume, without deciding, that 22 Nabong‘s trial counsel preserved these objections.18 Nonetheless, we are not persuaded by either argument. ― ‗[T]o be found unavailable on [privilege grounds] a witness must not only intend to assert the privilege, but also be entitled to assert it.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 303 (Seijas).) Evidence Code section 404 provides: ―Whenever the proffered evidence is claimed to be privileged under Section 940, the person claiming the privilege has the burden of showing that the proffered evidence might tend to incriminate him; and the | 1 | 1 |
Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2000(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70-73 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) “Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against the moving party. [Citation.]” (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 780 ].) Furthermore, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summa 2000(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70-73 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) “Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against the moving party. [Citation.]” (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 780 ].) Furthermore, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summa | 1 | 1 |
Leal v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianityyellow2 sentences2000(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70-73 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) “Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against the moving party. [Citation.]” (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 780 ].) Furthermore, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summa 2000(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70-73 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) “Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against the moving party. [Citation.]” (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 780 ].) Furthermore, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summa | 1 | 1 |
Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co.green2 sentences2000(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70-73 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) “Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against the moving party. [Citation.]” (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 780 ].) Furthermore, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summa 2000(Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 70-73 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ].) “Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against the moving party. [Citation.]” (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 383 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 780 ].) Furthermore, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summa | 1 | 1 |
AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bankgreen2 sentences1990(AARTS *384 Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) It is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summary judgment must be denied. 1990(AARTS *384 Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) It is the moving party’s burden to make a sufficient showing that the claim is entirely without merit and if that showing is deficient summary judgment must be denied. | 1 | 1 |
Lipson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1990(Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 644 P.2d 822 ].) “The motion must stand self-sufficient and cannot succeed because the opposition is weak. [Citations]. 1990(Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 644 P.2d 822 ].) “The motion must stand self-sufficient and cannot succeed because the opposition is weak. [Citations]. | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987Defendant sought to prove his English comprehension was so poor that without an interpreter’s assistance he was incapable, of entering a guilty plea with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” (Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 ].) However, having failed to establish that his English was so faulty that he could not understand the section 1016.5 advisement, defendant failed to meet the first requirement for the writ. 1987Defendant sought to prove his English comprehension was so poor that without an interpreter’s assistance he was incapable, of entering a guilty plea with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” (Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 ].) However, having failed to establish that his English was so faulty that he could not understand the section 1016.5 advisement, defendant failed to meet the first requirement for the writ. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Penrod
green
1 sentence2016There is no merit to these contentions. “[A] trial court is obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing on whether to discharge counsel for all purposes and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant indicates after conviction a desire to withdraw his plea on the ground that his current counsel provided ineffective assistance only when there is ‘at least some clear indication by defendant,’ either personally or through his current counsel, that defendant ‘wants a substitute attorney.’ [Citation.] …[A]dditionally[,] … at any time during criminal proceedings, if a defendant requests substitute cou | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Sanchez
green
1 sentence2016There is no merit to these contentions. “[A] trial court is obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing on whether to discharge counsel for all purposes and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant indicates after conviction a desire to withdraw his plea on the ground that his current counsel provided ineffective assistance only when there is ‘at least some clear indication by defendant,’ either personally or through his current counsel, that defendant ‘wants a substitute attorney.’ [Citation.] …[A]dditionally[,] … at any time during criminal proceedings, if a defendant requests substitute cou | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Nance
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Nance, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456 .) Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Soriano
green
1 sentence2015In his writ petition, defendant stated that at the time he entered his guilty plea he did not know that the plea would subject him to deportation, and if he had understood the consequences of his plea he would not have entered it. ( Soriano, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1472- 1474.) The court found: “Petitioner failed to make a sufficient showing at the hearing on the petition to overcome his own statement, made at the time his plea was entered, that he understood the [section] 1016.5 advisement. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2013The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The United States Supreme Court held in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 at pp. 53-54 that the confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821 .) Although Gonzalez contends that his constitutional right to confron 2013The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The United States Supreme Court held in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 at pp. 53-54 that the confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821 .) Although Gonzalez contends that his constitutional right to confron | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Davis v. Washington
green
1 sentence2013The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The United States Supreme Court held in Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 at pp. 53-54 that the confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821 .) Although Gonzalez contends that his constitutional right to confron | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gardner v. Steadman
green
2 sentences1920Dec. 78 ] ; Gardner v. Steadman, 31 Cal. App. 447 , [ 160 Pac. 834 ]), the parties to the action had a settlement between them of their differences, resulting in an understanding between them, whereby it was agreed that the defendant would pay to the plaintiff the sum of fifty dollars only, being the amount of the freightage for the shipping from San Francisco of those cattle of the number taken by the defendant to said city which he did not accept and use. 1920Dec. 78 ] ; Gardner v. Steadman, 31 Cal. App. 447 , [ 160 Pac. 834 ]), the parties to the action had a settlement between them of their differences, resulting in an understanding between them, whereby it was agreed that the defendant would pay to the plaintiff the sum of fifty dollars only, being the amount of the freightage for the shipping from San Francisco of those cattle of the number taken by the defendant to said city which he did not accept and use. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Wilson v. Berryman
neutral
1 sentence1920According to said affidavits, either of which separately or both together may be con *67 sidered for the purpose of testing and determining the question whether there is a sufficient showing of a defense on the merits (Wilson v. Berryman, 5 Cal. 44 , [ 63 Am. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.