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76 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1998–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018“Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. 2018“Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim. | 9 | 9 |
Cantu v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves factual determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test overall is “a purely legal question.” Id. 2026Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves factual determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test overall is “a purely legal question.” Id. | 7 | 51 |
Zamorano v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Review of the individual Barker factors involves both fact determinations and legal conclusions, but “[t]he balancing test as a whole . . . is a purely legal question.” Id. (quoting Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 n.19). 2019As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Cantu, “[r]eview of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but ‘[t]he balancing test as a whole ... is a purely legal question.’” 253 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 , 648 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc)). | 6 | 22 |
Henson, Kevin Raygreen2 sentences2022Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282 ; see also Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. 2021Id. at 282 ; see also Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (observing that at least two of the Barker factors—the reason for the delay and the prejudice to the accused—are fact-specific inquiries). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Lisa Lou Rittergreen1 sentence2019Because Melendez prevailed on his speedy trial claim, “we presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact issues in his favor.” See State v. Ritter, 531 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte McKenziegreen1 sentence2019“While the State has the burden of justifying the length of delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 ; see also Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (stating that “if an accused made a prima facie showing of prejudice, the State ‘must carry the obligation of proving that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay’”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munozgreen1 sentence2019Because Melendez prevailed on his speedy trial claim, “we presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact issues in his favor.” See State v. Ritter, 531 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Stategreen1 sentence2013“Under the abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts defer not only to a trial judge’s resolution of disputed facts, but also to his right to draw reasonable inferences from those facts.” Id. (citing Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 726-27 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Balderas v. State
green
2 sentences2026Review of the individual Barker factors involves both factual determinations as well as legal conclusions, but “the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (quoting Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 ). 2025“Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 . 4 Application The trial court lacked plenary power to rescind its dismissal orders. | 15 | 2018–2026 |
the State of Texas v. Vivian Lampkin
green
2 sentences2024Application Length of Delay In conducting a Barker analysis, “[w]e measure the length of delay from (1) the time the accused is arrested or charged to (2) the time of trial or the defendant’s demand for a speedy trial.” State v. Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d 559 , 563 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). 2024Courts generally deem a delay approaching one year as “unreasonable enough to trigger a Barker inquiry.” State v. Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d 559 , 563 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (quoting Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 and Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (“Generally, a delay of eight months to a year, or longer, is presumptively prejudicial and triggers a speedy trial analysis.”). | 3 | 2023–2024 |
Dragoo v. State
green
1 sentence2024Courts generally deem a delay approaching one year as “unreasonable enough to trigger a Barker inquiry.” State v. Lampkin, 630 S.W.3d 559 , 563 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (quoting Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 and Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314 ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (“Generally, a delay of eight months to a year, or longer, is presumptively prejudicial and triggers a speedy trial analysis.”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Henson v. Texas
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 282 ; see also Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (observing that at least two of the Barker factors—the reason for the delay and the prejudice to the accused—are fact-specific inquiries), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1141 (2014). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.