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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Allengreen2 sentences2017(Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 443 & fn. 7.) However, Justice Baxter provided guidance in his concurring opinion: “The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied to Boykin-Tahl issues, is tolerable only insofar as we can expect the record of the challenged prior guilty plea readily to show, on its face, that the defendant knew and waived his rights. 2017(Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 443 & fn. 7.) However, Justice Baxter provided guidance in his concurring opinion: “The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied to Boykin-Tahl issues, is tolerable only insofar as we can expect the record of the challenged prior guilty plea readily to show, on its face, that the defendant knew and waived his rights. | 2 | 7 |
Custis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999Because a Sumstine motion that alleges the complete denial of counsel in a prior case is constitutionally based (see Custis, supra, 511 U.S. 485 , 495 ), we may have less latitude to dictate the procedures governing such a motion. 1999In direct contradiction to the analysis of Sumstine , Custis concluded that both administrative considerations, and the strong policy favoring finality of criminal judgments, counseled against such a course. ( Custis, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 496-497 .) Less than three years ago, we found Custis persuasive enough to conclude that in noncapital cases at least, a Sumstine motion may not be used to challenge a prior conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953 ( Garcia ).) In particular, we stressed the disruption of orderly proceeding | 2 | 2 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999However, in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , we noted the overwhelming weight of federal authority is to the effect that Boykin does not require explicit on-the-record admonitions and waivers, and allows a guilty plea to be upheld, even on direct appeal, if the record as a whole affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary. ( Howard, supra , at pp. 1177-1179, citing, inter alia, Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 , 747-748 , fn. 4; United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417 , 424-425 .) *Page 447 The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied 1999However, in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , we noted the overwhelming weight of federal authority is to the effect that Boykin does not require explicit on-the-record admonitions and waivers, and allows a guilty plea to be upheld, even on direct appeal, if the record as a whole affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary. ( Howard, supra , at pp. 1177-1179, citing, inter alia, Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 , 747-748 , fn. 4; United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417 , 424-425 .) *Page 447 The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sumstinegreen2 sentences2025A Sumstine motion allows a defendant to launch a collateral attack on a previous conviction that is being used to enhance a sentence. ( Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 918-919.) The defendant alleges the previous conviction is invalid because of a constitutional failing in that proceeding. 1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hortongreen2 sentences1999Furthermore, by my various references to "noncapital" defendants, I do not mean to imply that I necessarily accept any broader rules or grounds for a Sumstine motion in capital cases, other than as specifically provided in People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068 , 1126-1141 . *Page 452 1999Furthermore, by my various references to “noncapital” defendants, I do not mean to imply that I necessarily accept any broader rules or grounds for a Sumstine motion in capital cases, other than as specifically provided in People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1126-1141 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 ], | 1 | 2 |
Boykin v. Alabamared2 sentences1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a 1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Green
green
2 sentences2017Just as this principle eliminates Boykin - Tahl challenges to California priors that predate Tahl , so must Boykin - Tahl challenges to non-California priors be excluded, except where it appears beyond doubt that the guilty pleas underlying such convictions were subject, under the law of the convicting jurisdictions, to Tahl -like procedural formalities." ( Id. at p. 447, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 981 P.2d 525 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.) italics omitted.) In Green , the Fifth District Court of Appeal followed Justice Baxter's concurrence in Allen , holding that "a defendant may not collaterally atta 2017Just as this principle eliminates Boykin - Tahl challenges to California priors that predate Tahl , so must Boykin - Tahl challenges to non-California priors be excluded, except where it appears beyond doubt that the guilty pleas underlying such convictions were subject, under the law of the convicting jurisdictions, to Tahl -like procedural formalities." ( Id. at p. 447, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 981 P.2d 525 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.) italics omitted.) In Green , the Fifth District Court of Appeal followed Justice Baxter's concurrence in Allen in holding that "a defendant may not collaterally att | 4 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Randall Wilford Pricepaul
green
2 sentences1999However, in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , we noted the overwhelming weight of federal authority is to the effect that Boykin does not require explicit on-the-record admonitions and waivers, and allows a guilty plea to be upheld, even on direct appeal, if the record as a whole affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary. ( Howard, supra , at pp. 1177-1179, citing, inter alia, Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 , 747-748 , fn. 4; United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417 , 424-425 .) *Page 447 The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied 1999However, in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , we noted the overwhelming weight of federal authority is to the effect that Boykin does not require explicit on-the-record admonitions and waivers, and allows a guilty plea to be upheld, even on direct appeal, if the record as a whole affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary. ( Howard, supra , at pp. 1177-1179, citing, inter alia, Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 , 747-748 , fn. 4; United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417 , 424-425 .) *Page 447 The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Garcia v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999In direct contradiction to the analysis of Sumstine, Custis concluded that both administrative considerations, and the strong policy favoring finality of criminal judgments, counseled against such a course. ( Custis, supra, 511 U. S. at pp. 496-497, 114 S.Ct. 1732 .) Less than three years ago, we found Custis persuasive enough to conclude that in noncapital cases at least, a Sumstine motion may not be used to challenge a prior conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953 , 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 , 928 P.2d 572 ( Garcia ).) In particul 1999In direct contradiction to the analysis of Sumstine , Custis concluded that both administrative considerations, and the strong policy favoring finality of criminal judgments, counseled against such a course. ( Custis, supra, 511 U.S. at pp. 496-497 .) Less than three years ago, we found Custis persuasive enough to conclude that in noncapital cases at least, a Sumstine motion may not be used to challenge a prior conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953 ( Garcia ).) In particular, we stressed the disruption of orderly proceeding | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Coffey
green
2 sentences1999A Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a prior conviction that, before Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 204 , 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 , would have been raised in a separate proceeding by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1999A Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a prior conviction that, before Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 204 , 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 , would have been raised in a separate proceeding by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Vienne
green
2 sentences1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a 1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Howard
red
2 sentences1999However, in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , we noted the overwhelming weight of federal authority is to the effect that Boykin does not require explicit on-the-record admonitions and waivers, and allows a guilty plea to be upheld, even on direct appeal, if the record as a whole affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary. ( Howard, supra , at pp. 1177-1179, citing, inter alia, Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 , 747-748 , fn. 4; United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417 , 424-425 .) *Page 447 The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied 1999However, in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132 , we noted the overwhelming weight of federal authority is to the effect that Boykin does not require explicit on-the-record admonitions and waivers, and allows a guilty plea to be upheld, even on direct appeal, if the record as a whole affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary. ( Howard, supra , at pp. 1177-1179, citing, inter alia, Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 , 747-748 , fn. 4; United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 417 , 424-425 .) *Page 447 The majority acknowledge that the Sumstine rule, as applied | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Curl v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a 1999In that case, we emphasized that a Sumstine motion is a collateral attack on a presumptively final conviction. ( Curl, supra, at p. 1303 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 .) Accordingly, the People need only make "a prima facie showing of the existence of the prior conviction" ( id. at p. 1304, fn. 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49 , 801 P.2d 292 ), whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant, who *691 bears the burden of proving the constitutional invalidity of the conviction ( ibid. ). [3] In order to rely on the prior conviction in sentencing, of course, the People retain the burden of proving, beyond a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.