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8 California opinions name it 1 courts 2006–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grant v. McAuliffegreen2 sentences2015As the Fourth District held in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545 : “A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedent’s cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1553; see also Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 864 [“[b]efore his death, the injured person himself has a separate and distinct cause of action 2007Survivor Claim A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedent's cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedent's personal representative or successor in interest. (§§ 377.20, 377.30; Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 864 , 264 P.2d 944 .) Damages for a survivor claim include punitive damages and all the decedent's losses incurred prior to death, but exclude any award for the decedent's pain or suffering. (§ 377.34.) There | 2 | 3 |
Shelton v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2006(Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 370 ] [husband’s claim for loss of consortium was wholly different legal liability or obligation from wife’s personal injury claim and therefore it did not relate back]; Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 345 ] [plaintiff could not amend her complaint for wrongful death after the statute of limitations had passed to state wholly distinct survivor cause of action for decedent’s injuries]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 66, 69-81 [128 Cal.Rptr. *1279 454].) According | 1 | 1 |
Bartalo v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2006(Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 370 ] [husband’s claim for loss of consortium was wholly different legal liability or obligation from wife’s personal injury claim and therefore it did not relate back]; Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 345 ] [plaintiff could not amend her complaint for wrongful death after the statute of limitations had passed to state wholly distinct survivor cause of action for decedent’s injuries]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 66, 69-81 [128 Cal.Rptr. *1279 454].) According 2006(Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 370 ] [husband’s claim for loss of consortium was wholly different legal liability or obligation from wife’s personal injury claim and therefore it did not relate back]; Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 345 ] [plaintiff could not amend her complaint for wrongful death after the statute of limitations had passed to state wholly distinct survivor cause of action for decedent’s injuries]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 66, 69-81 [128 Cal.Rptr. *1279 454].) According | 1 | 1 |
Dominguez v. City of Alhambragreen2 sentences2006(Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 370 ] [husband’s claim for loss of consortium was wholly different legal liability or obligation from wife’s personal injury claim and therefore it did not relate back]; Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 345 ] [plaintiff could not amend her complaint for wrongful death after the statute of limitations had passed to state wholly distinct survivor cause of action for decedent’s injuries]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 66, 69-81 [128 Cal.Rptr. *1279 454].) According 2006(Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 370 ] [husband’s claim for loss of consortium was wholly different legal liability or obligation from wife’s personal injury claim and therefore it did not relate back]; Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 243 [ 173 Cal.Rptr. 345 ] [plaintiff could not amend her complaint for wrongful death after the statute of limitations had passed to state wholly distinct survivor cause of action for decedent’s injuries]; Shelton v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 66, 69-81 [128 Cal.Rptr. *1279 454].) According | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Quiroz v. Seventh Avenue Center
green
2 sentences2017(Quiroz, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281 .)9 Therefore, in her role 8 This rule would also prevent Zach, in his individual capacity, from being able to assert a claim on Brenner's behalf under Section 1278.5. 9 Again, a survivor cause of action is distinct from a cause of action for wrongful death. 2017Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30 provides: "A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest ... and an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative *146 or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest." A survivor claim is a claim asserted on behalf of the victim or decedent. ( Quiroz , supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281 , 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 222 .) 9 Therefore, in her role as representative of Brenner's estate, Nancy appears to have "standing" to assert | 2 | 2017–2017 |
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015As the Fourth District held in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545 : “A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedent’s cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1553; see also Grant v. McAuliffe (1953) 41 Cal.2d 859, 864 [“[b]efore his death, the injured person himself has a separate and distinct cause of action 2011It is instead a separate and distinct cause of action which belonged to the decedent before death but, by statute, survives that event. [Citation.]”].) As the court in SDGE, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at page 1553 stated, “A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedent’s cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest. [Citations.]” It appears that the trial court “abated” the surviva | 2 | 2011–2015 |
Avila v. S. Cal. Specialty Care, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Citing Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835 (Avila) and Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 674 (Daniels), the heirs argued “claims for elder abuse are outside the scope of section 1295, and thus Mahmood’s agreement to arbitrate does not bind Plaintiffs [sic] with respect to that claim.” The heirs said “because an elder abuse claim is not subject to section 1295, section 1281.2(c)’s carve out for medical malpractice claims is not applicable to elder abuse claims.” Treating the estate’s survivor claim for elder abuse and the heirs | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ruiz v. Podolsky
green
1 sentence2023And the same “established law” the Quiroz court cited prohibits them from doing so. 9 contracts with a health care provider to resolve all medical malpractice claims through arbitration, does that agreement apply to the resolution of wrongful death claims, when the claimants are not themselves signatory to the arbitration agreement?” (Id. at p. 841.) The court concluded the answer was “yes,” at least where “the language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind [those] claimants.” (Ibid.) In Ruiz, the decedent’s heirs sued his doctor and others, alleging the defendants “failed to adequately | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Citing Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835 (Avila) and Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 674 (Daniels), the heirs argued “claims for elder abuse are outside the scope of section 1295, and thus Mahmood’s agreement to arbitrate does not bind Plaintiffs [sic] with respect to that claim.” The heirs said “because an elder abuse claim is not subject to section 1295, section 1281.2(c)’s carve out for medical malpractice claims is not applicable to elder abuse claims.” Treating the estate’s survivor claim for elder abuse and the heirs | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.