tortious discharge claim in California

2019(Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 894 [A tortious discharge claim requires that the employee be discharged in violation of a policy that is: “(1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental”].) It is upon the factors announced in Stevenson that plaintiff focuses his argument.

2012(Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ].) This issue was neither raised nor briefed by the parties in the petition, return, or reply.

2021Any other conclusion would sanction lawlessness, which courts by their very nature are bound to oppose.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094 , overruled on another point in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., at p. 80, fn. 6.) 15 “Our Supreme Court ‘[has] established a set of requirements that a policy must satisfy to support a tortious discharge claim.

2008The first prong of the test requires that the policy be "tethered" to either a constitutional or statutory provision. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 .) If the mere passage of a statute meant that a public policy was well or firmly established such that it could support a tortious discharge claim, then there would be no need for the third prong of the test.

2008Since the opinion in Stevenson was issued, our Supreme Court has reiterated that the public policy upon which a tortious discharge claim is based be "well established at the time of the discharge" ( City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1159 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 ), a formulation anticipated by this Division ( Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 938, 942 , 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 584 ).

2008Since the opinion in Stevenson was issued, our Supreme Court has reiterated that the public policy upon which a tortious discharge claim is based be "well established at the time of the discharge" ( City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1159 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 ), a formulation anticipated by this Division ( Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 938, 942 , 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 584 ).

2008Since the opinion in Stevenson was issued, our Supreme Court has reiterated that the public policy upon which a tortious discharge claim is based be "well established at the time of the discharge" ( City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1159 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 ), a formulation anticipated by this Division ( Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 938, 942 , 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 584 ).

2008Since the opinion in Stevenson was issued, our Supreme Court has reiterated that the public policy upon which a tortious discharge claim is based be "well established at the time of the discharge" ( City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1159 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 ), a formulation anticipated by this Division ( Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 938, 942 , 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 584 ).

2004Stat. Ann., § 31-51q (West 2003).) 8 In the absence of such action by the California Legislature, we cannot infer such a policy from the First Amendment itself and must defer *84 “ ‘to the judgment of the legislative branch’ ... to avoid judicial policymaking. [Citation.]” (Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 76.) For these reasons, we conclude the First Amendment free speech provision does not support a public policy on which to base a tortious discharge claim, against a private employer’s termination of an employee for the employee’s exercise of such First Amendment rights.

2004Co., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1480 [ 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 888 ]; see also Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 938, 947 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 ] [holding policy underlying statute did not support a tortious discharge claim because it did not clearly prohibit any employer conduct].) Further, substantive limitations in constitutional provisions articulating a public policy “circumscribe the common law wrongful discharge cause of action.” (City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1159 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 ].) With respect to its substantive limitati

2004Co., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1480 [ 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 888 ]; see also Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 938, 947 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 ] [holding policy underlying statute did not support a tortious discharge claim because it did not clearly prohibit any employer conduct].) Further, substantive limitations in constitutional provisions articulating a public policy “circumscribe the common law wrongful discharge cause of action.” (City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1159 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445 , 959 P.2d 752 ].) With respect to its substantive limitati

2004(TRW, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1844 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 460 ].) In TRW, the court found a private employer did not violate public policy under the Fifth Amendment by discharging an employee who refused to attend an internal security meeting without counsel because TRW was not constrained by the Fifth Amendment.

2004(TRW, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1844 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 460 ].) In TRW, the court found a private employer did not violate public policy under the Fifth Amendment by discharging an employee who refused to attend an internal security meeting without counsel because TRW was not constrained by the Fifth Amendment.

1997(See Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 221 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 649 P.2d 912 ].) As compared to a statutory FEHA cause of action, a common law wrongful discharge claim does not broaden the scope of prohibited conduct, nor does it expand the array of available remedies for prohibited age discrimination; it merely provides another legal theory on which employees may pursue remedies comparable in all relevant respects to those already available to them under the FEHA.

1997(See Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 221 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 270 , 649 P.2d 912 ].) As compared to a statutory FEHA cause of action, a common law wrongful discharge claim does not broaden the scope of prohibited conduct, nor does it expand the array of available remedies for prohibited age discrimination; it merely provides another legal theory on which employees may pursue remedies comparable in all relevant respects to those already available to them under the FEHA.