Tran claim in California

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209 .) In addition, the Tran court rejected the Tran defendant’s argument that “the Chapman[, supra,] 386 U.S. 18 standard for federal constitutional error should apply when reviewing his guilty verdicts. ‘[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.’ [Citation.] Such prejudice did not occur in this case.” (Tran, supra, at p. 1209.) The Tran court reasoned that there was strong evidence of guilt without the gang evidence.

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209 .) In addition, the Tran court rejected the Tran defendant’s argument that “the Chapman[, supra,] 386 U.S. 18 standard for federal constitutional error should apply when reviewing his guilty verdicts. ‘[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.’ [Citation.] Such prejudice did not occur in this case.” (Tran, supra, at p. 1209.) The Tran court reasoned that there was strong evidence of guilt without the gang evidence.

2022Generally, “arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 .) However, because the appellate authority holding that section 1109 applies retroactively was only issued after the time had passed for Tran to file his supplemental brief and the Attorney General has since been given the opportunity to respond to Tran’s claim, the usual concerns regarding unfairness have been mitigated.

2021Its ultimate decision to reject Tran’s claim for mortgage reimbursement was well within its equitable power to do “right and justice” without being bound by “rigid dogmas . . . .” (Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279 , 300.) We explain below that on this record the court could reasonably conclude Tran acted as a volunteer when she made payments on a property she did not own; its ruling did not contradict a statutory or constitutional requirement (compare Robin v. Crowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 727 , 753 [statute of limitations; equit

2021(Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 134 .) 15 IV.

2021(Thompson v. Asimos, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981 .) Tran’s argument amounts to a bare assertion that taxes, trust deed payments or money spent in preserving the property are recoverable as a matter of law; she fails to recognize it was for the trial court in this case to assess the evidence in making or declining to make its awards.

2020It maintains that Tran was “merely engaged in underhanded bargaining tactics to extort money and quit.” Even though the litigation privilege (see Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), which “ ‘bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution[]’ [citation]” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 322 ), and the anti-SLAPP statute “serve quite different purposes” (ibid.), courts “have looked to the litigation privilege as an aid in construing the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2) with respect to the first step of the two-step 19 anti-SLAPP inquiry.” (Id. at pp. 322-323.)

2020It maintains that Tran was “merely engaged in underhanded bargaining tactics to extort money and quit.” Even though the litigation privilege (see Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), which “ ‘bars all tort causes of action except a claim of malicious prosecution[]’ [citation]” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 322 ), and the anti-SLAPP statute “serve quite different purposes” (ibid.), courts “have looked to the litigation privilege as an aid in construing the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2) with respect to the first step of the two-step 19 anti-SLAPP inquiry.” (Id. at pp. 322-323.)

2019Therefore, we requested the parties submit letter briefs addressing the following issue: "[W]hether exigent circumstances allowed for the warrantless seizure of [Tran's] dashboard camera under United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696 [(Place)]." We requested such supplemental briefing because we were satisfied that the evidence proffered at the hearing on Tran's motion to suppress was fully developed to analyze the constitutionality of the seizure of the dashboard camera and no additional evidence was needed.

2019As such, we did not deem our request to violate Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126 .

2003In Delos, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d 642 , the court deemed Farmers Group a fiduciary for purposes of all the Exchange’s insurance business, because it was convinced that the Group exercised all the functions of an insurer, including control over claims processing.