Vickers hearing in California

2026It is firmly established that a party “may not go to trial before a judge and gamble on a favorable result, and then assert for the first time on appeal that the judge was biased.” (People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 626 .) As noted above, the Legislature has provided a ready means to raise and resolve bias claims at the earliest opportunity.

2026It is firmly established that a party “may not go to trial before a judge and gamble on a favorable result, and then assert for the first time on appeal that the judge was biased.” (People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 626 .) As noted above, the Legislature has provided a ready means to raise and resolve bias claims at the earliest opportunity.

2024DISCUSSION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW The order in question was issued after a Vickers hearing, i.e., a hearing on a motion to modify, revoke, or terminate a defendant’s probation. (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).) “The decision whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation (and thus send the defendant to prison) rests within the broad discretion of the trial court.” (People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421 (Bolian).) 2 People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 . 3 “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court, for example, is unaware of its discretion, fails to consider a relevant fac

2024DISCUSSION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW The order in question was issued after a Vickers hearing, i.e., a hearing on a motion to modify, revoke, or terminate a defendant’s probation. (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).) “The decision whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation (and thus send the defendant to prison) rests within the broad discretion of the trial court.” (People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421 (Bolian).) 2 People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 . 3 “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court, for example, is unaware of its discretion, fails to consider a relevant fac

2024(People v. Pinon (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 120, 124 .) 4 Furthermore, California Rules of Court, rule 4.435, specifically states that, when “deciding whether to permanently revoke supervision, the judge may consider the nature of the violation and the defendant’s past performance on supervision.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.435(a).) Here, the trial court found at defendant’s Vickers hearing that defendant had violated the terms of his probation.

2020The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant’s probation based on the felony conduct committed after the Vickers hearing and sentenced the defendant to state prison. ( Lewis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1951-1952.) On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court could not find he violated probation because he had already had a Vickers hearing in which he admitted a previous probation violation and he was only awaiting sentencing on the original conviction.

2020The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant’s probation based on the felony conduct committed after the Vickers hearing and sentenced the defendant to state prison. ( Lewis, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1951-1952.) On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court could not find he violated probation because he had already had a Vickers hearing in which he admitted a previous probation violation and he was only awaiting sentencing on the original conviction.

2015Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 , setting forth a statement of the case and a few potential arguable issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant violated the probation condition requiring him to report “every 14 days or as directed”; (2) whether defendant’s due process right to confront witnesses at a Vickers2 hearing was violated when the prosecution used hearsay evidence and did not produce the probation officer who personally interacted with him; (3) whether the ca

2015Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 , setting forth a statement of the case and a few potential arguable issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant violated the probation condition requiring him to report “every 14 days or as directed”; (2) whether defendant’s due process right to confront witnesses at a Vickers2 hearing was violated when the prosecution used hearsay evidence and did not produce the probation officer who personally interacted with him; (3) whether the ca

2015Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 , setting forth a statement of the case and a few potential arguable issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant violated the probation condition requiring him to report “every 14 days or as directed”; (2) whether defendant’s due process right to confront witnesses at a Vickers2 hearing was violated when the prosecution used hearsay evidence and did not produce the probation officer who personally interacted with him; (3) whether the ca

2015Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 , setting forth a statement of the case and a few potential arguable issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant violated the probation condition requiring him to report “every 14 days or as directed”; (2) whether defendant’s due process right to confront witnesses at a Vickers2 hearing was violated when the prosecution used hearsay evidence and did not produce the probation officer who personally interacted with him; (3) whether the ca

2013(In re Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, 930 .) Here, defendant executed the Agreement, similar to a plea bargain, by which he waived his rights to a Vickers hearing.

2013(In re Moss (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 913, 930 .) Here, defendant executed the Agreement, similar to a plea bargain, by which he waived his rights to a Vickers hearing.

2013(See People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 79 [challenge to stipulated sentence constitutes a challenge to the guilty plea itself].) Without a certificate of probable cause, we cannot review the 1 We disagree with defendant‟s assertion in his letter brief that he “could not have given a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a Vickers hearing because there was no way for [defendant] to assess what that waiver entailed at the time he gave it.” This could be similarly said of the waiver of the right to appeal approved in People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 . 10 validity of the

2013(See People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 79 [challenge to stipulated sentence constitutes a challenge to the guilty plea itself].) Without a certificate of probable cause, we cannot review the 1 We disagree with defendant‟s assertion in his letter brief that he “could not have given a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a Vickers hearing because there was no way for [defendant] to assess what that waiver entailed at the time he gave it.” This could be similarly said of the waiver of the right to appeal approved in People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68 . 10 validity of the

2013Penal Code former section 1203.2, subdivision (a) provided that a summary revocation of probation “shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” The majority holds that this provision, not substantively changed under current law, merely preserved the court’s authority to adjudicate, in a hearing under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ] and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 503 P.2d 1313 ] (Morrissey/Vickers hearing) held after the original imposed term of probation, whether a summary revocation entered during the

2013Penal Code former section 1203.2, subdivision (a) provided that a summary revocation of probation “shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” The majority holds that this provision, not substantively changed under current law, merely preserved the court’s authority to adjudicate, in a hearing under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ] and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 503 P.2d 1313 ] (Morrissey/Vickers hearing) held after the original imposed term of probation, whether a summary revocation entered during the

1992The court stated that a summary revocation of probation was the device by which the probationer was brought to court (Barkins, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 ), and “[a]ctual revocation of probation cannot occur until the probationer has been afforded the due process hearing rights provided in [Vickers].” (Id., at p. 33.) It held, “. . . until Vickers has been satisfied, the terms of probation remain in effect.” (Id., at p. 33.) Thus, defendant argues, his terms of probation were not in effect once the Vickers hearing had concluded and before probation had been reinstated.

1992The court stated that a summary revocation of probation was the device by which the probationer was brought to court (Barkins, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 32 ), and “[a]ctual revocation of probation cannot occur until the probationer has been afforded the due process hearing rights provided in [Vickers].” (Id., at p. 33.) It held, “. . . until Vickers has been satisfied, the terms of probation remain in effect.” (Id., at p. 33.) Thus, defendant argues, his terms of probation were not in effect once the Vickers hearing had concluded and before probation had been reinstated.