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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc.green2 sentences2026(See Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 912– 913, 915-916, citing Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703 (Lawson).) Rather, “plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of proving unlawful retaliation even when other, legitimate factors also contributed to the adverse action,” simply by showing that “the employer also had at least one retaliatory reason that was a contributing factor in the action.” (Lawson, at pp. 713-714, 716, italics added; Scheer, at pp. 915-916.)7 6 Section 8547.12, subdivision (e) provides in relevant part: “In any civil action or administrative proce 2022Once the plaintiff has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in 9 protected activity.” (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718 (Lawson).) In contrast, no parallel statute exists setting forth the respective parties’ burdens for a whistleblower retaliation claim brought pursuant to section 6310, subdivision (b). | 1 | 2 |
Jacobs v. State Board of Optometrygreen1 sentence2025(See, e.g., City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1287 [the fact that a city may attend local airport land use commission hearings and submit materials relevant to adoption of legislative act did not constitute an administrative remedy as the commission was not required to do anything in response to the submissions 15. or testimony received]; Jacobs v. State Bd. of Optometry (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the applicable statute allowed interested person to petition a state | 1 | 1 |
City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Commissiongreen1 sentence2025(See, e.g., City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1287 [the fact that a city may attend local airport land use commission hearings and submit materials relevant to adoption of legislative act did not constitute an administrative remedy as the commission was not required to do anything in response to the submissions 15. or testimony received]; Jacobs v. State Bd. of Optometry (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the applicable statute allowed interested person to petition a state | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. City of Santa Monicagreen1 sentence2025(See Harris, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 214-215.) Here, respondent D’Andre Lampkin (Lampkin) proved the elements of a whistleblower retaliation claim, but appellant County of Los Angeles (County) established the affirmative defense provided by section 1102.6, and Lampkin obtained no relief. | 1 | 1 |
Mcveigh v. Recology San Franciscogreen1 sentence2024(McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 468 [retaliation]; Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412 , 424 [age discrimination].) The legal definition is the same for both types of claims. | 1 | 1 |
Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Department of Adoptionsgreen2 sentences2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t 2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t | 1 | 1 |
Zelig v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t 2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t | 1 | 1 |
Adkins v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t 2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t | 1 | 1 |
Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authoritygreen2 sentences2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t 2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Runyon v. Board of Trustees of California State University
green
2 sentences2026(See Runyon, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 767, 769, 774.) Under the statute, a CSU employee establishes a whistleblower retaliation claim by proving (1) that he or she engaged in a “protected” activity or made a “protected disclosure[ ]” under the Act; and (2) that the protected activity was a “contributing factor” in the 18 alleged retaliation against the employee. (§ 8547.12, subd. (e).)6 If the employee makes this showing, “the burden of proof” then shifts to the employer “to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent rea 2018Code, § 8547.8 [protects state employees against whistleblower retaliation]; § 8547.10 [protects employees of the University of California system from whistleblower retaliation]; § 8547.12 [protects employees of the California State University system from whistleblower retaliation].) *353 In State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963 , 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 201 P.3d 457 ( Arbuckle ), the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature *636 intended that an administrative finding not be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil lawsuit involving a whistleblower retal | 2 | 2018–2026 |
State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court of Sacramento County
green
2 sentences2018Code, § 8547.8 [protects state employees against whistleblower retaliation]; § 8547.10 [protects employees of the University of California system from whistleblower retaliation]; § 8547.12 [protects employees of the California State University system from whistleblower retaliation].) *353 In State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963 , 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 201 P.3d 457 ( Arbuckle ), the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature *636 intended that an administrative finding not be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil lawsuit involving a whistleblower retal 2018Code, § 8547.8 [protects state employees against whistleblower retaliation]; § 8547.10 [protects employees of the University of California system from whistleblower retaliation]; § 8547.12 [protects employees of the California State University system from whistleblower retaliation].) *353 In State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963 , 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 201 P.3d 457 ( Arbuckle ), the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature *636 intended that an administrative finding not be given preclusive effect in a subsequent civil lawsuit involving a whistleblower retal | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Palmer v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences2014It noted that in Palmer v. Regents of University of 15 California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 (Palmer), “the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in . . . a whistleblower retaliation claim against the University of California. 2008(See Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 , 80 P.3d 656 ]; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127-1128 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 , 45 P.3d 1171 ]; see also Adkins v. State of California (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817-1818 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 59 ]; Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Adoptions (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 859, 866-867 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 504 ].) In Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 ], the Court of Appeal applied section 815 in a context similar to t | 2 | 2008–2014 |
Scheer v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
green
1 sentence2026(See Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 912– 913, 915-916, citing Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703 (Lawson).) Rather, “plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of proving unlawful retaliation even when other, legitimate factors also contributed to the adverse action,” simply by showing that “the employer also had at least one retaliatory reason that was a contributing factor in the action.” (Lawson, at pp. 713-714, 716, italics added; Scheer, at pp. 915-916.)7 6 Section 8547.12, subdivision (e) provides in relevant part: “In any civil action or administrative proce | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Plantier v. Ramona Mun. Water Dist.
green
1 sentence2025(See, e.g., City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 1287 [the fact that a city may attend local airport land use commission hearings and submit materials relevant to adoption of legislative act did not constitute an administrative remedy as the commission was not required to do anything in response to the submissions 15. or testimony received]; Jacobs v. State Bd. of Optometry (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [a plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies where the applicable statute allowed interested person to petition a state | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2025He argued Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 320 (Lloyd), in which the appellate court found the plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation claim was not governed by Los Angele County’s internal rules, was directly on point. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California
green
2 sentences2018Instead, the Supreme Court observed that the University of California's "unique constitutional status" might explain why "the Legislature would take a deferential approach when authorizing damages actions against the University" and not include the final sentence of Government Code section 8547.12, subdivision (c) authorizing civil actions in the former version of section 8547.10, subdivision (c). ( Miklosy, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 , 188 P.3d 629 .) As discussed ante , in 2010, the Legislature amended section 8547.10, subdivision (c) to authorize such actions. 2018Instead, the Supreme Court observed that the University of California's "unique constitutional status" might explain why "the Legislature would take a deferential approach when authorizing damages actions against the University" and not include the final sentence of Government Code section 8547.12, subdivision (c) authorizing civil actions in the former version of section 8547.10, subdivision (c). ( Miklosy, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 889 , 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 , 188 P.3d 629 .) As discussed ante , in 2010, the Legislature amended section 8547.10, subdivision (c) to authorize such actions. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.