assemblage doctrine (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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assemblage doctrine in Connecticut

9 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2008 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Commissioner v. Towpath Associatesgreen
conn · 2001 · cited in 7 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2002–2006
2 sentences

2002A footnote in that decision discussed the division of opinion in state courts as to whether or not the doctrine should apply "[w]ithout at least substantial unity of ownership and some indication of unity of use [but because] the trial court's decision in this case did not address this issue, we need not decide whether a unity of ownership is an essential predicate to an application of the doctrine of assemblage." Id., 549 n. 13.

2002Our Supreme Court first addressed the assemblage doctrine as it applies in condemnation proceedings and held that "an award may be made based on a parcel's highest and best use when that use requires an assemblage of separate lands." Commissioner of Transportation v. Towpath Associates , 255 Conn. 529 , 548 (2001).

57
Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Lewisgreen
gactapp · 1994 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001We note that courts in some jurisdictions require a unity of ownership of the separate parcels as a prerequisite to applying the doctrine of assemblage; see, e.g., Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Lewis, 215 Ga. App. 671, 672 , 452 S.E.2d 167 , cert. denied, 215 Ga. App. 913 (1994) (purpose of unity of ownership requirement “is to establish that an integrated use of the various parcels is ‘reasonably probable. ’ Without at least substantial unity of ownership and some indication of unity of use, the proposed assemblage is entirely speculative.”); while other courts apply the doctrine, regardless of w

2001We note that courts in some jurisdictions require a unity of ownership of the separate parcels as a prerequisite to applying the doctrine of assemblage; see, e.g., Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Lewis, 215 Ga. App. 671, 672 , 452 S.E.2d 167 , cert. denied, 215 Ga. App. 913 (1994) (purpose of unity of ownership requirement “is to establish that an integrated use of the various parcels is ‘reasonably probable. ’ Without at least substantial unity of ownership and some indication of unity of use, the proposed assemblage is entirely speculative.”); while other courts apply the doctrine, regardless of w

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Clarmar Realty Co. v. Redevelopment Authority green
wis · 1986
2 sentences

2002The footnote just cited also refers to a Wisconsin case that holds that unity of ownership of all the parcels condemned should not be required for the application of assemblage "because it permits property owners to establish a legitimate element of the fair market value of the property, i.e., its value in conjunction with adjacent land to which the owners may or may not hold title." Clarmar Realty Co., Inc. v. Redevelopment Authority , 383 N.W.2d 890 , 895 (Wis. 1986).

2002The footnote just cited also refers to a Wisconsin case that holds that unity of ownership of all the parcels condemned should not be required for the application of assemblage "because it permits property owners to establish a legitimate element of the fair market value of the property, i.e., its value in conjunction with adjacent land to which the owners may or may not hold title." Clarmar Realty Co., Inc. v. Redevelopment Authority , 383 N.W.2d 890 , 895 (Wis. 1986).

22002–2002
Franc v. Bethel Holding Co. green
connappct · 2002
2 sentences

2008Instead, the plaintiff contests the court’s reliance on Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, supra, 93 Conn. App. 799 , to support its conclusion that the doctrine of assemblage is appropriate for tax assessment valuation. *251 The plaintiff is correct in stating that Femgno did not involve a tax appeal; however, in Franc v. Bethel Holding Co., supra, 73 Conn. App. 114 , we engaged in a thorough discussion of the doctrine of assemblage, as applied in a variety of jurisdictions and contexts.

2008Instead, the plaintiff contests the court’s reliance on Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, supra, 93 Conn. App. 799 , to support its conclusion that the doctrine of assemblage is appropriate for tax assessment valuation. *251 The plaintiff is correct in stating that Femgno did not involve a tax appeal; however, in Franc v. Bethel Holding Co., supra, 73 Conn. App. 114 , we engaged in a thorough discussion of the doctrine of assemblage, as applied in a variety of jurisdictions and contexts.

12008–2008
Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates neutral
connappct · 2006
2 sentences

2008Instead, the plaintiff contests the court’s reliance on Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, supra, 93 Conn. App. 799 , to support its conclusion that the doctrine of assemblage is appropriate for tax assessment valuation. *251 The plaintiff is correct in stating that Femgno did not involve a tax appeal; however, in Franc v. Bethel Holding Co., supra, 73 Conn. App. 114 , we engaged in a thorough discussion of the doctrine of assemblage, as applied in a variety of jurisdictions and contexts.

2008Instead, the plaintiff contests the court’s reliance on Ferrigno v. Cromwell Development Associates, supra, 93 Conn. App. 799 , to support its conclusion that the doctrine of assemblage is appropriate for tax assessment valuation. *251 The plaintiff is correct in stating that Femgno did not involve a tax appeal; however, in Franc v. Bethel Holding Co., supra, 73 Conn. App. 114 , we engaged in a thorough discussion of the doctrine of assemblage, as applied in a variety of jurisdictions and contexts.

12008–2008
City of New London v. Picinich green
conn · 2003
2 sentences

2006We disagree. *124 At the outset, we note that the defendant has not cited any Connecticut case law that requires the application of the doctrine of assemblage in valuing property, and we have not found any support for such a mandate. 1 “Valuation is a matter of fact to be determined by the trier’s independent judgment. ” New London v. Picinich, 76 Conn. App. 678, 685 , 821 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901 , 832 A.2d 64 (2003).

2006We disagree. *124 At the outset, we note that the defendant has not cited any Connecticut case law that requires the application of the doctrine of assemblage in valuing property, and we have not found any support for such a mandate. 1 “Valuation is a matter of fact to be determined by the trier’s independent judgment. ” New London v. Picinich, 76 Conn. App. 678, 685 , 821 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901 , 832 A.2d 64 (2003).

12006–2006
City of New London v. Picinich neutral
connappct · 2003
2 sentences

2006We disagree. *124 At the outset, we note that the defendant has not cited any Connecticut case law that requires the application of the doctrine of assemblage in valuing property, and we have not found any support for such a mandate. 1 “Valuation is a matter of fact to be determined by the trier’s independent judgment. ” New London v. Picinich, 76 Conn. App. 678, 685 , 821 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901 , 832 A.2d 64 (2003).

2006We disagree. *124 At the outset, we note that the defendant has not cited any Connecticut case law that requires the application of the doctrine of assemblage in valuing property, and we have not found any support for such a mandate. 1 “Valuation is a matter of fact to be determined by the trier’s independent judgment. ” New London v. Picinich, 76 Conn. App. 678, 685 , 821 A.2d 782 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 901 , 832 A.2d 64 (2003).

12006–2006

Where else courts name it

CT 9 (2001–2008) TX 2 (2015–2015) WI 2 (1986–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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