defendant withdrew claim in Connecticut

2012The defendant withdrew this claim at oral argument before this court as a result of our Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin v. Superior Casting, 302 Conn. 219, 223 , 24 A.3d 1233 (2011), which concluded that “holding [the defendant] liable for an insolvent insurer’s obligations under § 31-299b as the last insurer on the risk does not conflict with § 38a-845.” 5 During the pendency of these proceedings, the plaintiff Richard Brooks died.

2012The defendant withdrew this claim at oral argument before this court as a result of our Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin v. Superior Casting, 302 Conn. 219, 223 , 24 A.3d 1233 (2011), which concluded that “holding [the defendant] liable for an insolvent insurer’s obligations under § 31-299b as the last insurer on the risk does not conflict with § 38a-845.” 5 During the pendency of these proceedings, the plaintiff Richard Brooks died.

2007Relying on Gorelick v. Montanaro, 94 Conn. App. 14 , 20 n.14, 891 A.2d 41 (2006), the defendant claims that the court’s conduct in this regard was “fundamentally unfair” and urges us to disregard the court’s factual determinations.

2007Relying on Gorelick v. Montanaro, 94 Conn. App. 14 , 20 n.14, 891 A.2d 41 (2006), the defendant claims that the court’s conduct in this regard was “fundamentally unfair” and urges us to disregard the court’s factual determinations.

2004The defendant withdrew that claim at oral argument, however, in light of Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312 , 813 A.2d 1003 (2003), in which our Supreme Court rejected the claim that “a purveyor who provides alcoholic beverages to an already intoxicated patron or a patron known to him to be an alcoholic cannot, as a matter of law, be the proximate cause of subsequent injuries caused by the intoxicated patron.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 334 .

2004The defendant withdrew that claim at oral argument, however, in light of Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312 , 813 A.2d 1003 (2003), in which our Supreme Court rejected the claim that “a purveyor who provides alcoholic beverages to an already intoxicated patron or a patron known to him to be an alcoholic cannot, as a matter of law, be the proximate cause of subsequent injuries caused by the intoxicated patron.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 334 .

2003The defendant also withdrew his claim that the state improperly failed to disclose in a timely manner the allegedly exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2003The defendant also withdrew his claim that the state improperly failed to disclose in a timely manner the allegedly exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 10 L.

2001In State v. Parra, 251 Conn. 617, 631 , 741 A.2d 902 (1999), our Supreme Court concluded that § 54-1j was to be applied retroactively.

2001In State v. Parra, 251 Conn. 617, 631 , 741 A.2d 902 (1999), our Supreme Court concluded that § 54-1j was to be applied retroactively.

1991Therefore, the sole issue remaining is whether, on the evidence presented by the plaintiff, probable cause can be found to support a PJR. "(PJR) proceedings are not involved with the adjudication of the merits of the action brought by the plaintiff. . .They are only concerned with whether and to what extent the plaintiff is entitled to have property of the defendant held in the custody of the law pending adjudication of the merits of the action." Ledgebrook Condominium Association, Inc. v. Lusk Corporation, 172 Conn. 577 , 583 (1977).

1986On the basis of principles articulated in State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588 , 427 A.2d 441 (1980), we recently rejected such a contention in State v. Castro, 196 Conn. 421, 429 , 493 A.2d 223 (1985).

1986During argument of this appeal the defendant withdrew her claim, which had been briefed, that the statements she had made to the police in Florida after her arrest and to the New Haven police after her extradition, but prior to her arraignment or indictment, were obtained in violation of her right to have counsel present at the interrogation under the strictures of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S. Ct. 1199 , 12 L.

1986During argument of this appeal the defendant withdrew her claim, which had been briefed, that the statements she had made to the police in Florida after her arrest and to the New Haven police after her extradition, but prior to her arraignment or indictment, were obtained in violation of her right to have counsel present at the interrogation under the strictures of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S. Ct. 1199 , 12 L.

1986On the basis of principles articulated in State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588 , 427 A.2d 441 (1980), we recently rejected such a contention in State v. Castro, 196 Conn. 421, 429 , 493 A.2d 223 (1985).

1986On the basis of principles articulated in State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588 , 427 A.2d 441 (1980), we recently rejected such a contention in State v. Castro, 196 Conn. 421, 429 , 493 A.2d 223 (1985).

1986At oral argument the defendant withdrew this claim in light of our recent decision in State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255 , 502 A.2d 886 (1986).

1986At oral argument the defendant withdrew this claim in light of our recent decision in State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255 , 502 A.2d 886 (1986).

1986With regard to the statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege; General Statutes § 52-146e; we have recently held that the trial court must conduct an in camera proceeding “[wjhere there is any reasonable basis in the evidence for believing that psychiatric personnel may have information relating to the mental condition of a witness that might affect his testimony.” State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211, 228 , 514 A.2d 724 (1986).

1986With regard to the statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege; General Statutes § 52-146e; we have recently held that the trial court must conduct an in camera proceeding “[wjhere there is any reasonable basis in the evidence for believing that psychiatric personnel may have information relating to the mental condition of a witness that might affect his testimony.” State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211, 228 , 514 A.2d 724 (1986).