four prong test in Connecticut

2000Because the defendant did not properly preserve this claim before the trial court, we now must determine whether the defendant can prevail under the four prong test articulated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 10 “While the first two prongs of the Golding analysis consider whether the defendant’s claim is reviewable, the last two prongs address the merits of the claim. ...

2000Because the defendant did not properly preserve this claim before the trial court, we now must determine whether the defendant can prevail under the four prong test articulated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 10 “While the first two prongs of the Golding analysis consider whether the defendant’s claim is reviewable, the last two prongs address the merits of the claim. ...

1999In State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588 , 427 A.2d 414 (1980), we constructed a four prong test whereby “[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense if, and only if, the following conditions are met: (1) an appropriate instruction is requested by either the state or the defendant; (2) it is not possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser; (3) there is some evidence, introduced by either the state or the defendant, or by a combination of their proofs, which justifies co

1999In State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588 , 427 A.2d 414 (1980), we constructed a four prong test whereby “[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense if, and only if, the following conditions are met: (1) an appropriate instruction is requested by either the state or the defendant; (2) it is not possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser; (3) there is some evidence, introduced by either the state or the defendant, or by a combination of their proofs, which justifies co

2015Second, even if the defendant had properly brought a petition for a new trial under § 42- 55, he would not be able to satisfy the four prong test, the first prong of which requires that ‘‘the proffered evidence is newly discovered, such that it could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn. App. 94, 100 , 917 A.2d 555 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 914 , 924 A.2d 140 (2007).

2015Second, even if the defendant had properly brought a petition for a new trial under § 42- 55, he would not be able to satisfy the four prong test, the first prong of which requires that ‘‘the proffered evidence is newly discovered, such that it could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn. App. 94, 100 , 917 A.2d 555 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 914 , 924 A.2d 140 (2007).

2015Second, even if the defendant had properly brought a petition for a new trial under § 42- 55, he would not be able to satisfy the four prong test, the first prong of which requires that ‘‘the proffered evidence is newly discovered, such that it could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn. App. 94, 100 , 917 A.2d 555 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 914 , 924 A.2d 140 (2007).

2015Second, even if the defendant had properly brought a petition for a new trial under § 42- 55, he would not be able to satisfy the four prong test, the first prong of which requires that ‘‘the proffered evidence is newly discovered, such that it could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn. App. 94, 100 , 917 A.2d 555 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 914 , 924 A.2d 140 (2007).

2001"To assert a claim for indemnification under Kaplan , an out-of-pocket defendant must show that: (1) the party against whom the indemnification is sought was negligent; (2) that party's active negligence, rather than the defendant's own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and the resulting injuries and death; (3) the other party was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the defendant seeking reimbursement; and (4) the defendant did not know of the other party's negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and reasonably could rely on the other party not

2001"To assert a claim for indemnification under Kaplan , an out-of-pocket defendant must show that: (1) the party against whom the indemnification is sought was negligent; (2) that party's active negligence, rather than the defendant's own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the accident and the resulting injuries and death; (3) the other party was in control of the situation to the exclusion of the defendant seeking reimbursement; and (4) the defendant did not know of the other party's negligence, had no reason to anticipate it, and reasonably could rely on the other party not

2001In its reasoning, the court expressly overruled Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), but did not expressly overrule Maloney or address its continuing application.

2001In its reasoning, the court expressly overruled Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), but did not expressly overrule Maloney or address its continuing application.

1999In State v. Sawyer, 227 Conn. 566, 583 , 630 A.2d 1064 (1993), we determined that, to assist the jury in making the transition from consideration of the greater offense to consideration of one or more lesser included offenses, the juiy must receive an “acquittal first” instruction.

1999In State v. Sawyer, 227 Conn. 566, 583 , 630 A.2d 1064 (1993), we determined that, to assist the jury in making the transition from consideration of the greater offense to consideration of one or more lesser included offenses, the juiy must receive an “acquittal first” instruction.

1998Id.

1996Discussion If CCM is subject to the Connecticut Freedom of Information Act it is because it is a public agency when subjected to the four prong test adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 544 , 554-555 (1980).