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9 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
International Derrick & Equipment Co. v. Buxbaumgreen2 sentences1983In International Derrick & Equipment Co. v. Buxbaum, 240 F.2d 536, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1957), however, the court rejected a similar argument and held that control in the nature of a possessory handling for the purpose of performing work on the property is sufficient to bring a claim within the meaning of the exclusion clause. 1983In International Derrick Equipment Co. v. Buxbaum, 240 F.2d 536 , 537-38 (3d Cir. 1957), however, the court rejected a similar argument and held that control in the nature of a possessory handling for the purpose of performing work on the property is sufficient to bring a claim within the meaning of the exclusion clause. | 1 | 2 |
Wadell v. Board of Zoning Appealsgreen2 sentences2014See [Wadell v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 136 Conn. 1, 8 , 68 A.2d 152 (1949)] (‘[c]ross-examination is the greatest aid to the ascertainment of the truth which the advocate possesses’) . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) The plaintiffs did not have an unqual- ified right, however, to cross-examine witnesses in the hearings on BNE’s petitions and, having failed to explain to the council the basis of their request to call Riese as a witness, they cannot now claim that council should have known that cross-examination of Riese was required for a ‘‘full and true disclosure of the facts.’’ General Statute 2014See [Wadell v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 136 Conn. 1, 8 , 68 A.2d 152 (1949)] (‘[c]ross-examination is the greatest aid to the ascertainment of the truth which the advocate possesses’) . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) The plaintiffs did not have an unqual- ified right, however, to cross-examine witnesses in the hearings on BNE’s petitions and, having failed to explain to the council the basis of their request to call Riese as a witness, they cannot now claim that council should have known that cross-examination of Riese was required for a ‘‘full and true disclosure of the facts.’’ General Statute | 1 | 1 |
Dinda v. Siroisgreen2 sentences1998"The negligence of the operator of an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to one who is a passenger in it." Silverman v. Silverman , 145 Conn. 663 , 668 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); see Dinda v. Sirois , 166 Conn. 68 , 70 , 347 A.2d 75 (1974). "[T]he alleged contributory negligence of a passenger [however] is relevant in considering whether to bar his recovery" where negligent conduct by the passenger is alleged. 1998"The negligence of the operator of an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to one who is a passenger in it." Silverman v. Silverman , 145 Conn. 663 , 668 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); see Dinda v. Sirois , 166 Conn. 68 , 70 , 347 A.2d 75 (1974). "[T]he alleged contributory negligence of a passenger [however] is relevant in considering whether to bar his recovery" where negligent conduct by the passenger is alleged. | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Smithgreen1 sentence1997See Mercy v. State, 211 Conn. 199 (1989) and Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Merly v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See Mercy v. State, 211 Conn. 199 (1989) and Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Caruso v. City of Bridgeport
green
1 sentence2019To the extent that the plaintiffs contend that the requirement under Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 263 , that they establish that ‘‘the reliability of the result of the election . . . is seriously in doubt’’ does not require them to establish that there is a significant risk that the result would have been different but for the conduct complained of, but only that there were significant improprieties in the election process, we expressly held to the contrary in Caruso II, supra, 285 Conn. 618 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp
green
2 sentences2008The plaintiffs contend that the trial court should have applied the two part test recognized in Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), and Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L. 2008The plaintiffs contend that the trial court should have applied the two part test recognized in Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), and Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh
green
2 sentences2008The plaintiffs contend that a requirement that they demonstrate that they have suffered an injury that is “unique” is contrary to standing jurisprudence, wherein “the concern is to distinguish those who have suffered some individual injury from those asserting only the common right of the entire public that the law be obeyed.” William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 203 , 346 A.2d 269 (1975). 2008The plaintiffs contend that a requirement that they demonstrate that they have suffered an injury that is “unique” is contrary to standing jurisprudence, wherein “the concern is to distinguish those who have suffered some individual injury from those asserting only the common right of the entire public that the law be obeyed.” William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 203 , 346 A.2d 269 (1975). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ducharme v. City of Putnam
green
2 sentences2008The plaintiffs contend that the trial court should have applied the two part test recognized in Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), and Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L. 2008The plaintiffs contend that the trial court should have applied the two part test recognized in Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), and Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Silverman v. Silverman
green
2 sentences1998"The negligence of the operator of an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to one who is a passenger in it." Silverman v. Silverman , 145 Conn. 663 , 668 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); see Dinda v. Sirois , 166 Conn. 68 , 70 , 347 A.2d 75 (1974). "[T]he alleged contributory negligence of a passenger [however] is relevant in considering whether to bar his recovery" where negligent conduct by the passenger is alleged. 1998"The negligence of the operator of an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to one who is a passenger in it." Silverman v. Silverman , 145 Conn. 663 , 668 , 145 A.2d 826 (1958); see Dinda v. Sirois , 166 Conn. 68 , 70 , 347 A.2d 75 (1974). "[T]he alleged contributory negligence of a passenger [however] is relevant in considering whether to bar his recovery" where negligent conduct by the passenger is alleged. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams
green
2 sentences1991The plaintiffs contend that their claim of deprivation is supported by Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 , 103 S. Ct. 2706 , 77 L. 1991The plaintiffs contend that their claim of deprivation is supported by Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 , 103 S. Ct. 2706 , 77 L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Petterson v. Weinstock
green
2 sentences1991In Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436 , 138 A. 433 (1927) the supreme court upheld a trial court ruling which held that the mortgagee's failure to meet technical mortgage requirements did not permit the mortgagor to foreclose. 1991In Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436 , 138 A. 433 (1927) the supreme court upheld a trial court ruling which held that the mortgagee's failure to meet technical mortgage requirements did not permit the mortgagor to foreclose. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope
green
2 sentences1991Ed. 2d 180 (1983), and Tulsa Professional Collections Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S. Ct. 1340 , 99 L. 1991Ed. 2d 180 (1983), and Tulsa Professional Collections Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S. Ct. 1340 , 99 L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.