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9 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLCgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, 96 Conn. App. 294, 306-307 , 900 A.2d 560 (2006) (court properly considered testimony that did not vary or contradict written agreement but, rather, explained meaning of undefined term). *59 VII The defendants’ last claim is that the court improperly permitted the plaintiff to submit evidence as to his attorney’s fees in a posttrial proceeding. 2007See, e.g., Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, 96 Conn. App. 294, 306-307 , 900 A.2d 560 (2006) (court properly considered testimony that did not vary or contradict written agreement but, rather, explained meaning of undefined term). *59 VII The defendants’ last claim is that the court improperly permitted the plaintiff to submit evidence as to his attorney’s fees in a posttrial proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc.green2 sentences1972DuPont deNemours Co., 443 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir.) (consideration of title VII claim in spite of prior determination on discrimination by N.L.R.B.: “This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of different statutes ordinarily vary”); see, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. 1972DuPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir.) (consideration of title VII claim in spite of prior determination on discrimination by N.L.R.B.: "This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of different statutes ordinarily vary"); see, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Sylvester TIPLER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. E. I. duPONT deNEMOURS AND CO., Inc., Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences1972DuPont deNemours Co., 443 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir.) (consideration of title VII claim in spite of prior determination on discrimination by N.L.R.B.: “This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of different statutes ordinarily vary”); see, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. 1972DuPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir.) (consideration of title VII claim in spite of prior determination on discrimination by N.L.R.B.: "This is because the purposes, requirements, perspective and configuration of different statutes ordinarily vary"); see, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Lashin v. Corcorangreen2 sentences1969The instructions in this regard closely followed the rule of loss or impairment of earning capacity enunciated in Lashin v. Corcoran, 146 Conn. 512, 514, 515 , 152 A.2d 639 ; 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 40. 1969The instructions in this regard closely followed the rule of loss or impairment of earning capacity enunciated in Lashin v. Corcoran, 146 Conn. 512, 514, 515 , 152 A.2d 639 ; 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 40. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arneda L. Hamilton v. Stephen Svatik and Eleanor Svatikgreen1 sentence1986Ind. 1984); see generally Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law (1983) pp. 405-406; but see Hamilton v. Svatik, supra. The CHRO, in finding that the complainant had made out a prima facie case, applied only the first three prongs of this standard and found that the complainant, a black individual, was in a protected class, that he made an offer to purchase lot 7, and that he was ready, willing, and able to buy, and was rejected. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2004In particular, the defendant argues that the pleadings with respect to counts one, two and four failed to allege, and the evidence failed to prove, the use of a firearm. 5 We begin by setting forth our standard of review. “[T]he standard of appellate review of a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal [challenging the sufficiency of the evidence] has been settled by judicial decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 75 Conn. App. 578, 584 , 816 A.2d 742 (2003). “[W]e apply a two part test. 2004In particular, the defendant argues that the pleadings with respect to counts one, two and four failed to allege, and the evidence failed to prove, the use of a firearm. 5 We begin by setting forth our standard of review. “[T]he standard of appellate review of a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal [challenging the sufficiency of the evidence] has been settled by judicial decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 75 Conn. App. 578, 584 , 816 A.2d 742 (2003). “[W]e apply a two part test. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Jones
green
1 sentence2001VII The defendant’s last claim is that the prosecutor improperly commented on the appropriateness of Cross’ and White’s guilty pleas, thereby burdening the defendant’s right to elect a jury trial. 25 The defendant solely relies on State v. Jones, 734 So. 2d 670 (La. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Belton
green
2 sentences1989State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 501 , 461 A.2d 973 (1983). 1989State v. Belton, 190 Conn. 496, 501 , 461 A.2d 973 (1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Ferrara
green
2 sentences1986After the charge to the jury, the defendant took an exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it “should view the testimony of a co-accused with special wariness.” We have previously stated that “[t]he well settled rule in this state regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that ‘where it is warranted by the evidence, it is the court’s duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the offense with which the defendant 1986After the charge to the jury, the defendant took an exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it “should view the testimony of a co-accused with special wariness.” We have previously stated that “[t]he well settled rule in this state regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that ‘where it is warranted by the evidence, it is the court’s duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the offense with which the defendant | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Shindell
green
2 sentences1986After the charge to the jury, the defendant took an exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it “should view the testimony of a co-accused with special wariness.” We have previously stated that “[t]he well settled rule in this state regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that ‘where it is warranted by the evidence, it is the court’s duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the offense with which the defendant 1986After the charge to the jury, the defendant took an exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it “should view the testimony of a co-accused with special wariness.” We have previously stated that “[t]he well settled rule in this state regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that ‘where it is warranted by the evidence, it is the court’s duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the offense with which the defendant | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Colton
green
2 sentences1986After the charge to the jury, the defendant took an exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it “should view the testimony of a co-accused with special wariness.” We have previously stated that “[t]he well settled rule in this state regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that ‘where it is warranted by the evidence, it is the court’s duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the offense with which the defendant 1986After the charge to the jury, the defendant took an exception to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it “should view the testimony of a co-accused with special wariness.” We have previously stated that “[t]he well settled rule in this state regarding the testimony of an accomplice is that ‘where it is warranted by the evidence, it is the court’s duty to caution the jury to scrutinize carefully the testimony if the jury finds that the witness intentionally assisted in the commission, or if he assisted or aided or abetted in the commission, of the offense with which the defendant | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Oliver v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1979We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments or his interpretation of the rulings of the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Indiana. 8 Instead, we again reaffirm the test laid down in State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 94 , 273 A.2d 867 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 , 91 S. Ct. 1637 , 29 L. 1979We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments or his interpretation of the rulings of the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Indiana. 8 Instead, we again reaffirm the test laid down in State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 94 , 273 A.2d 867 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 , 91 S. Ct. 1637 , 29 L. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Oliver
green
2 sentences1979We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments or his interpretation of the rulings of the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Indiana. 8 Instead, we again reaffirm the test laid down in State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 94 , 273 A.2d 867 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 , 91 S. Ct. 1637 , 29 L. 1979We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments or his interpretation of the rulings of the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Indiana. 8 Instead, we again reaffirm the test laid down in State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 94 , 273 A.2d 867 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 , 91 S. Ct. 1637 , 29 L. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State Ex Rel. Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell
green
1 sentence1972Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 , 89 S. Ct. 872 , 21 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male
green
2 sentences1972Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 , 89 S. Ct. 872 , 21 L. 1972Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 , 89 S. Ct. 872 , 21 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Peyton v. Gillespie
green
2 sentences1972Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 , 89 S. Ct. 872 , 21 L. 1972Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 , 89 S. Ct. 872 , 21 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.