Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Talat Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green1 sentence2025Co., 952 F. Supp. 773, 778 (M.D. | 1 | 1 |
Clay Elec. Co-Op., Inc. v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2020In Clay Electric 6 Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 2003), the supreme court approved the doctrine: “[w]henever one undertakes to provide a service to others, whether one does so gratuitously or by contract, the individual who undertakes to provide the service—i.e., the ‘undertaker’—thereby assumes a duty to act carefully and to not put others at an undue risk of harm.” Where a third person is involved, the court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) for assessing liability: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to | 1 | 1 |
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp.green1 sentence1996See also Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Thompson Aircraft, 353 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). | 1 | 1 |
Kane Furniture Corp. v. Mirandagreen1 sentence1987Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda, 506 So.2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Petrik v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.green2 sentences1986According to the supreme court, the rule emerging from other jurisdictions allowed for recovery based on the negligence of an employer who knowingly kept a dangerous employee on the premises, and the employer was held liable for an employee's acts committed outside the scope of employment, whether willful, malicious, or negligent, where the acts trespassed against the rights of someone legally on the employer's premises. [1] Section 317, Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth the rule as the employer's duty to exercise reasonable care to control his servant while acting outside the course of 1986According to the supreme court, the rule emerging from other jurisdictions allowed for recovery based on the negligence of an employer who knowingly kept a dangerous employee on the premises, and the employer was held liable for an employee's acts committed outside the scope of employment, whether willful, malicious, or negligent, where the acts trespassed against the rights of someone legally on the employer's premises. [1] Section 317, Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth the rule as the employer's duty to exercise reasonable care to control his servant while acting outside the course of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cantor v. Cochran
green
2 sentences1987In Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court approved the test set out in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958) for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor: (2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent *906 contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the matter may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, w 1984In Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court approved the test set out in Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220 (1958) for determining whether one is an employee or independent contractor: (2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to | 2 | 1984–1987 |
Talat Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
green
1 sentence2025Moreover, in holding that an insurer only has to pay the contractual damages to cure an alleged bad faith violation, the supreme court approved the analysis of a federal magistrate judge that "[s]ection 624.155 does not impose on an insurer the obligation to pay whatever the insured demands." Id. at 1282 (quoting Talat Enters., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013The supreme court approved the analysis in Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So.2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a case that, like Shotts and like this case, involved a nursing home arbitration. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Seaboard Coast Line RR Co. v. Smith
green
1 sentence1996In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427 (Fla.1978), the supreme court approved the analysis of this court in United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 334 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1086 (Fla.1976), where we held that there is no right of contribution in favor of a third-party tort-feasor, because the workers’ compensation employer and the third person are not under a “common liability” to the injured person. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United Gas Pipeline Company v. Gulf Power Company
green
1 sentence1996In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427 (Fla.1978), the supreme court approved the analysis of this court in United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 334 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1086 (Fla.1976), where we held that there is no right of contribution in favor of a third-party tort-feasor, because the workers’ compensation employer and the third person are not under a “common liability” to the injured person. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Harkins v. State
green
2 sentences1987(Emphasis supplied.) In Faison , the supreme court also approved the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s construction of the kidnapping statute in the case of Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), saying: We find that Harkins sets out the proper construction of the kidnapping statute, i.e., that “confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person ... with intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony” does not include movement or confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony. 380 So.2d at 528 . 1987(Emphasis supplied.) In Faison , the supreme court also approved the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s construction of the kidnapping statute in the case of Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), saying: We find that Harkins sets out the proper construction of the kidnapping statute, i.e., that “confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person ... with intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony” does not include movement or confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony. 380 So.2d at 528 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Buggs
green
2 sentences1987In Faison the supreme court approved a test enunciated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720 (1976) which established the following requirements: [I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime 1987In Faison the supreme court approved a test enunciated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720 (1976) which established the following requirements: [I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Abbott v. Payne
green
1 sentence1986According to the supreme court, the rule emerging from other jurisdictions allowed for recovery based on the negligence of an employer who knowingly kept a dangerous employee on the premises, and the employer was held liable for an employee's acts committed outside the scope of employment, whether willful, malicious, or negligent, where the acts trespassed against the rights of someone legally on the employer's premises. [1] Section 317, Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth the rule as the employer's duty to exercise reasonable care to control his servant while acting outside the course of | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mallory v. O'NEIL
green
1 sentence1986This cause of action in Florida had its inception in Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1954), a case in which the supreme court approved a doctrine that was emerging from other jurisdictions and was approved in section 317, Restatement (Second) of Torts. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Campbell v. State
green
1 sentence1986The supreme court noted in Campbell : "[A]lthough separated by time and space from the original felony ... it is clear that, in the circumstances, the death ... was the inevitable result of and an integral part of the same transaction, i.e., the robbery." Id. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Petrik v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.
neutral
1 sentence1986According to the supreme court, the rule emerging from other jurisdictions allowed for recovery based on the negligence of an employer who knowingly kept a dangerous employee on the premises, and the employer was held liable for an employee's acts committed outside the scope of employment, whether willful, malicious, or negligent, where the acts trespassed against the rights of someone legally on the employer's premises. [1] Section 317, Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth the rule as the employer's duty to exercise reasonable care to control his servant while acting outside the course of | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.