Supreme Court approved instruction in California

2016In fact, the court referred to People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239 , 957 P.2d 928 ], in which it had directed that the standard accomplice testimony instruction should refer only to testimony “that tends to incriminate the defendant” and instruct the jury to view an accomplice’s testimony with “caution” rather than with “distrust.” (See People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 104-105.) In Guiuan , the court explained that “[t]he word ‘caution,’ connoting ‘care and watchfulness,’ signals the need for the jury to pay special heed to incriminating testi

2015In fact, the court referred to People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 , in which it had directed that the standard accomplice testimony instruction should refer only to testimony “that tends to incriminate the defendant” and instruct the jury to view an accomplice‟s testimony with “caution” rather than with “distrust.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 104-105.) In Guiuan, the court explained that “[t]he word „caution,‟ connoting „care and watchfulness,‟ signals the need for the jury to pay special heed to incriminating testimony because it may be biased, but avoids

2021Indeed, “[a]lthough the Supreme Court approved the instruction that was given in Coffman and Marlow, which explicitly addressed how the jury should treat an accomplice’s testimony in his or her own behalf, it did not require this instruction.” (Johnson, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274 .) It was proper for the trial court to give CALJIC No. 3.18 without modifying the instruction like in Coffman and Marlow.

2018Arevalo Is Not Entitled to Relief Even if His Johnson Waiver Was Not Fully Knowing and Intelligent. “ ‘As with the waiver of any significant right by a criminal defendant, a defendant’s waiver of entitlement to section 2900.5 custody credits must, of course, be knowing and intelligent.’ ” (Arnold, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 308 .) “ ‘To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the inquiry should begin and end with deciding whether the defendant understood he [or she] was giving up custody credits to which he [or she] was otherwise entitled.’ ” (People v. Jeffrey (2004) 33 Cal.4th 31

2018Arevalo Is Not Entitled to Relief Even if His Johnson Waiver Was Not Fully Knowing and Intelligent. “ ‘As with the waiver of any significant right by a criminal defendant, a defendant’s waiver of entitlement to section 2900.5 custody credits must, of course, be knowing and intelligent.’ ” (Arnold, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 308 .) “ ‘To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the inquiry should begin and end with deciding whether the defendant understood he [or she] was giving up custody credits to which he [or she] was otherwise entitled.’ ” (People v. Jeffrey (2004) 33 Cal.4th 31

1999The Supreme Court approved an analysis similar to our own in Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1238-1239 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 783 P.2d 731 : "The [trial] court ... expressly concluded that the onstage conduct was not a theatrical performance.

1999The Supreme Court approved an analysis similar to our own in Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1238-1239 , 265 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 783 P.2d 731 : "The [trial] court ... expressly concluded that the onstage conduct was not a theatrical performance.

1955Ordinarily, the excuse relied upon by the violator presents a question of fact for the jury’s determination.” In Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal.2d 1 [ 271 P.2d 34 ], the Supreme Court approved an instruction stating “When there is a question whether a driver was negligent in entering an intersection against an automatic stop signal, all the surrounding circumstances should be considered with a view to judging whether his conduct was justifiable, excusable and in the manner of an ordinarily prudent person. ’ ’ This is in substance the instruction given here.

1955Ordinarily, the excuse relied upon by the violator presents a question of fact for the jury’s determination.” In Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal.2d 1 [ 271 P.2d 34 ], the Supreme Court approved an instruction stating “When there is a question whether a driver was negligent in entering an intersection against an automatic stop signal, all the surrounding circumstances should be considered with a view to judging whether his conduct was justifiable, excusable and in the manner of an ordinarily prudent person. ’ ’ This is in substance the instruction given here.

1940Since the decision on the former appeal, the Supreme Court approved the rule of Jones v. Pier, supra, and the holding of this court that the purchasers took an interest in the land in Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 110, where, at page 125 [ 43 Pac. (2d) 788 , 101 A. L.

1925In People v. Adams, 85 Cal. 231 [ 24 Pac. 629 ], the supreme court approved an instruction given to the jury to the effect that a peace officer making an arrest has the right to use all the force which from the surrounding circumstances seems to him as a reasonable man necessary, and that where the offense charged is a felony he has a right, if apparently necessary to a reasonable man, to kill the person whom he is seeking to arrest.

1925In People v. Adams, 85 Cal. 231 [ 24 Pac. 629 ], the supreme court approved an instruction given to the jury to the effect that a peace officer making an arrest has the right to use all the force which from the surrounding circumstances seems to him as a reasonable man necessary, and that where the offense charged is a felony he has a right, if apparently necessary to a reasonable man, to kill the person whom he is seeking to arrest.

1925In People v. Matthews, 6 Cal. Unrep. 341 [ 58 Pac. 371 ], the supremo court approved an instruction to the effect that if the defendant, a peace officer, had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that the deceased had committed a felony and had fired the fatal shot intending to shoot over the head of the deceased, the jury should find the defendant not guilty if they believed that such act on the part of the defendant was necessary for the purpose of effecting an arrest.

1925In People v. Matthews, 6 Cal. Unrep. 341 [ 58 Pac. 371 ], the supremo court approved an instruction to the effect that if the defendant, a peace officer, had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that the deceased had committed a felony and had fired the fatal shot intending to shoot over the head of the deceased, the jury should find the defendant not guilty if they believed that such act on the part of the defendant was necessary for the purpose of effecting an arrest.

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917In People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113 , [ 112 Pac. 862 ], relied upon by appellant, it appears “not only that the defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges, but that by reason of the rulings of the court he was forced to accept McKeen, a juror objectionable to him and challenged by him for cause and also that he ashed the privilege of challenging McKeen peremptorily and that his request was denied.” The rule is one not only of expediency but of justice.

1917In People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113 , [ 112 Pac. 862 ], relied upon by appellant, it appears “not only that the defendant exhausted all his peremptory challenges, but that by reason of the rulings of the court he was forced to accept McKeen, a juror objectionable to him and challenged by him for cause and also that he ashed the privilege of challenging McKeen peremptorily and that his request was denied.” The rule is one not only of expediency but of justice.

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi

1917The point is covered and controlled by the eases of People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 196 , [ 48 Pac. 75 ], People v. Schafer, 161 Cal. 573, 576 , [ 119 Pac. 920 ], Scragg v. Sallee, 24 Cal. App. 133, 139 , [ 140 Pac. 706 ] , and People v. Perry, 25 Cal. App. 337, 338 , [ 143 Pac. 798 ], Therein this and the supreme court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Trials, section 120, as follows: “It is a rule of paramount importance that errors committed in *370 overruling challenges for cause are not grounds of reversal, unless it be shown an objectionable juror was forced upon the challengi