Supreme Court approved instruction in Missouri

1988Mathenia, 702 S.W.2d at 844-45 .

1981There are two answers: (1) the court did not extend the term even though defendant was determined to be a persistent offender; (2) State v. Hunter, 586 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. banc 1979), ruled this question adversely to defendant’s contention.

1960Louis Public Service Company, Mo., 255 S.W.2d 736 , wherein *361 the Supreme Court approved an instruction submitting the case to the jury on specific negligence when the evidence showed that -the bus moved when plaintiff was in the act of boarding it and that plaintiff did not know what caused the bus to move.

1934It was said in Becker v. Lincoln Real Estate Co., 118 Mo. App. 74 , 83, 84, 93 S.W. 291, 294 , that: "`The Supreme Court approved the rule on this subject in force in Georgia and Massachusetts, in which States the courts treat disability to work as a part of the mental suffering resulting from an injury and as due to a consciousness of impaired power to take care of one's self.' "It is just as much a source of mental anxiety for one to realize that he cannot earn a living, in whole or in part, as to know that he cannot perform work, assuming that there is some logical difference between the tw

1934It was said in Becker v. Lincoln Real Estate Co., 118 Mo. App. 74 , 83, 84, 93 S.W. 291, 294 , that: "`The Supreme Court approved the rule on this subject in force in Georgia and Massachusetts, in which States the courts treat disability to work as a part of the mental suffering resulting from an injury and as due to a consciousness of impaired power to take care of one's self.' "It is just as much a source of mental anxiety for one to realize that he cannot earn a living, in whole or in part, as to know that he cannot perform work, assuming that there is some logical difference between the tw

1928In the case of Logan v. Railway Company, 183 Mo. 582 , 82 S. W. 126 , the jury was instructed as to the presumption arising from the relation of passenger and carrier.

1928In the case of Logan v. Railway Company, 183 Mo. 582 , 82 S. W. 126 , the jury was instructed as to the presumption arising from the relation of passenger and carrier.

1928In the case of Hutchinson v. Safety Gate Company, 247 Mo. 71 , l. c. 103, 152 S. W. 52 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction which informed the jury that “if you find no evidence to the contrary, you may assume deceased, at the time he was injured, was in the exercise of ordinary care. ’ ’ If it is proper to give to the jury, in an instruction, the benefit of the presumption of due care, we can perceive no *820 sound objection to instructing' the jury that the deceased had a right to assume, under the circumstances set forth in the instruction complained of, that the statutory signals wo

1928In the case of Hutchinson v. Safety Gate Company, 247 Mo. 71 , l. c. 103, 152 S. W. 52 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction which informed the jury that “if you find no evidence to the contrary, you may assume deceased, at the time he was injured, was in the exercise of ordinary care. ’ ’ If it is proper to give to the jury, in an instruction, the benefit of the presumption of due care, we can perceive no *820 sound objection to instructing' the jury that the deceased had a right to assume, under the circumstances set forth in the instruction complained of, that the statutory signals wo

1924In discussing the evidence of accidental means, the court said: "At the time he was injured he was attempting to perform the same act in the usual way, but there is reason to believe that he failed in this, and in an effort to prevent the head from falling he made some sudden, unusual, unexpected and involuntary movement of the body, which caused the injury from which he died." The case is ruled largely on United States Mutual Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 .

1915To hold otherwise would be to leave the respective rights and duties of the parties as they would be were there no statute.” In Simpson v. Iron Works Co., 249 Mo. 376 , the Supreme Court approved the doctrine of the dissenting opinion in the Huss case in the following language: “We think, therefore, that the lawmakers in conditioning the duty to guard upon the phrase above quoted meant thereby that it should attach when the ‘belting,’ etc., should be so placed in a factory that its normal operation would injure any employee who should approach near enough to be caught by its force or subjected

1910Co., 154 Mo. l. c. 364, 55 S. W. 438 , the Supreme Court approved the test announced by the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Daley v. Gates, 65 Vt. 592 , namely: “As long as the plaintiff adheres to the contract or injury originally declared upon, an alternation of the modes in which the defendant has broken the contract or caused the injury is not an introduction of a new cause of .action.” Our Supreme Court declares that if the amendment is merely the same matter more fully or differently laid to meet the possible scope of the testimony, it is not a change of the cause of action.

1910These cases do support the rule contended for by plaintiff, but in being distinguished by the Supreme Court in later cases, they have been practically overruled. [Dunn v. Northeast, etc., Co., 81 Mo. App. 42 .] In the late case of Waddell v. Railroad, 213 Mo. 8 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction similar in every essential feature to the instruction under consideration.

1910These cases do support the rule contended for by plaintiff, but in being distinguished by the Supreme Court in later cases, they have been practically overruled. [Dunn v. Northeast, etc., Co., 81 Mo. App. 42 .] In the late case of Waddell v. Railroad, 213 Mo. 8 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction similar in every essential feature to the instruction under consideration.

1907In Richardson v. Cole, 160 Mo. 372 , the Supreme Court approved the principle enunciated in these cases and without referring to other decisions we will treat it as being firmly settled in our jurisprudence.

1906In Alcorn v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 81 , 18 S. W. 188 , a majority of the court held whether it was or was not negligence in a railroad company not to block its guard rails, was a question for the jury.

1906Regarded in that light it ought to be recovered for by the patient, and the cases hold it may be definitely called to the jury’s attention in giving instructions on the measure of damages. [Powell v. Railroad, 77 Ga. 192, 200 ; Atlanta St.

1905R., 92 Mo. 208, 217 , the Supreme Court approved the doctrine stated in Thompson on Carriers of Passengers, that a railroad company is held to as strict accountability for the negligence of its employees in the management of a freight train with a caboose attached in which passengers are seated, as the law imposes on carriers of persons on passenger trains; but that a railroad company cannot be ejected to provide its freight trains with all the conveniences and safeguards against danger which may be demanded properly in trains designed solely for passengers.

1905In Feary v. Railroad, 162 Mo. 75 , 62 S. W. 452 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction given in this case containing the like direction, that the statements of plaintiff against his own interest imported unqualified verity; but we are unaware of any authority proceeding to' the length that the omission or declination of such instruction without more, would warrant reversal of a case otherwise devoid of error, and in this case consideration of such latter proposition is not enforced on this court and, therefore, not determined.

1905In Feary v. Railroad, 162 Mo. 75 , 62 S. W. 452 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction given in this case containing the like direction, that the statements of plaintiff against his own interest imported unqualified verity; but we are unaware of any authority proceeding to' the length that the omission or declination of such instruction without more, would warrant reversal of a case otherwise devoid of error, and in this case consideration of such latter proposition is not enforced on this court and, therefore, not determined.

1904In Jackson v. Railway, 118 Mo. 199 , the Supreme Court approved an instruction that if the common carrier had stopped its car for any reason, if the fact was known to the conductor, that plaintiff, a passenger, was in the act of alighting, or desired to alight, it was the duty of the carrier to give such passenger a reasonable opportunity to alight before starting the car.

1904In Chicago, etc., v. Mills, 105 Ill. 63 , a case relied on in the foregoing decision, the judge, announcing the conclusion of the court, adopts the following language: “It was of no consequence whether the car was stopped at instance of plaintiff or not, since the act of stopping was productive of no injury, and is in no respect complained of.