policies underlying doctrine in Illinois

1992We consider that the prohibiting of the use of evidence obtained of past or existing criminal activity, as well as the exposing of the offending officers to criminal and civil liability, were the only sanctions which have been intended under the exclusionary rule to redress, in a sense, the constitutional violation and to fulfill the policies underlying the rule, which are referred to in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 486 , 9 L.

1992We consider that the prohibiting of the use of evidence obtained of past or existing criminal activity, as well as the exposing of the offending officers to criminal and civil liability, were the only sanctions which have been intended under the exclusionary rule to redress, in a sense, the constitutional violation and to fulfill the policies underlying the rule, which are referred to in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 486 , 9 L.

1986The court was careful to caution, though, against interpreting its holding as a liberalization of the rule of strict application, noting that the facts of the case presented “a unique and nonrecurrent situation.” ( 411 Ill. 431, 442 .) Of particular significance, we think, was the court’s observation that “[t]he policies which underlie the doctrine of res judicata. — protection of the defendant from harassment and of the public from multiple litigation — are not applicable to the peculiar facts here involved.” ( 411 Ill. 431, 442-43 .) Unlike the situation presented in Adams, the policies unde

1986The court was careful to caution, though, against interpreting its holding as a liberalization of the rule of strict application, noting that the facts of the case presented “a unique and nonrecurrent situation.” ( 411 Ill. 431, 442 .) Of particular significance, we think, was the court’s observation that “[t]he policies which underlie the doctrine of res judicata. — protection of the defendant from harassment and of the public from multiple litigation — are not applicable to the peculiar facts here involved.” ( 411 Ill. 431, 442-43 .) Unlike the situation presented in Adams, the policies unde

2026“The policies underlying the doctrine are to promote judicial economy and to protect defendants from the burden of having to relitigate essentially the same claim.” Id. ¶ 62 “Three requirements must be met for res judicata to apply: (1) an identity of parties or their privies, (2) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an identity of cause of action.” Id. ¶ 36.

2022Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 21 (citing Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 45 ). ¶ 35 2.

1995The rule against claim splitting is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata. ( Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 177 Ill.App.3d at 662 , 126 Ill.Dec. 738 , 532 N.E.2d 423 .) The policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata are the protection of the defendant from harassment and of the public from multiple litigation.

1995The rule against claim splitting is closely related to the doctrine of res judicata. ( Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 177 Ill.App.3d at 662 , 126 Ill.Dec. 738 , 532 N.E.2d 423 .) The policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata are the protection of the defendant from harassment and of the public from multiple litigation.

1989Similarly, the mere fact that certain information may be relevant or useful does not establish a ‘particularized need’ for disclosure of information. [Citations.] The party seeking disclosure of the privileged information must show a ‘compelling necessity’ for the specific information requested. [Citations.]” (Emphasis in original.) Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac (7th Cir. 1983), 715 F.2d 331, 338 .

1989Similarly, the mere fact that certain information may be relevant or useful does not establish a `particularized need' for disclosure of information. [Citations.] The party seeking disclosure of the privileged information must show a `compelling necessity' for the specific information requested. [Citations.]" (Emphasis in original.) Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac (7th Cir.1983), 715 F.2d 331, 338 .

1988(Torres v. Rebarchak (7th Cir. 1987), 814 F.2d 1219, 1224 .) The policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata are protection of the defendant from harassment and of the public from multiple litigation; the rule against splitting a cause of action has been relaxed where there was an omission due to ignorance, mistake, or fraud, or where it would be inequitable to apply the rule.

1988Torres, 814 F.2d at 1226 ; Adams, 411 Ill. at 442-43 , 104 N.E.2d at 273 .

1988App. 3d 847, 856 , 510 N.E.2d 952, 958 .) We are persuaded that, in this case, a contrary conclusion would not serve the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata — protection of the defendant from harassment and the promotion of judicial economy.

1987It ensures that controversies once decided on their *398 merits remain in repose. ( Hughey v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 577 , 394 N.E.2d 1164 ; Redfern v. Sullivan (1982), 111 Ill.

1987It ensures that controversies once decided on their *398 merits remain in repose. ( Hughey v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 577 , 394 N.E.2d 1164 ; Redfern v. Sullivan (1982), 111 Ill.

1987It ensures that controversies once decided on their *398 merits remain in repose. ( Hughey v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 577 , 394 N.E.2d 1164 ; Redfern v. Sullivan (1982), 111 Ill.

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-408(b).) The trial court's decision with respect to a petition for leave to intervene will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 , cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 921 , 68 L.Ed.2d 312 , 101 S.Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court's denial of Osborne's petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was not a clear abuse of discretion. • 3 Under the doctrine of res judicata,

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-408(b).) The trial court's decision with respect to a petition for leave to intervene will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 , cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 921 , 68 L.Ed.2d 312 , 101 S.Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court's denial of Osborne's petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was not a clear abuse of discretion. • 3 Under the doctrine of res judicata,

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-408(b).) The trial court's decision with respect to a petition for leave to intervene will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 , cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 921 , 68 L.Ed.2d 312 , 101 S.Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court's denial of Osborne's petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was not a clear abuse of discretion. • 3 Under the doctrine of res judicata,

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-408(b).) The trial court's decision with respect to a petition for leave to intervene will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 , cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 921 , 68 L.Ed.2d 312 , 101 S.Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court's denial of Osborne's petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was not a clear abuse of discretion. • 3 Under the doctrine of res judicata,

1987Ed. 2d 312 , 101 S. Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court’s denial of Osborne’s petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was hot a clear abuse of discretion.

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-408(b).) The trial court's decision with respect to a petition for leave to intervene will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 , cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 921 , 68 L.Ed.2d 312 , 101 S.Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court's denial of Osborne's petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was not a clear abuse of discretion. • 3 Under the doctrine of res judicata,

1987Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-408(b).) The trial court's decision with respect to a petition for leave to intervene will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. ( Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill.2d 373 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 , cert. denied (1981), 451 U.S. 921 , 68 L.Ed.2d 312 , 101 S.Ct. 2000 .) We conclude that the circuit court's denial of Osborne's petition for leave to intervene, when considered in view of the policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata and of statutes of limitation, was not a clear abuse of discretion. • 3 Under the doctrine of res judicata,