policies underlying privilege in California

2022This privilege is absolute in nature . . . ‘the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ [Citation.] The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 .) The litigation privilege “will apply to

2017Generally, the litigation privilege precludes liability in tort, not liability for breach of contract. ( Navellier II, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 773 , 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 201 .) If one expressly contracts not to engage in certain speech or petition activity and then does so, applying the privilege would frustrate the very purpose of the contract if there was a privilege to breach it. ( Id . at p. 774, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 201 .) Thus, the privilege will apply to contract claims only if the agreement does not "clearly prohibit" the challenged conduct, and if applying the privilege furthers the polici

2022(Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212 .) Moreover, the policies underlying the privilege (e.g., allowing access to courts without fear of harassing derivative actions) would be furthered by application of the privilege. ( Feldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1485–1486.) Simply labeling these claims as brought under the UCL and Declaratory Judgment Act does not avoid the litigation privilege.

2017In fact, it would defeat them. " 'The principal purpose of section [47, subdivision (b),] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.' ( Silberg v. Anderson [, supra ,] 50 Cal.3d [at p.] 213 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ].) Additionally, the privilege promotes effective judicial proceedings by encouraging ' "open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" ' without the external threat of liability ( ibid. ), and 'by encouraging attorneys to zealously pro

2021(Anderson v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995 (Anderson); O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335 , 362–363 (O’Neil).) The public policies articulated in Greenman and Vandermark that form the foundation for the application of strict liability are the following: (1) whether Amazon may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end, (2) whether Amazon may be the only member in the distribution chain reasonably available to the injured plaintiff, and (3) whether Amazon is in a position

2015Because those decisions do not expressly impose Hennessy’s proposed condition, to determine the scope of the Tellez-Cordova exception, we may properly examine the policies underlying the rule shielding a product manufacturer from strict liability for injuries due to an “adjacent” product. 5 *1149 (O’Neil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 362 .) As explained in O’Neil , strict liability for such injuries is ordinarily imposed only on the manufacturer of the “adjacent” product, as product manufacturers generally lack continuing business relationships, and thus cannot exert pressure on one another to ensu

2016(Kasel, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 725 .) That principle dictates a fact-sensitive inquiry into the party’s activities relating to the defective product, with due attention to the policies underlying the doctrine of strict liability.

2015(Kasel, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 725 .) That principle dictates a fact-sensitive inquiry into the party’s activities relating to the defective product, with due attention to the policies underlying the doctrine of strict liability.

2022In fact, it would defeat them.” Although the nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding was 5 The California Supreme Court granted review on this issue in Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 687 , but ultimately did not reach it. 15 litigation-related conduct, applying the privilege would not serve the purpose of free and open access to the courts – rather, it would defeat those aims by allowing a defendant to violate California foreclosure law with no remedy.

2022In fact, it would defeat them.” Although the nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding was 5 The California Supreme Court granted review on this issue in Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 687 , but ultimately did not reach it. 15 litigation-related conduct, applying the privilege would not serve the purpose of free and open access to the courts – rather, it would defeat those aims by allowing a defendant to violate California foreclosure law with no remedy.

2021(See Carrasco, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 808 ; Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 27-28 .) Based on the policies underlying the rule, “the test for what is and is not a [material or] ‘substantive change’ should focus on whether the [change] might give rise to any different amount or form of liability, or indicate the existence of any defense or ground for avoiding liability, not reasonably disclosed in the original complaint.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 6:701, italics added; see Engebretson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at pp. 442

2021(See Carrasco, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 808 ; Leo v. Dunlap (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 24, 27-28 .) Based on the policies underlying the rule, “the test for what is and is not a [material or] ‘substantive change’ should focus on whether the [change] might give rise to any different amount or form of liability, or indicate the existence of any defense or ground for avoiding liability, not reasonably disclosed in the original complaint.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 6:701, italics added; see Engebretson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at pp. 442

2017(See Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 19 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 .) We conclude they were not.

2017(See Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 19 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 .) We conclude they were not.

2017When the plaintiff embarks [on a course of substantial compliance], every reasonable objective of [the statute at issue] has been satisfied.' [Citation.] ... [Citation.] Furthermore, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply at all when a statute's requirements are mandatory, instead of merely directory. [Citations.] A mandatory statute 'is one that is essential to the promotion of the overall statutory design and thus does not permit substantial compliance. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" ( Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305 , 1332-1333, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , italic

2017When the plaintiff embarks [on a course of substantial compliance], every reasonable objective of [the statute at issue] has been satisfied.' [Citation.] ... [Citation.] Furthermore, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply at all when a statute's requirements are mandatory, instead of merely directory. [Citations.] A mandatory statute 'is one that is essential to the promotion of the overall statutory design and thus does not permit substantial compliance. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" ( Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305 , 1332-1333, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , italic

2017In fact, it would defeat them. " 'The principal purpose of section [47, subdivision (b),] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.' ( Silberg v. Anderson [, supra ,] 50 Cal.3d [at p.] 213 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ].) Additionally, the privilege promotes effective judicial proceedings by encouraging ' "open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" ' without the external threat of liability ( ibid. ), and 'by encouraging attorneys to zealously pro

2017In fact, it would defeat them. " 'The principal purpose of section [47, subdivision (b),] is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.' ( Silberg v. Anderson [, supra ,] 50 Cal.3d [at p.] 213 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 , 786 P.2d 365 ].) Additionally, the privilege promotes effective judicial proceedings by encouraging ' "open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" ' without the external threat of liability ( ibid. ), and 'by encouraging attorneys to zealously pro

2013The majority quotes the final six words of the following passage from Wentland in support of its new rule that the litigation privilege applies to breach of contract actions of the type involved in the present case: “Our review of Laborde [v. Aronson (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 459 ] and Pollock [v. Superior Court (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 26 ], as well as other cases that have considered the litigation privilege in the context of a breach of contract case, instructs that whether the litigation privilege applies to an action for breach of contract turns on whether its application furthers the policies u

2005(Laborde v. Aronson, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 459 ; Pollock v. Superior Court, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 26 .) The “principal purpose” of the litigation privilege “is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort action.” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213 .) The privilege “promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging ‘open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence’ in judicial proceedings.” (Ibid.) The privilege “promotes the effectiveness of ju

2013The majority quotes the final six words of the following passage from Wentland in support of its new rule that the litigation privilege applies to breach of contract actions of the type involved in the present case: “Our review of Laborde [v. Aronson (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 459 ] and Pollock [v. Superior Court (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 26 ], as well as other cases that have considered the litigation privilege in the context of a breach of contract case, instructs that whether the litigation privilege applies to an action for breach of contract turns on whether its application furthers the policies u

2005(Laborde v. Aronson, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 459 ; Pollock v. Superior Court, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 26 .) The “principal purpose” of the litigation privilege “is to afford litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort action.” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 213 .) The privilege “promotes the effectiveness of judicial proceedings by encouraging ‘open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence’ in judicial proceedings.” (Ibid.) The privilege “promotes the effectiveness of ju

2006For example, if an insured waits 11 months after discovering the loss to make his claim, he will have only 1 month to file his action after the claim is denied before it is time-barred under [Insurance Code] section 2071.” (Ibid.) Finally, a literal application of the one-year suit provision could create the anomalous situation where an insured’s suit “would have been untimely before the insurer denied coverage.” (Id. at pp. 692-693.) The court concluded that the one-year suit provision begins to run from the date of inception of the loss, but is tolled “from the time an insured gives notice o

2006Third, a doctrine of equitable tolling will further our policy of encouraging settlement between insurers and insureds, and will discourage unnecessary bad faith suits that are often the only recourse for indemnity if the insurer denies coverage after the limitation period has expired.” (Prudential-LMI, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 692 .) Fourth, “[e]quitable tolling is also consistent with the policies underlying the claim and limitation periods—e.g., the insurer is entitled to receive prompt notice of a claim and the insured is penalized for waiting too long after discovery to make a claim.

2024(See Rojes v. Riverside General Hospital (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1161 , overruled on other grounds by Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1605 [rejecting argument that order denying motion for reconsideration is appealable under section 904.1, subd. (a)(2), and holding that “[t]he same policy reasons for determining that denials of motions to vacate judgments and motions for new trial are not appealable are applicable to denials of motions for reconsideration: namely, to eliminate the possibilities that (1) a nonappealable order or judgment would be made appealable, (2) a pa

2022Because we must resolve any doubts in favor of applying the litigation privilege (Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 913 ), we conclude it applies to Veeva’s declaratory relief and UCL claims.

2022(Id. at p. 277.) Similarly, in Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467 , the court found that the litigation privilege applied to a breach of contract cause of action because application “of the privilege furthers the policy of allowing access to the courts without fear of harassing derivative actions.” (Id. at p. 1498.) 11 Seidl does not deny that the litigation privilege may apply to prelitigation communications (Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 873, 889 ; Olsen v. Harbison (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 325, 334 ) or that it ma

2022(Id. at p. 277.) Similarly, in Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467 , the court found that the litigation privilege applied to a breach of contract cause of action because application “of the privilege furthers the policy of allowing access to the courts without fear of harassing derivative actions.” (Id. at p. 1498.) 11 Seidl does not deny that the litigation privilege may apply to prelitigation communications (Digerati Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 873, 889 ; Olsen v. Harbison (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 325, 334 ) or that it ma

2022(See William S. Hart, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 869–870.) “The most commonly mentioned aims of tort law are (1) compensation of the injured persons and (2) deterrence of undesirable behavior.” (Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts (2021 2d ed.) § 10.) The undesirable behavior that the duty to protect students seeks to deter is the lack of ordinary care by school employees in performing that duty.

2022This privilege is absolute in nature . . . ‘the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ [Citation.] The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 .) The litigation privilege “will apply to

2021(Anderson v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995 (Anderson); O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335 , 362–363 (O’Neil).) The public policies articulated in Greenman and Vandermark that form the foundation for the application of strict liability are the following: (1) whether Amazon may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end, (2) whether Amazon may be the only member in the distribution chain reasonably available to the injured plaintiff, and (3) whether Amazon is in a position

2021(Anderson v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 995 (Anderson); O’Neil v. Crane Co. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 335 , 362–363 (O’Neil).) The public policies articulated in Greenman and Vandermark that form the foundation for the application of strict liability are the following: (1) whether Amazon may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end, (2) whether Amazon may be the only member in the distribution chain reasonably available to the injured plaintiff, and (3) whether Amazon is in a position