first-party claim in Indiana

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1489 | February 12, 2020 Page 10 of 14 This contractual relationship is at times a traditional arms-length dealing between two parties, as in the initial purchase of a policy, but is also at times one of a fiduciary nature, see, e.g., Richey v. Chappell[, 594 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 1992),] (statements from the insured to the insurer concerning an occurrence which may be the basis of a claim by a third party are privileged from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege), and, at other times, an adversarial one, as here in the context of a first-part

2006Rather, it is the unique character of the insurance contract which supports the conclusion that there is a “special relationship.” This contractual relationship is at times a traditional arms-length dealing between two parties, as in the initial purchase of a policy, but is also at times one of a fiduciary nature, see, e.g., Richey v. Chappell, [ 594 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind.1992)] (statements from the insured to the insurer concerning an occurrence which may be made the basis of a claim by a third party are privileged from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege), and, at other times, an adve

2018Co. v. Hammond , 759 N.E.2d 1162 , 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding even though the trial focused entirely on the nature and extent of the plaintiff's damages, the "action was effectively one alleging breach of contract by [insurer] in failing to pay uninsured motorist benefits").

2015Co. v. Hammond, 759 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (finding even though the trial focused entirely on the nature and extent of the plaintiffs damages, the “action was effectively one alleging breach of contract by [insurer] in failing to pay uninsured motorist benefits”).

2015Id.; Brown-Day, 915 N.E.2d at 552 (“The cause of action to be tried before the jury is a first party claim for contract enforcement against [insurer], seeking underinsured motorist benefits.”); Allstate Ins.

2010Insofar as Allstate "stood by" and allowed the driver's dismissal from the case instead of advancing payment and asserting a subro-gation interest under Indiana Code section 27-t-5-6, Allstate treated "[the cause of action to be tried before the jury [as] a first party claim for contract enforcement against Allstate, seeking underinsured motorist benefits." Id.

2012See Bailey, 881 N.E.2d at 1002-03 (holding that, although Indiana recognizes a third party claim for negligent entrustment against an entrustor when the third party is injured by an incapacitated driver, Indiana does not recognize a first party claim by the incapacitated driver for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle to a voluntarily intoxicated adult). 5 .

2008On the other hand, in explaining why an intoxicated driver should not have a first-party claim for negligent entrustment, the New *1003 York appellate court stated the principle that “an intoxicated person should not gem-erally be permitted to benefit from his or her own intoxication.” Shultes v. Carr, 127 A.D.2d 916 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (N.Y.App.Div.1987).

2008On the other hand, in explaining why an intoxicated driver should not have a first-party claim for negligent entrustment, the New *1003 York appellate court stated the principle that “an intoxicated person should not gem-erally be permitted to benefit from his or her own intoxication.” Shultes v. Carr, 127 A.D.2d 916 , 512 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (N.Y.App.Div.1987).