first-party claim in Texas

2020Finally, these decisions fail to address or resolve the jurisdictional conundrum that sees the contract cause of action accrue before the filing of the direct action for limitations purposes per Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 829 (“Limitations on a first party claim appropriately begins to run at denial, not the date the separate suit to determine coverage under the contract is resolved.”), but accrue only after the rendition of a binding judgment in the same direct action for purposes of presentment per Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818 (“[T]he UIM insurer is under no contractual duty to pay benefits until

1992See Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex.1990) (“Limitations on a first party claim appropriately begins to run at denial, not the date a separate suit to determine coverage under the contract is resolved”).

2006Co. v. Davalos, 84 S.W.3d 314, 318-19 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 140 S.W.3d 685 (Tex.2004) (holding that the insurer did not fail to timely provide a defense and thus declining to decide whether an insurer’s failure to promptly pay defense costs could entitle an insured to article 21.55 penalties). 14 *65 We agree with our sister courts who have held that a demand for a defense under a liability policy is not a first party claim under such policy.

2006Co. v. Davalos , 84 S.W.3d 314, 318-19 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2002), rev = d on other grounds , 140 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2004) (holding that the insurer did not fail to timely provide a defense and thus declining to decide whether an insurer = s failure to promptly pay defense costs could entitle an insured to article 21.55 penalties). [14] We agree with our sister courts who have held that a demand for a defense under a liability policy is not a first party claim under such policy.

2007A conflicting line of authority holds that the insured's claim for defense costs is "a first-party claim" and that the prompt-payment statute does indeed apply when an insurer wrongfully refuses to pay for the insured's defense. [21] These cases principally *253 stem from the suggestion in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.1996), that the prompt-payment statute might hypothetically apply to an insured's claim for a defense under a liability policy.

2007A conflicting line of authority holds that the insured’s claim for defense costs is “a first-party claim” and that the prompt-payment statute does indeed apply when an insurer wrongfully refuses to pay for the insured’s defense. 21 These cases principally stem from the suggestion in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.1996), that the prompt-payment statute might hypothetically apply to an insured’s claim for a defense under a liability policy.

2006See 55 F.Supp.2d at 603-04 .

2006See 55 F. Supp. 2d at 603 B 04.

2006Co. v. Bonner, 51 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Tex. 2001) (stating that to successfully maintain a cause of action for penalties under article 21.55, the insured must establish, among other elements, that the insurer is liable for the claim). [76] We note the Hartman court indicated that a request for a defense was not a first-party claim.

2006Co. v. Bonner , 51 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Tex. 2001) (stating that to successfully maintain a cause of action for penalties under article 21.55, the insured must establish, among other elements, that the insurer is liable for the claim). [76] We note the Hartman court indicated that a request for a defense was not a first-party claim.

2021We rejected such a contention in Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., holding in that case that an insurer owes interest on the amount of the claim it did not promptly pay when it makes a partial payment. 35 The phrase “must be paid by the insurer” in the definition of “claim” includes the amount of the claim and “limits ‘claim’ to the amount ultimately determined to be owed, which of course would be net of any partial payments made prior to that determination.”36 We explained that “[t]his encourages insurers to pay the undisputed portion of a claim early, 32 569 S.W.3d 304, 3

2020Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 829 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Webster v. Allstate Ins., 833 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (“Causes of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for breach of the uninsured motorist provisions of an insurance policy accrue and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the insurance company denies the claim.”).

2018Co. v. Martinez, 216 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2007) (stating that the “statute defines a ‘claim’ to . . . limit coverage to beneficiaries named in the policy”).

2007But our holding was more broadly stated: “[T]he Comparative Responsibility Act — Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code— is applicable to Chapter 2 [dram shop] causes of action.” Id. at 351 (emphasis added).

2007But our holding was more broadly stated: "[T]he Comparative Responsibility Act—Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code— is applicable to Chapter 2 [dram shop] causes of action. " Id. at 351 (emphasis added).

2006See Rx.Com, Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d at 616-18 .

2006Compare, e.g., Rx.Com, Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d at 611-20 ; Davalos, 84 S.W.3d at 319 ; with TIG Ins.

2006See Caserotti, 791 S.W.2d at 566 (first party claims are “suits by insureds pursuant to their own insurance policies”).

2002We addressed this precise issue in Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insurance Company, where we held that inherent diminished value is not recoverable under the standard Texas Personal Automobile Insurance Policy. 32 S.W.3d 454, 465 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

1996See Charter Roofing Co., 841 S.W.2d at 905-06 .

1996See Charter Roofing Co., 841 S.W.2d at 905-06 .