wholesome principle in Kansas

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1964And the principle is generally applicable without any preliminary showing of inconsistency ( Jencks v. United States, supra) or any resulting right in the State to introduce the notes or statements as corroborative evidence on its behalf." (pp. 530, 531.) *521 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2224, the rule is similarly expressed: "It seems wise to stand firm upon ordinary considerations of fairness, and to hold that the prosecutor is not entitled at the trial to withhold from the inspection of the accused and the jury any documents or chattels relevant to the case unless they

1962In such a situation the question is one of law only.’ (l. c. 483.)” (pp. 1004 and 1005.) *12 See, also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Skinner, 140 Kan. 413 , 36 P. 2d 968 , where it was said: “Appellant contends the court erred in directing a verdict.

1962In such a situation the question is one of law only.’ (l. c. 483.)” (pp. 1004 and 1005.) *12 See, also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Skinner, 140 Kan. 413 , 36 P. 2d 968 , where it was said: “Appellant contends the court erred in directing a verdict.

1946(Johnson v. Lanter, 92 Kan. 257 , 139 Pac. 1031 ; Blake v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 155 Kan. 201 , 124 P. 2d 478 .) It is, of course, well settled that in order to permit a verdict to stand it must have the independent approval of the trial court.

1946(Johnson v. Lanter, 92 Kan. 257 , 139 Pac. 1031 ; Blake v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 155 Kan. 201 , 124 P. 2d 478 .) It is, of course, well settled that in order to permit a verdict to stand it must have the independent approval of the trial court.

1946(Johnson v. Lanter, 92 Kan. 257 , 139 Pac. 1031 ; Blake v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 155 Kan. 201 , 124 P. 2d 478 .) It is, of course, well settled that in order to permit a verdict to stand it must have the independent approval of the trial court.

1946(Johnson v. Lanter, 92 Kan. 257 , 139 Pac. 1031 ; Blake v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 155 Kan. 201 , 124 P. 2d 478 .) It is, of course, well settled that in order to permit a verdict to stand it must have the independent approval of the trial court.

1937In Hardware Co. v. Semke, 105 Kan. 628 , 185 Pac. 732 , it was held: “The transfer of property by a debtor to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his property subject to be taken by creditors beyond the reach of his creditors, amounted to a fraud in law, and the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer is immaterial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) See, also, Security Benefit Ass’n v. Swartz, 141 Kan. 227 , 40 P. 2d 433 ; Farmers State Bank v. Mitchell, 143 Kan. 286 , 55 P. 2d 423 , and cases cited.

1937In Hardware Co. v. Semke, 105 Kan. 628 , 185 Pac. 732 , it was held: “The transfer of property by a debtor to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his property subject to be taken by creditors beyond the reach of his creditors, amounted to a fraud in law, and the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer is immaterial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) See, also, Security Benefit Ass’n v. Swartz, 141 Kan. 227 , 40 P. 2d 433 ; Farmers State Bank v. Mitchell, 143 Kan. 286 , 55 P. 2d 423 , and cases cited.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937Co., 122 Kan. 587 , 253 Pac. 242 ; Kansas Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Rinkel, 126 Kan. 733 , 271 Pac. 311 ; Jones v. Prather, 136 Kan. 335 , 15 P. 2d 403 ; Ward v. Grant, 138 Kan. 363 , 26 P. 2d 279 .) If that were not the rule there would be no purpose in the wholesome requirement that in order for a verdict to stand it must not only have the approval of the jury but also the approval of the trial court.

1937In Hardware Co. v. Semke, 105 Kan. 628 , 185 Pac. 732 , it was held: “The transfer of property by a debtor to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his property subject to be taken by creditors beyond the reach of his creditors, amounted to a fraud in law, and the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer is immaterial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) See, also, Security Benefit Ass’n v. Swartz, 141 Kan. 227 , 40 P. 2d 433 ; Farmers State Bank v. Mitchell, 143 Kan. 286 , 55 P. 2d 423 , and cases cited.

1937In Hardware Co. v. Semke, 105 Kan. 628 , 185 Pac. 732 , it was held: “The transfer of property by a debtor to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his property subject to be taken by creditors beyond the reach of his creditors, amounted to a fraud in law, and the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer is immaterial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) See, also, Security Benefit Ass’n v. Swartz, 141 Kan. 227 , 40 P. 2d 433 ; Farmers State Bank v. Mitchell, 143 Kan. 286 , 55 P. 2d 423 , and cases cited.

1937In Hardware Co. v. Semke, 105 Kan. 628 , 185 Pac. 732 , it was held: “The transfer of property by a debtor to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his property subject to be taken by creditors beyond the reach of his creditors, amounted to a fraud in law, and the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer is immaterial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) See, also, Security Benefit Ass’n v. Swartz, 141 Kan. 227 , 40 P. 2d 433 ; Farmers State Bank v. Mitchell, 143 Kan. 286 , 55 P. 2d 423 , and cases cited.

1937In Hardware Co. v. Semke, 105 Kan. 628 , 185 Pac. 732 , it was held: “The transfer of property by a debtor to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his property subject to be taken by creditors beyond the reach of his creditors, amounted to a fraud in law, and the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer is immaterial.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) See, also, Security Benefit Ass’n v. Swartz, 141 Kan. 227 , 40 P. 2d 433 ; Farmers State Bank v. Mitchell, 143 Kan. 286 , 55 P. 2d 423 , and cases cited.

1924The wholesome doctrine of Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 , seems to have been overruled in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ; Strand v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 , seems to follow in the wake of the Adams case; and likewise Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457 .

1924The wholesome doctrine of Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 , seems to have been overruled in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ; Strand v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 , seems to follow in the wake of the Adams case; and likewise Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457 .

1924The wholesome doctrine of Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 , seems to have been overruled in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ; Strand v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 , seems to follow in the wake of the Adams case; and likewise Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457 .

1924The wholesome doctrine of Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 , seems to have been overruled in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ; Strand v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 , seems to follow in the wake of the Adams case; and likewise Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457 .

1916The decision was rested upon the wholesome doctrine declared in The State v. Beuerman, 59 Kan. 586 , 53 Pac. 874 , cited in the opinion, that the absence of the trial judge during the argument of a cause can not be sustained.

1916The decision was rested upon the wholesome doctrine declared in The State v. Beuerman, 59 Kan. 586 , 53 Pac. 874 , cited in the opinion, that the absence of the trial judge during the argument of a cause can not be sustained.

1913It was said in Tipton v. Street Railway Co., ante, p. 451, 132 Pac. 189 that a street-car company “is not to be held responsible for the condition of public streets, and ordinarily will not be liable for injuries to passengers caused by defects therein.” (p. 458.) This principle does not conflict with the wholesome rule that a carrier should not receive and discharge passengers at a place which is dangerous for that purpose, although it may not be responsible for the defect.

1897Thompson et al. v. Roberts et al., supra; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619 .