9 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hydegreen2 sentences2014As we have stated it another way, retroactive application of a law increases a defendant’s punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause when it “increase[s] the severity of the sentence by altering the terms and conditions under which defendant must serve the penalty.” Hyde, 07-1314 at p. 2, 968 So.2d at 726 (finding that application of a sentencing law enacted post- offense runs afoul of the ex post facto prohibition). 2014As we have stated it another way, retroactive application of a law increases a defendant’s punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause when it “increase[s] the severity of the sentence by altering the terms and conditions under which defendant must serve the penalty.” Hyde , 07-1314 at p. 2, 968 So.2d at 726 (finding that application of a sentencing law enacted post-offense runs afoul of the ex post facto prohibition). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McHugh v. Placid Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1986In 1909, State v. Price, 124 La. 917 , 50 So. 794 , defined a fine as "a pecuniary penalty." Price was followed in 1944 by McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511, 531 , 19 So.2d 221, 227 , where we said "... a fine is a pecuniary exaction, imposed as a punishment for violation of the law, and collectible by proceedings of public authority either Criminal or Civil in form...." C.Cr.P. 887 is divided into four parts. 1986In 1909, State v. Price, 124 La. 917 , 50 So. 794 , defined a fine as "a pecuniary penalty." Price was followed in 1944 by McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511, 531 , 19 So.2d 221, 227 , where we said "... a fine is a pecuniary exaction, imposed as a punishment for violation of the law, and collectible by proceedings of public authority either Criminal or Civil in form...." C.Cr.P. 887 is divided into four parts. | 2 | 1977–1986 |
State v. Price
green
2 sentences1986In 1909, State v. Price, 124 La. 917 , 50 So. 794 , defined a fine as "a pecuniary penalty." Price was followed in 1944 by McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511, 531 , 19 So.2d 221, 227 , where we said "... a fine is a pecuniary exaction, imposed as a punishment for violation of the law, and collectible by proceedings of public authority either Criminal or Civil in form...." C.Cr.P. 887 is divided into four parts. 1986In 1909, State v. Price, 124 La. 917 , 50 So. 794 , defined a fine as "a pecuniary penalty." Price was followed in 1944 by McHugh v. Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511, 531 , 19 So.2d 221, 227 , where we said "... a fine is a pecuniary exaction, imposed as a punishment for violation of the law, and collectible by proceedings of public authority either Criminal or Civil in form...." C.Cr.P. 887 is divided into four parts. | 2 | 1977–1986 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1960While “The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture * * * Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizens may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon> another.” United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592 , 19 Ann.Cas. 68, quoted with approval in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , where it was further pointed out that “a statute which either forbids or 1960While “The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture * * * Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizens may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon> another.” United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592 , 19 Ann.Cas. 68, quoted with approval in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , where it was further pointed out that “a statute which either forbids or | 2 | 1953–1960 |
United States v. Capital Traction Co.
green
2 sentences1960While “The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture * * * Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizens may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon> another.” United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592 , 19 Ann.Cas. 68, quoted with approval in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , where it was further pointed out that “a statute which either forbids or 1960Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizens may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another,” United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592 , 19 Ann.Cas. 68, quoted with approval in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 128 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , where it was further pointed out that “ * * * a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must neces | 2 | 1953–1960 |
Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp.
green
1 sentence2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Marinello
green
1 sentence1989The Committee and Dutel filed a Joint Motion to Proceed Without Appointment of Commissioner and Waiver of Applicable Rights, a streamlined procedure established in Louisiana State Bar Association v. Vincent Marinello, 523 So.2d 838 (La.1988), wherein this Court ordered that the parties be permitted to waive oral argument, the appointment of a Commissioner, and the Commissioner’s Hearing and Report. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Cloud
green
2 sentences1969State v. Cloud, 248 La. 125 , 176 So.2d 620 (1965); State v. Bonanno, supra. The United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Reese, supra, that: "Laws which prohibit the doing of things and provide a punishment for their violation, should have no double meaning." * * * * * * "If the Legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offense and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that need not deceive the common mind. 1969State v. Cloud, 248 La. 125 , 176 So.2d 620 (1965); State v. Bonanno, supra. The United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Reese, supra, that: "Laws which prohibit the doing of things and provide a punishment for their violation, should have no double meaning." * * * * * * "If the Legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offense and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that need not deceive the common mind. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
United States v. REESE
green
2 sentences1960Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizens may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another" United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592 , 19 Ann.Cas. 68, quoted with approval in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , where it was further pointed out that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily g 1960While “The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture * * * Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizens may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon> another.” United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592 , 19 Ann.Cas. 68, quoted with approval in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 , where it was further pointed out that “a statute which either forbids or | 1 | 1960–1960 |
State v. Comeaux
neutral
2 sentences1960(Emphasis supplied.) This court, in the early case of State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930 , 60 So. 620 , held Act 202 of 1912, seeking to define and punish indecent assaults, to be unconstitutional for the reason that “the act does not say what shall constitute an indecent assault, and the court is without authority to determine this matter,” and, following this same principle in a later case (City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906 , 83 So. 186, 187 ), reversed the conviction and sentence of the defendants, charged with violation of an ordinance of Shreveport that made it unlawful to use any hote 1960(Emphasis supplied.) This court, in the early case of State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930 , 60 So. 620 , held Act 202 of 1912, seeking to define and punish indecent assaults, to be unconstitutional for the reason that “the act does not say what shall constitute an indecent assault, and the court is without authority to determine this matter,” and, following this same principle in a later case (City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906 , 83 So. 186, 187 ), reversed the conviction and sentence of the defendants, charged with violation of an ordinance of Shreveport that made it unlawful to use any hote | 1 | 1960–1960 |
State v. Rose
green
2 sentences1960(Emphasis supplied.) This court, in the early case of State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930 , 60 So. 620 , held Act 202 of 1912, seeking to define and punish indecent assaults, to be unconstitutional for the reason that " the act does not say what shall constitute an indecent assault, and the court is without authority to determine this matter, " and, following this same principle in a later case (City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906 , 83 So. 186, 187 ), reversed the conviction and sentence of the defendants, charged with violation of an ordinance of Shreveport that made it unlawful to use any ho 1960(Emphasis supplied.) This court, in the early case of State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930 , 60 So. 620 , held Act 202 of 1912, seeking to define and punish indecent assaults, to be unconstitutional for the reason that “the act does not say what shall constitute an indecent assault, and the court is without authority to determine this matter,” and, following this same principle in a later case (City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906 , 83 So. 186, 187 ), reversed the conviction and sentence of the defendants, charged with violation of an ordinance of Shreveport that made it unlawful to use any hote | 1 | 1960–1960 |
City of Shreveport v. Wilson
neutral
2 sentences1960(Emphasis supplied.) This court, in the early case of State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930 , 60 So. 620 , held Act 202 of 1912, seeking to define and punish indecent assaults, to be unconstitutional for the reason that “the act does not say what shall constitute an indecent assault, and the court is without authority to determine this matter,” and, following this same principle in a later case (City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906 , 83 So. 186, 187 ), reversed the conviction and sentence of the defendants, charged with violation of an ordinance of Shreveport that made it unlawful to use any hote 1960(Emphasis supplied.) This court, in the early case of State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930 , 60 So. 620 , held Act 202 of 1912, seeking to define and punish indecent assaults, to be unconstitutional for the reason that “the act does not say what shall constitute an indecent assault, and the court is without authority to determine this matter,” and, following this same principle in a later case (City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906 , 83 So. 186, 187 ), reversed the conviction and sentence of the defendants, charged with violation of an ordinance of Shreveport that made it unlawful to use any hote | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc.
green
2 sentences1939Wagner Co. v. City of Monroe, 52 La.Ann. 2132 , 28 So. 229 ; Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, 162 La. 139 , 110 So. 178 . 1939Wagner Co. v. City of Monroe, 52 La.Ann. 2132 , 28 So. 229 ; Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, 162 La. 139 , 110 So. 178 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
J. G. Wagner Co. v. City of Monroe
neutral
1 sentence1939Wagner Co. v. City of Monroe, 52 La.Ann. 2132 , 28 So. 229 ; Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, 162 La. 139 , 110 So. 178 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.