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1,502 Texas opinions name it 10 courts 1920–2026 169 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Issa v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The court further stated that a 11 “defendant is entitled to a punishment hearing after the adjudication of guilt, and the trial judge must allow the accused the opportunity to present evidence.” Id. 2023ANN. art. 42A.110(a); Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. 2 The State alternatively argues that even if error had been preserved, appellant was not entitled to a separate punishment hearing because he presented mitigation evidence during the June 7, 2021 hearing. | 58 | 103 |
Hardeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2024However, Issa “does not stand for the absolute right to a separate punishment hearing” but instead “requires the defendant to have the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if not afforded during adjudication.” Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. Crim. 2022App. 2007) (explaining that “Issa did not stand for a general right to a separate punishment hearing, much less one on a different day” (citing Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690-91 (Tex. Crim App. 1999))). | 55 | 67 |
Vidaurri v. Stategreen2 sentences2023However, the entitlement to a separate punishment hearing “is a statutory right which can be waived.” Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. 2023Punishment Hearing In her first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing her an “opportunity to present punishment evidence” before assessing her punishment at confinement for twenty-four months and a fine of $750.00 because a trial “court must conduct a separate second phase to determine punishment” after finding true an allegation of a violation of a condition of community supervision. 6 After the trial court adjudicates a defendant guilty during a hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate, the defendant “is entitled to a punishment hearing,” and “the trial [court | 53 | 74 |
Kirtley v. Stategreen2 sentences2012The court of appeals concluded that the record of this hearing “was not necessary” to the appeal, but the court of criminal appeals disagreed, noting that there was “nothing to prohibit appellant from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during the punishment hearing.” Id. at 51-52 . 2010In Payne v. State, 802 S.W.2d 686, 687, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), the court ordered a new trial after the testimony of three witnesses had been “irretrievably lost.” And in Kirtley v. State, 56 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), the court held that the record of the punishment hearing was necessary because the defendant could raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 46 | 54 |
Burt, Lemuel Carlgreen2 sentences2024App. P. 33.1; Burt, 396 S.W.3d at 577 (“A sentencing issue may be preserved by objecting at the punishment hearing, or when the sentence is pronounced.”); Richardson v. State, 328 S.W.3d 61, 72 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding appellant failed to preserve complaint about alleged disproportionate sentencing); Arnold, 2023 WL 8940397 , at *6 (holding appellant waived complaint about his sentence’s length). 4 /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. 2024Although appellant raised his allocution complaint in a motion for new trial, “an appellant may raise a sentencing issue in a motion for new trial for the first time only if the appellant did not have the opportunity to object in the punishment hearing.” Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574 , 577 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. | 36 | 54 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017See, e.g. , Strickland , 466 U.S. at 699 -700 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (prejudice from allegedly deficient performance in failing to present evidence at punishment hearing was analyzed in terms of its effect on the punishment hearing). 2017See, e.g. , Strickland , 466 U.S. at 699 -700 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (prejudice from allegedly deficient performance in failing to present evidence at punishment hearing was analyzed in terms of its effect on the punishment hearing). | 26 | 49 |
Pearson v. Stategreen2 sentences2025As explained in Hardeman, “Issa did not stand for a general right to a separate punishment hearing, much less one on a different day.” Euler, 218 S.W.3d at 92 (discussing Hardeman); see also Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176 , 177–78 (Tex. Crim. 2018Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim App. 1992) (a defendant “is entitled to a punishment hearing after the adjudication of guilt, and the trial judge must allow the accused the opportunity to present evidence.”); see also Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. | 21 | 28 |
Jordan v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Wise v. State, 394 S.W.3d 594, 600-01 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet); see also Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“When a reviewing court determines that the State’s evidence fails to show that an enhancement allegation is true, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the use of the enhancement conviction during a retrial on punishment.”). 4 Because we are remanding the case for a new punishment hearing, we need not address Rodriguez’s remaining arguments in this issue asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support the enhancement finding for the 2013 convic 2023Remedy Appellant asks this court to remand for a new punishment hearing “within the state jail felony punishment range.” Appellant cites no authority to limit his new punishment hearing to the range for an unenhanced state jail felony, and we find none. “[S]ufficiency of the evidence with regard to a conviction and sufficiency with regard to a prior conviction alleged for enhancement purposes involve very different considerations.” Jordan, 256 S.W.3d at 292 . | 13 | 17 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 2019Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. | 13 | 13 |
Bowen, Deborahgreen2 sentences2022The court remanded Bowen’s case to the trial court with instructions “to reform the conviction to reflect the felony of misapplication of fiduciary property in the second degree and to conduct a new punishment hearing.” Id. 2020Based on the principles announced in Bowen v. State, 374 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), we reform the 3 judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser-included offense of attempted tampering with evidence, a state jail felony,5 and we remand this matter to the trial court to conduct a new punishment hearing.6 Because we also agree with the State that the trial court erred in refusing to submit its amended double-enhancement notice, upon a new punishment hearing, the jury shall be appropriately instructed according to the notice given and the evidence presented.7 BACKGROUND Late at night o | 12 | 20 |
Freeman, Corey Thomasgreen2 sentences2025CONCLUSION Having sustained Hargro’s first, second, and third issues but having also held that sufficient evidence exists for the jury to have convicted him of a lesser-included offense, we remand the case to the trial court to reform Hargro’s judgment to reflect a conviction for the third-degree offense of injury to a disabled individual by omission 28 causing bodily injury, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04 (a-1)(3), (f), and to conduct a new punishment hearing based on the reformed judgment, see Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 299–300. /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. 2015Therefore, under Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 299-300 , rather than acquitting Appellant, we must reform her conviction to misdemeanor hindering apprehension and remand the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. | 12 | 15 |
Lopez v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Salinas, 980 S.W.2d at 521 ; see also Lopez, 96 S.W.3d at 415 n.3 (although defendant, in his motion for new trial, “did complain of a lack of a separate punishment hearing,” he “did not specify” the evidence he “would have presented”); Hardeman v. State, 981 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (“[A]ppellant’s motion for new trial only complained that the motion to adjudicate proceeding ‘was invalid’ because the trial court imposed punishment ‘without conducting a separate hearing after the finding of guilt’.... 2015See Salinas, 980 S.W.2d at 521 ; see also Lopez, 96 S.W.3d at 415 n.3 (although defendant, in his motion for new trial, “did complain of a lack of a separate punishment hearing,” he “did not specify” the evidence he “would have presented”); Hardeman v. State, 981 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 18 Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (“[A]ppellant’s motion for new trial only complained that the motion to adjudicate proceeding ‘was invalid’ because the trial court imposed punishment ‘without conducting a separate hearing after the finding of guilt’. . . . | 11 | 12 |
Idowu v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (appellant failed to preserve error as to restitution amount by failing to object at the punishment hearing to amount of restitution sought by the prosecution); Russell v. State, 341 S.W.3d 526 , 527-28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (appellant failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint when he did not object at sentencing). 2021“A sentencing issue may be preserved by objecting at the punishment hearing, or when the sentence is pronounced.” Burt, 396 S.W.3d at 577 (citing Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). | 11 | 11 |
Mercado v. Stategreen2 sentences2024App. 1996) (holding that complaint of cruel and unusual punishment under Texas constitution was waived because defendant presented his argument for the first time on appeal); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144 , 151–52 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant failed to object to his sentence at the punishment hearing or to complain about it in his motion for new trial, he failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint that the punishment assessed was “grossly disproportionate and oppressive”); see also Mercado, 718 S.W.2d at 296 (stating that as a general r 2024App. 1996) (holding that complaint of cruel and unusual punishment under Texas constitution was waived because defendant presented his argument for the first time on appeal); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144 , 151–52 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant failed to object to his sentence at the punishment hearing or to complain about it in his motion for new trial, he failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint that the punishment assessed was “grossly disproportionate and oppressive”); see also Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. | 11 | 11 |
Ex Parte Richgreen2 sentences2024P. 47.1. 6 See Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“In cases in which a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without the benefit of a plea bargain and the trial judge assesses a punishment not authorized by law, the appropriate remedy is to allow the finding of guilt to remain and to remand the case for a new punishment hearing.”); see also TEX. 2009Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. (footnote: 1) See Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d at 513 (stating that when there is error at the punishment phase, the case may be remanded for the proper assessment of punishment). | 10 | 13 |
Euler v. Stategreen2 sentences2025As explained in Hardeman, “Issa did not stand for a general right to a separate punishment hearing, much less one on a different day.” Euler, 218 S.W.3d at 92 (discussing Hardeman); see also Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176 , 177–78 (Tex. Crim. 2025Accordingly, 4 trial court does not violate due process by conducting a unitary revocation proceeding because there is no “general right to a separate punishment hearing.” 3 Euler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 88 , 92– 93 (Tex. Crim. | 9 | 14 |
Anders v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019The record before us show that without the benefit of a plea agreement, Capetillo pleaded guilty in 2017 to the crime of evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle, a third-degree felony. 3 During a punishment hearing, the State proved and the trial court found that Capetillo has a 1988 felony conviction for armed robbery. 4 The trial court then sentenced Capetillo to seven years’ imprisonment.5 After reviewing the appellate record and the Anders brief filed by Capetillo’s counsel, we agree with counsel’s determination that Capetillo cannot raise any 2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 2014At the conclusion of the punishment hearing for the failure to register offense, the trial court dismissed the jury and called the parties for the hearing on the State’s motion 3 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. | 9 | 14 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013On this record, we cannot conclude that, had appellant’s counsel performed the complained-of actions at the punishment hearing, there is “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different.” See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812 . 2011Given that a silent record ordinarily will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance, we will review Martinez‘s appellate complaint to determine whether trial counsel‘s alleged failure to present any mitigating evidence during the punishment hearing was ―so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.‖ See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 533 ; Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392 ; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 . | 9 | 12 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Young v. State, 922 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd) (case reversed for a new punishment hearing where the jury failed to include a mandatory fine when assessing the defendant’s punishment). 2007See Young v. State , 922 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Tex. App. C Beaumont 1996, pet. ref = d) (case reversed for a new punishment hearing where the jury failed to include a mandatory fine when assessing the defendant = s punishment). | 9 | 9 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020According to Ward, although the gravity of the offense to which he pleaded guilty is “very serious in the harm to [L.H.]” and Ward has three prior convictions for driving while intoxicated, his treating oncologist “testified at the punishment hearing that confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice is effectively a death sentence because Appellant has been diagnosed with cancer and if left untreated, will cause Appellant’s death.” In reviewing a trial court’s sentencing determination, we afford the trial court “a great deal of discretion[.]” See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 81 2017See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322 (reviewing for an abuse of discretion when the trial court granted a new punishment hearing based on a claim of grossly disproportionate sen *569 tence); see also Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. | 8 | 10 |
| Trevino v. Stategreen | 8 | 8 |
Noland v. Stategreen2 sentences2024App. 1996) (holding that complaint of cruel and unusual punishment under Texas constitution was waived because defendant presented his argument for the first time on appeal); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144 , 151–52 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant failed to object to his sentence at the punishment hearing or to complain about it in his motion for new trial, he failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint that the punishment assessed was “grossly disproportionate and oppressive”); see also Mercado, 718 S.W.2d at 296 (stating that as a general r 2024App. 1996) (holding that complaint of cruel and unusual punishment under Texas constitution was waived because defendant presented his argument for the first time on appeal); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144 , 151–52 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant failed to object to his sentence at the punishment hearing or to complain about it in his motion for new trial, he failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint that the punishment assessed was “grossly disproportionate and oppressive”); see also Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. | 7 | 18 |
Russell v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (appellant failed to preserve error as to restitution amount by failing to object at the punishment hearing to amount of restitution sought by the prosecution); Russell v. State, 341 S.W.3d 526 , 527-28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (appellant failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint when he did not object at sentencing). 2019App. 2002) (holding that appellant failed to preserve error as to restitution amount by failing to object at the punishment hearing to amount of restitution sought by the prosecution); Russell v. State, 341 S.W.3d 526 , 527–28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (reasoning that appellant failed to preserve Eighth Amendment complaint when he did not object at sentencing). | 7 | 9 |
| Hernandez v. Stategreen | 7 | 8 |
| Ex Parte Hillgreen | 7 | 8 |
| Wynn v. Stategreen | 7 | 7 |
Barfield v. Stategreen2 sentences2025In a unitary proceeding, the trial court’s decision “is not fixed until it renders judgment on guilt and punishment after all the evidence and arguments have been heard.”4 Barfield, 63 S.W.3d at 451 . 2015App. Houston 14th Dist. 1998 no pet.), not designated for publication, holding that the defendant waived the issue as to the admission of an unsworn stipulation in support of a plea of guilty under Article 1.15. 17 guilty evidence at the punishment hearing may be used to support the plea of guilty and Brooks, supra. See also Barfield v. State, 63 S.W.3d 446 (Tx. | 6 | 10 |
Andrews v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 104 ; see also TEX. 2015Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To obtain a reversal based on harm from counsel’s deficient performance at punishment, an appellant must show that “a reasonable probability [exists] that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the punishment hearing would have been different.” See Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101, 103 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 9 |
Russeau v. Stategreen2 sentences2013In Russeau , the State introduced into evidence at the defendant’s punishment hearing “incident reports” from the Smith County Jail and “disciplinary reports” from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. 171 S.W.3d at 880 . 2011Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 9 |
| Solis v. Stategreen | 6 | 7 |
| Manuel v. Stategreen | 6 | 7 |
| Whitney v. Stategreen | 6 | 6 |
| Pelache v. Statered | 6 | 6 |
| Nirschl v. Stategreen | 6 | 6 |
Almanza v. Statered2 sentences2021CONCURRING OPINION I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the defect in the punishment-phase jury instructions here constituted ordinary charge error, such that the error is subject to a harm analysis under Almanza 1 before reversal and a new punishment hearing is appropriate. 1 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. 2021Thus, we find the charge failed to sequence the 2012 conviction properly because it did not require the jury to find that he committed the underlying offense relevant to his conviction in 2012 on a finding that he committed that offense after his conviction on one or more of the felonies he incurred in 2006 became final. 35 When there is error in the charge, the reviewing court must determine whether the defendant was harmed.36 And the degree of harm needed before the defendant is entitled to a new punishment hearing depends on whether the error in the charge was properly preserved in the tria | 5 | 11 |
Levy v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“In cases in which a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without the benefit of a plea bargain and the trial judge assesses a punishment not authorized by law, the appropriate remedy is to allow the finding of guilt to remain and to remand the case for a new punishment hearing.” Id. (citing -2- 04-25-00079-CR Levy, 818 S.W.2d at 803 ); see also Adair v. State, 673 S.W.3d 348 , 350 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2023, no pet.) (holding that appellant’s sentence was illegal because it was outside the range of punishment, and remanding the cause for a new punishment hearing w 2026“In cases in which a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without the benefit of a plea bargain and the trial judge assesses a punishment not authorized by law, the appropriate remedy is to allow the finding of guilt to remain and to remand the case for a new punishment hearing.” Id. (citing -2- 04-25-00079-CR Levy, 818 S.W.2d at 803 ); see also Adair v. State, 673 S.W.3d 348 , 350 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2023, no pet.) (holding that appellant’s sentence was illegal because it was outside the range of punishment, and remanding the cause for a new punishment hearing w | 5 | 10 |
| Kim v. Stategreen | 5 | 8 |
| Thornton, Gregorygreen | 5 | 8 |
| Pelache v. Stategreen | 5 | 8 |
| McNew v. Stategreen | 5 | 8 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Penry v. Lynaugh red | 6 | 2004–2010 |
| Jackson v. State green | 6 | 1996–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.