punishment violation in Illinois

2007Because the penalty is imposed “as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the State.” Williams, 251 U.S. at 66 , 64 L.

2007Because the penalty is imposed “as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the State.” Williams, 251 U.S. at 66 , 64 L.

1998Historically Regarded as Punishment The defendant cites Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), in support of his contention that the sex offender registration and notification requirements traditionally have been viewed as punishment.

1998Historically Regarded as Punishment The defendant cites Doe v. Pataki , 940 F. Supp. 603 (1996), in support of his contention that the sex offender registration and notification requirements traditionally have been viewed as punishment.

1996(Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186 , 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 .) Punitive damages are designed as a punishment and as a warning and example to deter the defendant and others from committing similar offenses in the future.

1996(Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186 , 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 .) Punitive damages are designed as a punishment and as a warning and example to deter the defendant and others from committing similar offenses in the future.

1993(People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 501, 535 , 578 N.E.2d 952, 967 .) Accordingly, even if counsel’s performance was somehow deficient, there was no indication defendant would have received a different punishment had defense counsel presented mitigating evidence.

1993(People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 501, 535 , 578 N.E.2d 952, 967 .) Accordingly, even if counsel’s performance was somehow deficient, there was no indication defendant would have received a different punishment had defense counsel presented mitigating evidence.

1992The Court concluded: “[Ujnder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” (Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 , 104 L.

1992The Court concluded: “[Ujnder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” (Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 , 104 L.

1970(People v. Curtin, 44 Ill.2d 507 ; People v. Hurst, 42 Ill.2d 217 .) The sentence imposed here was within the term provided by statute.

1970(People v. Curtin, 44 Ill.2d 507 ; People v. Hurst, 42 Ill.2d 217 .) The sentence imposed here was within the term provided by statute.

1934(People v. Phipps, 268 Ill. 210 ; People v. Casey, 231 id. 261 ; Nordgren v. People, 211 id. 425.) In a case of the character before us, where the jury is permitted to fix the punishment and where the defense is insanity,, it is important that the jury hear all evidence which might produce the condition sought to be established by the defense.

1934(People v. Phipps, 268 Ill. 210 ; People v. Casey, 231 id. 261 ; Nordgren v. People, 211 id. 425.) In a case of the character before us, where the jury is permitted to fix the punishment and where the defense is insanity,, it is important that the jury hear all evidence which might produce the condition sought to be established by the defense.

1927People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23 ; People v. Berglin, 309 Ill. 488 ; People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592 .

1927People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23 ; People v. Berglin, 309 Ill. 488 ; People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592 .

1927People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23 ; People v. Berglin, 309 Ill. 488 ; People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592 .

1917In the case of Diversey v. Smith, 103 Ill. 378 , this court adopted the definition in Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, that a penal statute is one which imposes a forfeiture or a penalty for tratisgressing its provisions or for doing a thing prohibited, and then said: “It is the effect—not the form— of the statute that is to be considered, and when its object is clearly to inflict a punishment upon a party for violating it,—i. e., doing what is prohibited or failing to do what is commanded to be done,—it is penal in its character, and the circumstance that in punishing, remedy is likewise afforde

1917In the case of Diversey v. Smith, 103 Ill. 378 , this court adopted the definition in Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, that a penal statute is one which imposes a forfeiture or a penalty for tratisgressing its provisions or for doing a thing prohibited, and then said: “It is the effect—not the form— of the statute that is to be considered, and when its object is clearly to inflict a punishment upon a party for violating it,—i. e., doing what is prohibited or failing to do what is commanded to be done,—it is penal in its character, and the circumstance that in punishing, remedy is likewise afforde

1916It is therefore penal in its character.” In Hale’s Private Corporations, 162, the author says: “But since section 18 is interpreted as penal, the two year statute of limitations applies to all actions based upon it. * * *” In Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill. 489 , the court adopted the language in Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, where the text writer says: “A penal statute is one which imposes a forfeiture or penalty for transgressing its provisions or for doing a thing prohibited.