50 California opinions name it 4 courts 1925–2023 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bouzasgreen2 sentences2015The Supreme Court has held that section 666 “is a sentence- enhancing statute, not a substantive ‘offense’ statute.” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 479 (Bouzas).) Included in title 16 of the Penal Code, “which is directed primarily to sentencing and punishment” (Bouzas, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 478 ), section 666 “is structured to enhance the punishment for violation of other defined crimes and not to define an offense in the first instance. 2015The Supreme Court has held that section 666 “is a sentence- enhancing statute, not a substantive ‘offense’ statute.” (People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 479 (Bouzas).) Included in title 16 of the Penal Code, “which is directed primarily to sentencing and punishment” (Bouzas, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 478 ), section 666 “is structured to enhance the punishment for violation of other defined crimes and not to define an offense in the first instance. | 3 | 7 |
People v. Malfavongreen2 sentences2023(People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-738, 740-741 (Malfavon); People v. Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660; see People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 398-399 [rejecting equal protection challenge]; People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 854-857 [rejecting cruel and unusual punishment challenge].)4 Defendant acknowledges the cases rejecting his position but argues they should not be followed. 2023(See, e.g., People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 738-741 [because child abuse homicide and murder are separate crimes, there was no constitutional reason why the Legislature could not define a new homicide crime without the element of malice and set a 25-year-to-life penalty for such crime] (Malfavon); People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 399 [element of care and custody creates a “meaningful distinction” between child abuse homicide and murder]; Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 659-660 .) Defendant, however, argues section 273ab has remained “static” despite changes in the | 2 | 2 |
People v. Basutagreen2 sentences2023(People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-738, 740-741 (Malfavon); People v. Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660; see People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 398-399 [rejecting equal protection challenge]; People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 854-857 [rejecting cruel and unusual punishment challenge].)4 Defendant acknowledges the cases rejecting his position but argues they should not be followed. 2023(See, e.g., People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 738-741 [because child abuse homicide and murder are separate crimes, there was no constitutional reason why the Legislature could not define a new homicide crime without the element of malice and set a 25-year-to-life penalty for such crime] (Malfavon); People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 399 [element of care and custody creates a “meaningful distinction” between child abuse homicide and murder]; Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 659-660 .) Defendant, however, argues section 273ab has remained “static” despite changes in the | 2 | 2 |
City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc.green2 sentences2014Inland Empire also summarily rejected in a footnote any notion the ban impinged on sick patients’ due process rights or constitutional right to travel by concluding the right of cities and counties to reject a “‘one size fits all’” local distribution plan in the MMP would not “so impede the ability of transient citizens to obtain access to medical marijuana . . . .” (Inland Empire, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 756, fn. 10 .) Finally, QPA’s assertion the city improperly “amended” the MMP is misplaced. 2014Inland Empire also summarily rejected in a footnote any notion the ban impinged on sick patients’ due process rights or constitutional right to travel by concluding the right of cities and counties to reject a “‘one size fits all’” local distribution plan in the MMP would not “so impede the ability of transient citizens to obtain access to medical marijuana . . . .” (Inland Empire, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 756, fn. 10 .) Finally, QPA’s assertion the city improperly “amended” the MMP is misplaced. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Murphygreen2 sentences2007Subdivision (a) sets out the elements of the crime of stalking. [8] Subdivisions (b) and (c), after referring to subdivision (a), focus on `""the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such ... perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for [stalking].' [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Wallace, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 [penalties under one and three strikes laws (§§ 667, 667.71) depend on fact of the defendant's recidivism, 2007Subdivision (a) sets out the elements of the crime of stalking. [8] Subdivisions (b) and (c), after referring to subdivision (a), focus on `""the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such ... perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for [stalking].' [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Wallace, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 [penalties under one and three strikes laws (§§ 667, 667.71) depend on fact of the defendant's recidivism, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Tardygreen2 sentences2007Subdivision (a) sets out the elements of the crime of stalking. [8] Subdivisions (b) and (c), after referring to subdivision (a), focus on `""the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such ... perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for [stalking].' [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Wallace, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 [penalties under one and three strikes laws (§§ 667, 667.71) depend on fact of the defendant's recidivism, 2007Subdivision (a) sets out the elements of the crime of stalking. [8] Subdivisions (b) and (c), after referring to subdivision (a), focus on `""the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such ... perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for [stalking].' [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Wallace, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 [penalties under one and three strikes laws (§§ 667, 667.71) depend on fact of the defendant's recidivism, | 2 | 2 |
People v. Beamongreen2 sentences1976(See fn. 4, ante. ) Therefore, its execution *23 must be stayed. ( People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 640 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 681 , 504 P.2d 905 ]; see In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 763 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ].) The judgment is modified by adding the italicized language to the following two sentences: (1) "The court orders that as to Count VI, being a felon in possession of a firearm, violation of section 12021 of the Penal Code, the defendant is sentenced to the State Prison of the State of C 1976(See fn. 4, ante. ) Therefore, its execution *23 must be stayed. ( People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 640 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 681 , 504 P.2d 905 ]; see In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 763 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ].) The judgment is modified by adding the italicized language to the following two sentences: (1) "The court orders that as to Count VI, being a felon in possession of a firearm, violation of section 12021 of the Penal Code, the defendant is sentenced to the State Prison of the State of C | 2 | 2 |
In re Wrightgreen2 sentences1970However, the Legislature has prescribed the punishment for a violation of section 217 to be “imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than fourteen years,” while it has made a violation of section 12021 “punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding 15 years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or by both.” (Italics added.) At the trial level, it would have been possible to make the section 217 violation the greater offense for purposes of punishment by the court imposing a misdemeanor sentence on 1970However, the Legislature has prescribed the punishment for a violation of section 217 to be "imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than fourteen years," while it has made a violation of section 12021 "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding 15 years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or by both." (Italics added.) At the trial level, it would have been possible to make the section 217 violation the greater offense for purposes of punishment by the court imposing a misdemeanor sentence on | 2 | 2 |
Neal v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1966The rule against multiple *791 prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible. ’ (Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) Thus, the punishment clause of section 654 does not apply when a single act of violence causes injury to several persons. 1966The rule against multiple *791 prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible. ’ (Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) Thus, the punishment clause of section 654 does not apply when a single act of violence causes injury to several persons. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Demaragreen2 sentences2003We reject the argument for the reasons stated in People v. Demara (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 455 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 ], Penal Code section 666.5 does not define a new offense, but simply increases the punishment for violation of section 10851, subdivision (a) by a recidivist. 2003We reject the argument for the reasons stated in People v. Demara (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 455 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 ], Penal Code section 666.5 does not define a new offense, but simply increases the punishment for violation of section 10851, subdivision (a) by a recidivist. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2023(People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-738, 740-741 (Malfavon); People v. Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660; see People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 398-399 [rejecting equal protection challenge]; People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 854-857 [rejecting cruel and unusual punishment challenge].)4 Defendant acknowledges the cases rejecting his position but argues they should not be followed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rhodesgreen1 sentence2023(Ibid.; see People v. Rhodes (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1385 .) Thus, we found it “immaterial that the punishment for a violation of section 273ab is the same as first degree murder.” (Norman, at p. 228.) Other courts, facing similar challenges, have reached the same conclusion. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Watsongreen1 sentence2021The defendant argued that his conduct was punishable only under a special statute, Business and Professions Code former section 7030 [citation], which made it a misdemeanor to ‘conspire[ ] with another person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter.’ Th[e Supreme Court] agreed. [The Supreme Court] explained, ‘To conclude that the punishment for the violation of section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code is stated in section 182 of 13 the Penal Code, which deals with conspiracies in general, would be inconsistent with the designation of the particular conspiracy as a misdemeanor | 1 | 1 |
People v. Murphygreen1 sentence2021The defendant argued that his conduct was punishable only under a special statute, Business and Professions Code former section 7030 [citation], which made it a misdemeanor to ‘conspire[ ] with another person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter.’ Th[e Supreme Court] agreed. [The Supreme Court] explained, ‘To conclude that the punishment for the violation of section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code is stated in section 182 of 13 the Penal Code, which deals with conspiracies in general, would be inconsistent with the designation of the particular conspiracy as a misdemeanor | 1 | 1 |
Thurston v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2020If [an officeholder] violate[s] any duty imposed upon him as an incumbent of the office . . . during a former term the law furnishes a mode or modes for his punishment; but to remove him from an office to which he has been subsequently elected is not the punishment for such violation of duty prescribed by any law of this state.” (Thurston v. Clark (1895) 107 Cal. 285, 288 (Thurston).) Thurston, however, has no relevance to quo warranto proceedings; the officeholder in Thurston faced removal under a former Penal Code statute repealed in 1929. 2020(Thurston, supra, 107 Cal. at p. 287 .) That statute permitted removal of an officeholder for misconduct in office, and construed strictly as a 26 penal statute, the Thurston court concluded this “in office” language must be understood to permit removal only while serving the term during which the misconduct occurred. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2016“A term of life with the possibility of parole does not have a minimum determinate term of seven years; rather, a person sentenced to such a term first becomes eligible for parole in seven years. (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).)” (People v. Robinson (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 69, 72, fn. 3 .) Therefore, we modify defendant’s sentence for counts 1, 8, 13, and 25, to life with the possibility of parole. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
The People v. McCallgreen1 sentence2014Our Supreme Court held the specific statute controlled over the general one because, “To conclude that the punishment for the violation of section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code is stated in section 182 of the Penal Code, which deals with conspiracies in general, would be inconsistent with the designation of the particular conspiracy as a misdemeanor.” (Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 655 ; see People v. McCall (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012-1013 [ 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 471 ].) 4. | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Eddie M.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Brightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Simongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Tartargreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Vogelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bustamantegreen | 1 | 1 |
| UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel CRETACCI, Defendant-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Serfass v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Drucker v. State Board of Medical Examinersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Farinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Venegasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McFarlandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Williamson
green
2 sentences2021We explained, ‘To conclude that the punishment for the violation of section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code is stated in section 182 of the Penal Code, which deals with conspiracies in general, would be inconsistent with the designation of the particular conspiracy as a misdemeanor.’ (Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 655 ; see also People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 481, [prosecution for theft barred by special statute prohibiting use of false statement to obtain welfare, because ‘any conduct which violated [the welfare fraud statute] would also constitute a violation of the 2021We explained, ‘To conclude that the punishment for the violation of section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code is stated in section 182 of the Penal Code, which deals with conspiracies in general, would be inconsistent with the designation of the particular conspiracy as a misdemeanor.’ (Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 655 ; see also People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 481, [prosecution for theft barred by special statute prohibiting use of false statement to obtain welfare, because ‘any conduct which violated [the welfare fraud statute] would also constitute a violation of the | 6 | 1968–2021 |
PEOPLR v. Albritton
green
2 sentences2023(See, e.g., People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 738-741 [because child abuse homicide and murder are separate crimes, there was no constitutional reason why the Legislature could not define a new homicide crime without the element of malice and set a 25-year-to-life penalty for such crime] (Malfavon); People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 399 [element of care and custody creates a “meaningful distinction” between child abuse homicide and murder]; Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 659-660 .) Defendant, however, argues section 273ab has remained “static” despite changes in the 2023(See, e.g., People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 738-741 [because child abuse homicide and murder are separate crimes, there was no constitutional reason why the Legislature could not define a new homicide crime without the element of malice and set a 25-year-to-life penalty for such crime] (Malfavon); People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 399 [element of care and custody creates a “meaningful distinction” between child abuse homicide and murder]; Albritton, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 659-660 .) Defendant, however, argues section 273ab has remained “static” despite changes in the | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Norman
green
2 sentences2015The Legislature exercised its prerogative in selecting the range of punishment, and there is no principle of law that precludes the same punishment for different crimes." (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 228 .) Furthermore, section 273ab is not a murder statute; it is a child abuse homicide statute. 2015The Legislature exercised its prerogative in selecting the range of punishment, and there is no principle of law that precludes the same punishment for different crimes." (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 228 .) Cruz also argues that the sentence imposed by section 237ab violates principles of the merger doctrine because it imposes a life sentence for an assault. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Wallace
green
2 sentences2007Subdivision (a) sets out the elements of the crime of stalking. [8] Subdivisions (b) and (c), after referring to subdivision (a), focus on `""the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such ... perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for [stalking].' [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Wallace, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 [penalties under one and three strikes laws (§§ 667, 667.71) depend on fact of the defendant's recidivism, 2007Subdivision (a) sets out the elements of the crime of stalking. [8] Subdivisions (b) and (c), after referring to subdivision (a), focus on `""the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such ... perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for [stalking].' [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Wallace, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324 ; see also People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 [penalties under one and three strikes laws (§§ 667, 667.71) depend on fact of the defendant's recidivism, | 2 | 2007–2007 |
In Re Maston
green
2 sentences1976Recently this court had occasion to consider a constitutional attack upon the punishment for violation of section 209 with bodily harm identical to that maintained in the present appeal. ( In re Maston (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 559 [ 109 Cal. Rptr. 164 ], hg. den.) Applying the criteria announced in In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], we rejected the constitutional challenge. 1976Recently this court had occasion to consider a constitutional attack upon the punishment for violation of section 209 with bodily harm identical to that maintained in the present appeal. ( In re Maston (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 559 [ 109 Cal. Rptr. 164 ], hg. den.) Applying the criteria announced in In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], we rejected the constitutional challenge. | 2 | 1976–1976 |
In Re Lynch
red
2 sentences1976Recently this court had occasion to consider a constitutional attack upon the punishment for violation of section 209 with bodily harm identical to that maintained in the present appeal. ( In re Maston (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 559 [ 109 Cal. Rptr. 164 ], hg. den.) Applying the criteria announced in In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], we rejected the constitutional challenge. 1976Recently this court had occasion to consider a constitutional attack upon the punishment for violation of section 209 with bodily harm identical to that maintained in the present appeal. ( In re Maston (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 559 [ 109 Cal. Rptr. 164 ], hg. den.) Applying the criteria announced in In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], we rejected the constitutional challenge. | 2 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516 .) California’s constitutional proscription against cruel or unusual punishment “does not require California to march in lockstep with other states in fashioning a penal code. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Lopez
green
1 sentence2022The punishment for a violation of subdivision (d) is three, five, or seven years of imprisonment. (§ 626.9, subd. (f)(3).) 5 An offense can also be determined to be a necessarily included offense under “the accusatory pleading test.” Under this test, “a lesser offense is included within the greater charged offense ‘“if the charging allegations of the accusatory pleading include language describing the offense in such a way that if committed as specified the lesser offense is necessarily committed.”’” (People v. Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 288-289.) 12 Here, the elements for the offense of | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Moses
green
1 sentence2019Here, the People pursued defendant’s conviction under the Attempted Act Prong of the statute — the prong that has generated confusion and the interpretation of which results in our departure from the reasoning of our colleagues in Shields, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 1242 and the majority opinion in Moses, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 757 , review granted. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Shields
green
2 sentences2019Here, the People pursued defendant’s conviction under the Attempted Act Prong of the statute — the prong that has generated confusion and the interpretation of which results in our departure from the reasoning of our colleagues in Shields, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 1242 and the majority opinion in Moses, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 757 , review granted. 2019Here, the People pursued defendant’s conviction under the Attempted Act Prong of the statute — the prong that has generated confusion and the interpretation of which results in our departure from the reasoning of our colleagues in Shields, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 1242 and the majority opinion in Moses, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 757 , review granted. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Breverman
green
2 sentences2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the 2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Flannel
red
2 sentences2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the 2017Because attempted rescue is a lesser included offense of an attempted violation of section 405a, the trial court was required to instruct on attempted rescue if the evidence raised " 'a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present,' and there was evidence that 'the offense was less than that charged.' " ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ( Breverman ).) To warrant instruction, the evidence that a defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense must merely be " 'substantial enough to merit consideration' by the | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Tufunga
green
1 sentence2015It simply refers to other substantive offenses defined elsewhere in the Penal and Vehicle Codes and provides that if a defendant has previously been convicted of and imprisoned for any of these theft-related offenses, and thereafter commits petty theft (defined in section 484), the defendant is subject to punishment enhanced over that which would apply following a ‘first time’ petty theft conviction.” (Id. at pp. 478-479.) Put another way, “[s]ection 666 operates like the Three Strikes law . . .; it does not establish an enhancement, but establishes an alternate and elevated penalty for a pett | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Fiene green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Alvarez green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Welgoss v. End green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Pierson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Muhammad neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In Re Claude J. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Eric J. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Corey green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Arreola-Ramos green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. Renato Torres green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. Frank L. Baird green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. George H. Ruth green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Hoopa Valley Tribe green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Angeloni green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Heller v. Norcal Mutual Life Insurance green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Hernandez green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Owen v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Hicks green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| People v. Swann green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| People v. Houston green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| People v. Carillo green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Lanzetta v. New Jersey green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| People v. Frese neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Ex parte Stephen green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| In Re Schiaffino neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.